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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Christianity and the Challenge of the World Religions 
In recent decades, the variety and vitality of the world religions have become newly 
apparent to Western Christians. Factors such as the availability of rapid travel and 
communications, changing patterns in immigration, and international trade and business 
have brought unprecedented numbers of Christians into first-hand acquaintance with the 
followers, beliefs, and practices of non-Christian religions. This encounter has given a 
sense of urgency to questions that previously had not often been asked: Do other religions 
know the same God? Do they look toward the same goal? Where their teachings 
resemble those of the Christian faith, then do they share to some extent in the truth? If 
their teachings are quite different from those of the Christian faith, then are these 
differences important? What will be the final destiny of those who never have had the 
opportunity to hear the Gospel of Jesus Christ? Can God really condemn them, especially 
if they have sought, as best they can, to order their lives according to and put their hope in 
some ultimate reality? 
A new area of Christian theological study has emerged in response to the challenges 
that the awareness of religious plurality poses: the "theology of religions." The scientific 
study of religion (Religionswissenschaft) seeks a disinterested course of investigation. Its 
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aim, as Max Muller put it, is "an impartial and truly scientific comparison of all, or at all 
events, of the most important religions of mankind."' A theology of religions, however, 
pursues an understanding and evaluation of the non-Christian religious communities from 
a Christian standpoint, interpreting them, not on a supposedly neutral basis, but on the 
basis of the Christian faith. 
Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism 
The field of the theology of religions has its own variety and vitality. In coming to 
terms with this variety, it has become usual to distinguish different theologies of religions 
with the threefold typology of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism.' 
'F. Max Muller, Introduction to the Science of Religion (London, 1873), 34; quoted in Eric J. 
Sharpe, Comparative Religion: A History, 2d ed. (LaSalle, Illinois: Open Court, 1986), 1. 
'See, for example, Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian 
Theology of Religions, 2d. ed. (London: SCM Press Ltd; and Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 
1993); Gavin D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism (London: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1986); John 
Hick, A Christian Theology ofReligions: The Rainbow ofFaiths (Louisville: Westminster John Knox 
Press, 1995), 18-30; and Paul F. Knitter, One Earth Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue and Global 
Responsibility, preface by Hans Kfing (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1995). David J. Bosch 
makes the same distinctions but with different terms (exclusivism, fulfillment, and relativism) in 
Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology ofMission, American Society of Missiology, No. 
16 (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 478-483. 
The terms "exclusiveness" and "inclusiveness" as descriptions of Christian attitudes toward other 
religions were used more than twenty years before by noted historian of religion and mission theologian 
Hendrik Kraemer in World Cultures and World Religions (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), 
363-364. In his book The Intrareligious Dialogue (New York and Ramsey, New Jersey: Paulist Press, 
1978), Raimundo Panikkar categorized Christian attitudes toward other religions under the four headings 
of exclusivism, inclusivism, parallelism, and pluralism (see pp. xiv-xxviii). 
In the theology of religions, the term "pluralism" has two different meanings. Sometimes it is used as 
a description. For instance, Willem A. Visser 't Hooft defines pluralism as "a situation in which various 
religious, philosophical or ideological conceptions live side by side and in which none of them holds a 
privileged status" ("Pluralism—Temptation or Opportunity?" Ecumenical Review 18 [1966]: 129). 
"Pluralism," however, is also used to refer to a theological position that maintains that other religions may 
be equally valid ways of salvation. To avoid confusion, I shall use the term "plurality" for descriptive 
purposes, and reserve the use of "pluralism" for the theological position. Where quotations use 
"pluralism" to describe the situation of numerical plurality, either the context will make this clear, or I 
shall note it. 
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Exclusivism maintains Jesus Christ is the sole mediator of salvation and that this 
salvation is made available only through the Christian religion. Salvation is found only in 
the Christian religion; no other religion leads to it. Exclusivism has been the predominant 
attitude of the Christian church for much of its history and clearly can be traced to the 
New Testament.3 As Alan Race puts it: 
Not even the most detached reader of the New Testament can fail to gain the 
impression that the overall picture of Christian faith which it presents is intended to be 
absolute or final. It is indicated in general themes and by specific texts. With regard 
to the latter, the ones which most readily spring to mind are the words of Peter in Acts 
4.12: 'And there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven 
given among men by which we must be saved,' and the words attributed to Jesus in 
the Fourth Gospel in John 14.6: 'I am the way, and the truth, and the life; no one 
comes to the Father, but by me.' The negative evaluation which these two texts 
suggest is hard to ignore.' 
In subsequent centuries exclusivism has been part of the Church's confession.' Today, 
while it is often questioned and attacked, exclusivism is still held in many quarters, with 
the so-called "conservative evangelicals" perhaps being its most widely recognized 
defenders.6 
'For example, this attitude is clearly articulated in the Athanasian Creed. 
'Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 10. 
'See also below, 187-188, for specifically Lutheran considerations of an exclusivist nature. 
6See, for example, see the Frankfurt Declaration and the Lausanne Covenant. On the importance of 
evangelicals for the exclusivist position, see Knitter, No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian 
Attitudes Toward the World Religions, American Society of Missiology Series, no. 7 (Matylcnoll, New 
York: Orbis Books, 1985), 75. By their own admission, evangelicals have been slow to engage the 
problems raised both by religious plurality and the variety of Christian responses to the other. For 
summaries of evangelical perspectives, see Waldron Scott, "No Other Name—An Evangelical 
Conviction," in Christ's Lordship and Religious Pluralism, ed. Gerald H. Anderson and Thomas F. 
Stransky (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1981); 58-74; Through No Fault of their Own? ed. 
Crockett and Sigountos; and One God, One Lord:• Christianity in a World of Religious Pluralism, ed. 
Andrew D. Clarke and Bruce W. Winter, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1992). Statements 
of exclusivism from the evangelical perspective that engage other positions and their objections to 
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Inclusivism agrees with exclusivism that salvation is found only Jesus Christ, but, 
unlike exclusivism, it contends that this salvation is extended to non-Christians through 
their religions. In other words, it affirms "the salvific presence of God in non-Christian 
religions while still maintaining that Christ is the definitive and authoritative revelation of 
God."' Inclusivists view Christianity as the fulfillment of all religions; it stands in a 
complementary rather than adversarial relationship to the religions. 
Perhaps the most influential inclusivist account has been Karl Rainier's so-called 
"anonymous Christian" theory.' For Rainier, the starting point for Christian reflection on 
other religions was Christianity as the absolute religion; beside it, no religion can rightly 
claim equal status. Unlike exclusivists, however, he held that non-Christian religions 
possessed not only a natural knowledge of God but elements of grace. Thus Christian 
theology must ask other religions what part they play in the divine economy of salvation. 
Similarly, Christians should regard the follower of other religions not as a "mere non-
Christian" but as "someone who can and must be regarded in this or that respect as an 
anonymous Christian."' In view of this, the missionary task of the Church is to bring them 
to an explicit consciousness of what God has already given them. 
Pluralism, unlike both exclusivism and inclusivism, "maintains that other religions are 
exclusivism include Harold A. Netland, Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of 
Truth (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991); and Ronald H. Nash, Is Jesus 
the Only Savior? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994). 
7D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, 80. 
8Karl Miner, "Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions," in Theological Reflections, vol. 5, 
trans. K. Kruger (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), 115-134. 
Ibid., 131. 
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equally salvific paths to the one God, and Christianity's claim that it is the only path 
(exclusivism), or the fulfillment of other paths (inclusivism) should be rejected for good 
theological and phenomenological reasons."' The foremost proponent of pluralism is 
John Hick. He has long urged a "Copernican revolution in theology" which involves "a 
paradigm shift from a Christianity-centered or Jesus-centered to a God-centered model of 
the universe of faiths. One then sees the great world religions as different human 
responses to the one divine Reality, embodying different perceptions which have been 
formed in different historical and cultural circumstances."' He contends that the world 
religions share a common soteriological conception in their different doctrines about 
salvation or enlightenment or liberation. Whether the ultimate reality is viewed as 
personal or impersonal, all of them involve "the transformation of human existence from 
self-centredness to Reality-centredness."2 
The acceptance of pluralism has been helped by increasing dissatisfaction with other 
Christian attitudes: 
Many Christians . . . are recognizing the inadequacy of traditional values that exclude 
other religions by insisting that there is no salvation outside the Church or the kerygma 
and that Christianity is the only site of revelation and salvation; but neither are many of 
1°D'Costa, Theology and Religious Pluralism, 22. 
"John Hick, God Has Many Names (London: Macmillan, 1980), 131. See also Hick, God and the 
Universe of Faiths (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973). More recently Hick has refined his argument; 
now instead of referring to the ultimate reality as "God" he speaks of it as the "Real," and he has put his 
scheme on detailed philosophical and phenomenological bases. See especially John Hick, An 
Interpretation of Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988), which is based on his 1986-87 
Gifford Lectures, and A Christian Theology of Religions. See also Hick, "Straightening the Record: 
Some Response to Critics," Modern Theology 6 (1990): 187-195, in which, as the title suggests, he 
answers criticisms raised by his critics, including charges of inconsistency over his use of the term "God." 
An Interpretation of Religion, 36. 
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these same Christians satisified with the more modern, liberal views (developed 
especially at the Second Vatican Council and in the WCC) which recognize the value 
of other religions as ways of experiencing God but which then insist that this value 
originates from Christ and must be included and fulfilled in him and his church. And 
so, more and more Christians and Christian theologians feel the need to explore a 
pluralist approach to other faiths—one that recognizes the possible independent 
validity and "rough parity" of other religious paths.°  
Three basic reasons stand behind the growing acceptance of pluralism." The first is 
historical consciousness—"the ever more impelling awareness of the historico-cultural 
limitation of all knowledge and religious beliefs, and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 
judging the truth claims of another culture or religion on the basis of one's own."' 
Pluralism insists that truth, including religious truth, is always finite and conditioned by 
historical situations. Therefore, it is necessary that Christians give up claims of being the 
only or the highest form of religion.' The second reason is a religious consciousness that 
considers divine reality and truth always greater than any person or religion can 
comprehend. If historical consciousness tells us that truth is finite, religious consciousness 
tells us that "the object or content of authentic religious experience is infinite—Mystery 
beyond all forms, exceeding our every grasp. The infinity and ineffability of God-Mystery 
demands religious pluralism and forbids any one religion from having the 'only' or 'final' 
"Paul F. Knitter, "The Pluralist Move and Its Critics," The Drew Gateway 58 (1988): 2. 
"Paul F. Knitter, "Preface," in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology 
ofReligions, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter (Marylcnoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1986), ix-xi. 
"Knitter, "Preface," ix. 
"Ibid. See also Gordon D. Kaufman, "Religious Diversity, Historical Consciousness, and Christian 
Theology," in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, 3-15, and Knitter, "The Pluralist Move,"3-4. 
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word."' The third reason is ethical: "The need to promote justice becomes . . . the need 
for a new Christian attitude toward other faiths."' 
Looking beyond Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism 
Challenges to these proposals have come recently from so-called "postmodern" 
perspectives.' Although specific proposals may differ widely from each other, they share 
in the criticism that many exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist proposals are inadequate, 
because they hold certain shortcomings specifically associated with a liberal or modern 
perspective. While different proposals may pursue very different agendas, they all share a 
concern to recognize and account for differences in the theology of religions. 
Following Paul Knitter, these critiques and proposals for the theology of religions may 
be distinguished into three categories." A first type may be called hermeneutical. These 
"Knitter, "Preface," x. 
'Ibid., xi. 
'A survey of postmodern strategies to the theology of religions see Terrence W. Tilley, et al, 
Postmodern Theologies: The Challenge of Religious Diversity (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 
1995). A serious shortcoming of this work is that it proceeds from certain models of postmodern theology 
and then asks how each views and responds to the challenges of religious plurality. Some of the most 
important responses that appear to be decisively informed by postmodern concerns are therefore not 
discussed. This is in part compensated for by an earlier article by Peter Donovan, "The Intolerance of 
Religious Pluralism," Religious Studies 29 (1993): 217-229. Donovan notes selected examples of what 
he calls a "postmodernist critique" in the theology of religions. The limitations of his work are that 1) he 
limits himself to critiques, passing by constructive proposals, and 2) that he confines his examples to 
selections from only two books. Other recent useful discussions include those of John Hick in A Christian 
Theology ofReligion, 31-56; and Paul Knitter, One Earth, 38-53. In these cases, they discuss only 
examples of criticisms that bear on their own positions. Since, however, they are probably the two most 
well-known and widely discussed pluralists, their proposals have been the targets of many of the critiques 
and the point of departure for a number of alternatives. 
2°I am adopting the distinctions and adapting the terminology of Knitter in One Earth, 38, where he 
distinguishes postmodernist critiques along the lines of "cultural anthropology," "hermeneutical theory," 
and "political theory." Here I refer to them, respectively, as postliberal, hermeneutical, and political. 
In making these distinctions, I should note that I agree with this assessment of the postmodern 
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proposals contend that a mutual understanding between religions needs to account for the 
historical conditionedness of knowledge. Drawing on the insights of philosophers such as 
Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, these theologies of religions try to make such an 
account. David Tracy's recent book Dialogue with the Other is an example of this type." 
Tracy argues that one should be "suspicious of how easily claims to 'analogy' or 
`similarity' can become subtle evasions of the other and the different."' This can easily 
happen when one's approach generalizes features of different religions and emphasizes 
likenesses among them. Tracy argues that this is the case with many inclusivist and 
pluralist proposals. What is needed are "hermeneutical criteria that can enhance the 
possibilities of a responsible interpretation of religious differences."" He regards 
hermeneutics as the best methodological hope for entering into a dialogue that can both 
recognize and appreciate differences and yet can carry on a true conversation. 
Another type of postmodern theology of religions may be called political. Its basic 
theological scene by Terrence W. Tilley: "The patterns in contemporary theologies are as fluid as wild 
rivers running in the spring. Each analyst or historian of the theological flood composes a snapshot of the 
contemporary scene in order to capture a pattern in the chaos and to draw connections and reveal 
oppositions between the 'types' of theologies he or she 'discovers.' But no pattern is final or definitive. 
As one who has structured a book with four patterns, I can imagine other interesting ways (e.g., David 
Griffin's) of setting off the differences and similarities among postmodern theologies. The situation is 
indeed fluid" (Postmodern Theologies, 115; although no reference is cited regarding Griffin, I believe 
Tilley is referring to David Ray Griffin, William A. Beardslee, and Joe Holland, Varieties of Postmodern 
Theologies [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989]). Here I wish only to make more 
apparent the variety of postmodem approaches current in the theology of religions, and not to argue 
vigorously for a definitive pattern. 
'David Tracy, Dialogue with the Other: The Interreligious Dialogue (Louvain: Peeters Press; 
Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1990). 
"Ibid., 42. 
"Ibid., 54. 
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feature is a critique of many exclusivist, inclusivist, and pluralist accounts for an 
imperialistic or colonialist attitude toward non-Christian religions. The pluralist 
perspective in particular has received strong criticism on this basis. Pluralists often 
contend that their approach is more open and less prejudiced to other religions. These 
"post-colonialists" argue that pluralists often close themselves to what the followers of 
other religions may regard as distinctive or unique. They also agree that the pluralist 
search for common ground among all religions actually prejudge the results of dialogue. 
The essays of John Milbank and Kenneth Surin in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered 
are examples of this approach.' According to Milbank, pluralists fail to recognize that 
religions are "social projects as well as worldviews."' They criticize exclusivists and 
inclusivists for an imperialism in identifying salvation with Christ but celebrate their own 
universalism. They do not recognize that their ideal of the Christian community, which 
they want to carry forward, is itself imperialistic, having "an immense `deterritorializing' 
effect in terms of disturbing political, social, and legal barriers?"26 The emphases on 
justice, equality, and freedom that pluralists regard as universally shared are better 
`John Milbank, "The End of Dialogue," in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth of a 
Pluralistic Theology of Religions, 174-191, ed. Gavin D'Costa (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 
1990); Kenneth Surin, "A 'Politics of Speech': Religious Pluralism in the Age of the McDonald's 
Hamburger," in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, 192-212. A fuller version of Surin's essay is "A 
Certain 'Politics of Speech': 'Religious Pluralism' in the Age of the McDonald's Hamburger" Modern 
Theology 7 (1990): 67-100. 
In his most recent book One Earth Many Religions, Paul Knitter argues for what he calls "a 
correlational, globally responsible model for interreligious dialogue" (23). This model is a pluralist 
approach that acknowledges the concerns and tries to incorporate of both the hermeneutical approach 
exemplified by Tracy (hence the label "correlational") and political concerns similar to those raised by 
Milbank and Surin. 
'Milbank, "The End of Dialogue,"179. 
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understood as products not even of Christian thought but of the Enlightenment.' For 
Milbank, this spells the end of dialogue (hence the title). It is better, he claims, to replace 
the notion of "dialogue" with that of "mutual suspicion." Conversation between religions 
can and should continue, but no one should pretend that "this proposal means anything 
other than continuing the work of conversion."28 
Surin is similarly critical of pluralists—and inclusivists and exclusivists, too. He argues 
that common to influential proposals in all three paradigms is 
the assumption that the task of "theorizing the relationships between the religions" is 
one that is pre-eminently, or even solely, a matter of affirming, clarifying, defending, 
and perhaps discarding certain philosophical and theological formulations. . . . The 
idea seems to be that most, if not all, the difficulties that stand in the way of an 
adequate understanding of the relationships between the various major religious 
traditions can be overcome if only we are able to get our theories and doctrines 
"right."' 
Surin is critical of these efforts because fail to grasp the complexity of the situation. Such 
"thinkers betoken a thoroughly Eurocentric or First World perspective on their parts: only 
someone who is not sufficiently aware of the always particular 'location' from which he or 
she theorizes can celebrate the new 'global city' and propound a world or global theology 
in this apparently unreflective way . . ."" In his view, a more adequate view of 
interreligious dialogue 
would be one which focused not so much on theological or doctrinal propositions as 
on the particular histories, the specific social locations, the varying repertoires of 
271bid., 187. 
"Ibid., 190. 
29Surin, "A 'Politics of Speech,'"201-202. 
'Ibid., 195. 
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signifying practices, and so on, of those engaged in such dialogue. This is not to say 
that there is no place for such theological formulation. There is, but only in 
conjunction with an account of those processes and practices of signification which 
precisely underlie the always historically specific characterizations a speaker/ 
theologian/philosopher/historian gives of the particular religious traditions.' 
A third type of postmodern theology of religions may be called postliberal. Unlike 
many inclusivist and pluralist proposals, which look for common features to tie different 
religions together, postliberals stress that each religious community is unique. This 
uniqueness is governed by its scheme of religious doctrines and shows in the claims, 
directives, rituals, and behavior of the community. 
Purposes. Nature, and Outline of this Study 
This study focuses on the third type—the postliberal approaches to the theology of 
religions. In undertaking this, I have two basic purposes. One is to examine these 
postliberal approaches. This examination will include a description and analysis of 
selected postliberal proposals concerning issues and concerns in the theology of religions. 
The second is to assess these proposals on key issues and appropriate certain insights from 
the postliberal approach for the purpose of developing a Lutheran theology of religions. 
While few proposals in the theology of religions have been characterized as 
"postliberal," there are considerable differences among them. Therefore I shall look at 
specific proposals, rather than try, for instance, to ascertain first what features should be 
considered common to the postliberal approach, and then to see how different proposals 
have incorporated them. Here I shall look at four of the most fully worked out proposals, 
"Ibid., 202. 
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those offered in the writings of Karl Barth, George A. Lindbeck, Paul J. Griffiths, and J. 
A. DilsToia. 
There are several related reasons for undertaking this study. The most straightforward 
reason is that the postliberal approach has been recognized as an important trend in the 
theology of religions. It has given some far-reaching criticisms of the focus on salvation in 
the prevailing paradigm of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. It also provides 
different grounds for thinking about the relationship between religions. Another reason is 
the broader importance of postliberal thinking in Christian theology. While recent in 
development, postliberalism has already been the subject of much discussion as a way of 
conceiving the theological task and for its approach in areas like Biblical interpretation. 
Given this significance, its contributions in the area of the theology of religions, itself a 
much discussed issue in theology, warrant attention. A third reason is the congruence of 
the postliberal approach with traditional theological concerns and ways of thinking. To be 
sure, this congruence is partial. But in its criticisms of the liberal conception of the 
theological task, in its attention to features such as the religious doctrines and biblical 
narratives, and in its concern for the uniqueness of the Christian faith and Christian 
community, postliberal theology would seem to hold much potential as a source for 
insights. Already the postliberal approach has already attracted the serious attention of 
traditionally-minded Christian theologians.' For this reason alone it merits a close 
examination and response. Beyond this, however, I am convinced that confessional 
Witness, for example, the 1995 Wheaton Theology Conference, which took for its topic the 
relationship of postliberalism with conservative evangelicalism. 
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traditions may find useful such aspects as its critique of theological liberalism and its 
insights into the task of theology and the nature of doctrine. 
There are some limitations that I should make clear. I shall not try to trace the 
development of any subject's views concerning the theology of religions. I shall not try to 
relate systematically any subject's views on the theology of religions to other aspects of 
his theology, although as the need for clarity or to provide a fuller analysis arises, I shall 
draw on or relate to certain other points. Further, I shall not try in any systematic way to 
relate or trace a given person's positions or emphases to other sources, although, again, if 
makes certain points of the presentation clearer, then I shall do so. In assessing them, 
however, I shall compare and contrast their positions on specified issues, and also evaluate 
them in terms of the concerns and issues prevalent in the entire area of the theology of 
religions and in terms of their fitness for a specifically Lutheran theology of religions. 
The remainder of this chapter will complete the introduction of this subject with an by 
outline of the features of postliberal theology and a review of the relevant secondary 
literature. 
Part I is devoted to the presentation of the proposals of Barth, Lindbeck, Griffiths, and 
DiNoia. Each chapter deals with a single figure, presenting his approach to issues in the 
field of the Christian theology of religions. The focus falls in two directions. One is on 
the way in which they identify and distinguish themselves from the traits or tendencies of 
modern theology. The other is on the constructive proposals they offer as alternatives. 
Part II offers an assessment and critical appropriation of these different postliberal 
proposals. I suggest some points that a Lutheran theology of religions should consider in 
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light of the postliberal critique and constructive proposals. I shall argue that a 
confessional Lutheran view of theology shares with postliberal theology a concern for a 
nonfoundational, descriptive approach. To be sure, this can be said only with 
qualification. For example; the view of George Lindbeck about the believer's knowledge 
of truth claims strongly leans toward agnosticism. This is in striking contrast to the 
certainty expressed, for instance, in the explanations to the Creed in the Small Catechism, 
each of which closes with the exclamation, "This is most certainly true." I intend to 
explore the matter of agreement between postliberal and confessional Lutheran views 
further. But like postliberal theology, Lutheran theology is concerned to take nothing but 
the Scriptures as its source and its norm, and it is careful to make sure that extrabiblical, 
extrachristian categories, concepts, and points of view do not take the Scriptural view 
captive. For these reasons, I shall try to show ways in which postliberal concerns and 
insights might be appropriated for a Lutheran theology of religions. 
Toward a Postliberal Theology 
With the 1984 publication of his book The Nature of Doctrine, George Lindbeck not 
only outlined his own proposal for understanding religion, doctrine, and theology, but he 
also brought attention to a range of projects which, following Lindbeck's suggestion, now 
are often called "postliberal."' More specifically, what Lindbeck did, in the words of his 
33George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), esp. 112-138. The most useful discussions of postliberal 
theology are those by William C. Placher in Unapologetic Theology: A Christian in a Pluralistic 
Conversation (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), "Postliberal Theology," in The Modern 
Theologians: An introduction to Christian theology in the twentieth century, ed. David F. Ford (Oxford 
and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 2: 115-128, and in "Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies and 
the Public Character of Theology," The Thomist 49 (1985): 392-41, and John E. Thiel, 
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Yale colleague Brevard Childs, was to bring to light "a distinct family resemblance among 
several recent theological proposals stemming from Yale."' This Yale connection has 
suggested to William Placher something like a postliberal canon: 
In addition to Lindbeck's own work, a list could include David Kelsey's The Uses of 
Scripture in Recent Theology, Charles Wood's The Formation of Christian 
Understanding, Paul Holmer's continuing studies of Wittgenstein and theology, 
Brevard Childs' interpretation of the Old Testament as canon, William Christian's 
philosophical analysis of inter-religious dialogue, Ronald Thiemann's discussions of 
Biblical authority, and above all the work of Hans Frei—all published by people 
connected with Yale, . ." 
Drawing on a diverse lot of sources and disciplines, ranging from philosopher Ludwig 
Nonfoundationalism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1994). David Tracy, an outspoken critic of Lindbeck, 
used the term "postliberal" several years before Lindbeck to denote the model of theology needed in a 
pluralistic age (Blessed Rage for Order: The New Pluralism in Theology [Minneapolis: The Winston-
Seabury Press, 1975], 32-34; see also 15 n. 7). But more than a decade before Tracy, John Macquarrie 
had applied "post-liberal" to theologians such as John Baillie who had been influenced by neo-orthodox 
theology (Twentieth Century Religious Thought: The Frontiers of Philosophy and Theology, 1900-1960 
[New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1963]). Lindbeck's use, however, is distinct 
from both Tracy and Macquarrie. 
'Brevard S. Childs, "The Canonical Approach and the 'New Yale Theology,— excursus in The New 
Testament as Canon: An Introduction (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 541. This piece gave wide 
currency to the label "New Yale theology." 
35William C. Placher, "Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies and the Public Character of Theology," 
The Thomist 49 (1985): 393. In the accompanying footnote Placher specifies following works: David H. 
Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975); Charles M. 
Wood, The Formation of Christian Understanding (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981); Paul L. 
Holmer, "Wittgenstein and Theology," in D. M. High, New Essays on Religious Language (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1969); Holmer, "The Nature of Religious Propositions," in Ronald S. Santoni, 
Religious Language and the Problem ofReligious Knowledge (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana 
University Press, 1968); Brevard S. Childs, Introduction to the Old Testament as Scripture 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1979); William A. Christian, Oppositions ofReligious Doctrines (London: 
Herder and Herder, 1972); Ronald F. Thiemann, Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated 
Promise (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985); Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of 
Biblical Narrative: A Study of Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century Hermeneutics (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1974); and Frei, The Identity ofJesus Christ (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1975). It should be noted that Placher himself was once a student at Yale University, and that he is 
explicitly sympathetic with the postliberal approach over against the revisionist/liberal alternative. For a 
parallel "canon," but by a rather more critical observer, see Mark I. Wallace, The Second Naivete: Barth, 
Ricoeur, and the New Yale Theology, Studies in American Biblical Hermeneutics 6 (Macon, Georgia: 
Mercer University Press, 1990), 87, n. 2. 
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Wittgenstein, historian of science Thomas S. Kuhn, literary critic Erich Auerbach, 
anthropologist Clifford Geertz, and theologians like Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth, 
postliberals urge Christians to do nothing less than rethink the nature and task of theology. 
It needs to be noted that the postliberal proposals do not comprise something as unified or 
coherent as a school. They do not follow a narrowly defined approach, fix on a particular 
and well-defined aim, or stress the same issues. Nor do their efforts amount to much more 
than extended sketches: nothing has been produced remotely approaching the scope or 
depth of—to draw comparisons with their own sources—Thomas or Barth. They do, 
however, share the conviction that the apologetic aim and correlational methods of the 
modern theology are thoroughly mistaken and have led to serious and widespread 
difficulties for the Christian church. They also share the conviction that the corrective lies 
in a "postliberal" approach, which reverses the priorities of the modern aim and seeks 
methods of theology that serve these new priorities. 
The focus on narrative has been the most widely discussed feature of postliberal 
theology. For the purposes of the theology of religions, however, a more important 
feature of postliberal theology lies with its view of the theological task. The postliberal 
conception of theology may be described critically as nonfoundational and constructively 
as descriptive.' Foundationalism in this context is the attempt to ground all knowledge 
The terms "nonfoundational" and "descriptive" have been adopted from Ronald F. Thiemann in 
Constructing a Public Theology: The Church in a Pluralistic Culture (Louisville: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1991), 23, and in Revelation and Theology, 71-91. Others have used similar terms. See 
Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine, 12, 32-41, 113-115, 129-131; William Werpehowski, "Ad Hoc 
Apologetics," The Journal ofReligion 66 (1986): 285; Hans W. Frei, "Remarks in Connection with a 
Theological Proposal," in Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, ed. George Hunsinger and William 
C. Placher (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 27, 33-37; idem, "Theology and the 
Interpretation of Narrative," in Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, ed. George Hunsinger and 
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in self-evident beliefs." As Thiemann puts it, "foundationalists all agree that knowledge is 
grounded in a set of non-inferential, self-evident beliefs which, because their intelligibility 
is not constituted by a relationship with other beliefs, can serve as the source of 
intelligibility for all beliefs in a conceptual framework."' Such beliefs, which need no 
support themselves, can provide sure, stable foundations for knowledge and thus protect 
against uncertainty and subjectivity. In theology, foundationalism shows in conceptions of 
the theological task as one of translating Christian concepts and practices into those of 
other conceptual frameworks. As nonfoundationalists, postliberals are doubtful about the 
possibility of securing such foundations and suspicious about theology that looks to test or 
substantiate Christian language and practice according to external criteria. 
The nonfoundational stance and descriptive task are evident in the argument of Hans 
William C. Placher (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 110-114; idem, "The 
`Literal Reading' of Biblical Narrative," in Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, ed. George 
Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 145-148. 
See also Thiel, Nonfoundationalism, 57-66, for a survey of postliberal theology which he describes 
under the heading of "theology as nonfoundational description." 
"For discussions of foundationalism especially as understood by postliberals, see Lindbeck, The 
Nature ofDoctrine, 128-134; Placher, Unapologetic Theology, especially 24-35; Thiel, 
Nonfoundationalism; Thiemann, Revelation and Theology, 1-7 and corresponding notes. See also 
Jeffrey Stout, The Flight from Authority: Religion, Morality, and the Quest for Autonomy (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), especially 25-92; and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason 
within the Bounds. ofReligion 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1984). 
Thiel points out that postliberal nonfoundationalism agrees only partially with such nonfoundational 
philosophies as those of Willard van Orman Quine and Richard Rorty. As he says: "The nonfoundational 
philosophers we have examined, for instance, hardly would accept the theological conception of 
Toundationless' delineated in the work of Lindbeck and Thiemann. For the philosophers, any appeal to 
the revelational authority of a religious tradition would constitute a foundationalism that warranted 
reasoning could not abide" (87). Postliberals are nonfoundational largely in a critical sense, in that they 
oppose the attempt to find universally accessible criteria against which truth claims may be tested and 
certain knowledge secured. 
38Thiemann, 158. 
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Frei's 1967 lecture, "Remarks in Connection with a Theological Proposal."" Here he 
challenges the aim and the method of modem Christian theology: 
The conviction underlying these pages is that the story of modern Christian theology 
(beginning with the end of the seventeenth century) is increasingly, indeed, almost 
exclusively that of anthropological and Christological apologetics, . . . I am convinced 
that the alternatives are either a nonapologetic and dogmatic, rather than systematic, 
theological procedure in which Christology continues to be the crucial ingredient or 
else a metaphysic or ontology in which Christology would play a peripheral role.°  
According to Frei, "we have lived for almost three hundred years in an era in which an 
anthropologically oriented theological apologetic has tried to demonstrate that the notion 
of a unique divine revelation in Jesus Christ is one whose meaning and possibility are 
reflected in general human experience.' This has meant that theology has aimed to show 
the potential in all human beings for a specifically Christocentric faith. For Frei, the 
underlying error of modem theology has been its attempt "to validate the possibility and, 
hence, the meaning of Christian claims concerning the shape of human existence and the 
divine relation to it, even though the actual occurrence—and thus the verification of the 
claim—is a matter of divine, self-authenticating action and revelation."' 
In direct contrast to the modern conviction and approach, Frei argues: 
Frei, "Remarks," 26-44. This lecture was delivered in December 1967 at the Harvard Divinity 
School. A useful essay discussing the key features of this lecture and relating them to other of Frei's 
works is George Hunsinger, "Afterword: Hans Frei as Theologian," in Theology and Narrative: Selected 
Essays, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1993), 235-270. 
'Frei, "Remarks," 27. 
41.. • AIota ., 29. As he explains elsewhere, by the term "apologetics" he means the "appeal to a common 
ground between analysis of human experience by direct natural and by some distinctively Christian 
thought" Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, 129. 
'Frei, "Remarks," 30. Emphases original. 
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[I]t is not the business of Christian theology to argue the possibility of Christian truth 
any more than the instantiation or actuality of that truth. The possibility follows 
logically as well as existentially from its actuality. Hence, I should want to draw a 
sharp distinction between the logical structure as well as the content of Christian 
belief, which it is the business of Christian theologians to describe but not to explain or 
argue, and the totally different logic of how one comes to believe, or the possibility of 
believing immanent in human existence, on which the theologian has relatively little to 
say and on which he should in any case not base the structure of his theology.' 
It should also be noted that while Frei in this instance has in mind theological liberalism, 
elsewhere he extends this criticism against an apologetic, explanatory approach to 
theology to conservative theologians like Carl Henry." Postliberal theology, then, is 
nonfoundational in the sense that it opposes the view that theology must seek to explain or 
justify claims, teachings, symbols, and practices on a foundation outside of the religion 
itself. Rather, the theological task aims to "describe but not to explain or argue" the 
structure and content of Christian belief. 
George Lindbeck is also critical of the liberal project, particularly for its appeal to 
supposedly self-evident universal experiences: 
The great strength of theological liberalism, it can be argued, lies in its commitment to 
making religion experientially intelligible to the cultured and the uncultured among 
both its despisers and its appreciators. It is in order to clarify the gospel in a world 
where it has become opaque that liberals typically choose the categories in which to 
expound their systematic theologies; and it is by their success in communicating to the 
modern mind that they assess the faithfulness of their endeavors. If there are no such 
°Ibid. Emphases original. 
'Hans W. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 24. See also Frei, "Response to 'Narrative Theology: 
An Evangelical Appraisal,'" Trinity Journal 8 n.s. (1987): 21-24. Cf. Carl F. H. Henry, "Narrative 
Theology: An Evangelical Appraisal," Trinity Journal 8 NS (1987): 3-19; and George Hunsinger, "What 
Can Evangelicals and Postliberals Can Learn from Each Other? The Carl Henry-Hans Frei Exchange 
Reconsidered," in Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okhohn, eds. The Nature of Confession: 
Evangelicals and Postliberals in Conversation, (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 
134-150. 
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universals, then how can one make the faith credible, not only to those outside the 
church but to the half-believers within it and, not least, to theologians? 
Against the characteristically liberal search for foundations to theology in various 
nontheological explanations, Lindbeck contends, "The norms of reasonableness are too 
rich and subtle to be adequately specified in any general theory of reason or knowledge."45 
 
On this point a "cultural-linguistic" model of religion proves more adequate than the so-
called "experiential-expressivism" of theological liberalism, which regards different 
religions as manifestations of a common prereflective experience. To the extent that 
religions are like languages, they cannot be learned by relating them to experience, but 
only through actual practice. Moreover, owing to the linguistic character of religion, the 
proper approach to theology is not explanation but, again, description: "In view of their 
comprehensiveness, reflexivity, and complexity, religions require what Clifford Geertz, 
borrowing a terms from Gilbert Ryle, has called 'thick description,' . . ."46 The theological 
task is a matter of tracing the logic, interconnections, and implications of a complex and 
all-encompassing framework of thought. Theology involves, on the one hand, a very close 
acquaintance with very small matters, and yet, on the other hand, permits—even 
demands—wide-ranging investigation, imagination, and invention. 
Ronald F. Thiemann offers still another similar argument against theological liberalism. 
In Revelation and Theology, he tries to rehabilitate the doctrine of revelation for the post-
Enlightenment age. For the Reformers, the conviction that God himself gives all 
'Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 130. 
46Ibid., 115. 
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knowledge of God was a "background belief' to the doctrine of revelation.' Modern 
doctrines of revelation, however, no longer held this conviction. Instead, the knowledge 
of God came to be understood as "a dependent belief which must be justified in relation to 
new basic convictions independent of the Christian faith."" This shift in conviction has 
forced the need of an apologetic strategy: 
When the assertion of God's prevenience functions as a background belief, a doctrine 
of revelation simply explicates the content of that knowledge given by God's grace. 
Issues concerning the possibility or actuality of God's revelation simply do not arise, 
because theologians begin from the "givenness" of our knowledge of God. But when 
the assertion becomes a dependent belief justifiable by general epistemological 
principles, its apparent self-evidence dissolves. Claims about knowledge of God must 
be demonstrated to be in accord with (or at least not contrary to) the ruling 
epistemological theory. In light of that demand, doctrines of revelation must do more 
than simply explicate the content of a "given" revelation; they must justify both the 
content of particular claims to knowledge and the prior assertion that these claims are 
given by God.49 
Against such an approach, Thiemann argues for a nonfoundational, descriptive 
theology.' This kind of theology does not look outside itself but seeks "to 're-describe' 
the internal logic of the Christian faith," that is, "it seeks to uncover the patterns of 
coherent interrelationships which characterize the beliefs and practices of that complex 
phenomenon we call the Christian faith."' This approach does not rule out making a 
'By "background beliefs" Thiemann means "certain convictions which are assumed to be true and 
thus provide stability for the whole framework. These beliefs are basic because the coherence of many 
other beliefs depends on the acceptance of these beliefs as true, and they are background because their 
axiomatic status makes explicit justification of them unnecessary" (Revelation and Theology, 11). 
48Ibid., 12. 
°Ibid., 14. 
5°See ibid., 71-91. 
'Ibid., 75. 
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justification of its claims, but it sees this task as one of making a rational justification 
based on its own logic rather than seeking some ultimate causal explanation.' 
As we have already seen in the case of Frei and Lindbeck, and as Thiemann would 
agree, the prevailing form of foundationalism in modern theology is the attempt to ground 
theology in a some form of common human experience.' Having an apologetic aim, 
modern theology typically explains the first-order language of the church (e.g., its liturgy, 
preaching, and prayers) as a manifestation of a deeper and more universal experience. In 
this view, theology serves Christianity as "both its theoretical defender and its critic."' 
Postliberal theology, however, recognizes a close connection between the first-order 
language and activity of the church and the second-order theological activity. Theology, 
then, may be compared to discerning grammar or logic." Paul Holmer offers a clear 
explanation on this point. He calls attention to learning the grammar of ordinary 
languages, e.g., English or French. When people do so, it often involves learning the 
grammatical rules. But the actual speaking of a language is not a matter of speaking the 
52Ibid., 43. 
'For Thiemann's view on this see Revelation and Theology, 73. 
'For the phrase "theology as grammar," see Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 
trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), §373. For postliberal proposals that 
compare theology to grammar in a sense resembling Wittgenstein, see Paul Holmer, The Grammar of 
Faith (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., 1978), 17-22; Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine; 
Kathryn E. Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford and 
New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988); and Frei, Types of Christian Theology, 2, 19-27. Also see Elsabeth 
S. Hilke, "Theology as Grammar: An Inquiry into the Function of Language in the Theology of Karl 
Barth," Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1976, which argues that Barth's theology, especially in Church 
Dogmatics, parallels the linguistic method of Wittgenstein. 
See Holmer, The Grammar ofFaith, 17-22; Frei, Types ofChristian Theology, 2; and Thiemann, 
Revelation and Theology, 75 for comparisons of theology with logic. 
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grammar but in saying everything in accordance with the grammar. "The more skilled we 
become in writing and speaking, the more does our knowledge of grammar inform 
everything we say and write. After a while we simply speak grammatically without 
ostentatiously remembering the grammar at all. Our practice becomes intrinsically and 
naturally grammatical."' 
So it is also with theology: it is like the grammar of the Christian faith, it is like the 
logical rules. The ultimate aim of learning theology is not to become firmly acquainted 
with these "rules," but to be able to think, speak, and act as a Christian. The parallel, 
however, is not exact: "[T]here is an additional difference about theology that, thought it 
is like grammar in some respects, namely, in not being the aim and intent of belief and the 
substance in and of itself (i.e., in not being the end but the means), still it is the declaration 
of the essence of Christianity. In so far as Christianity can be 'said' at all, theology and 
Scripture say it."57 
Seen in this way, the task of theology is not a matter of invention, but an uncovering 
and extending the already established and applied rules. In other words, the theological 
task is grammatical. It does not invent the grammar of the faith, nor does it arbitrarily 
handle the faith so as to say what might be desired or desirable. Rather, theology is 
dependent on the faith, on the Scriptures and consensus of the Church regarding the 
teachings drawn from them. "Theology," says Holmer, "answers the question—what is 
Christianity? But it tells us the answer by giving us the order and priorities, the structure 
56Holiner, The Grammar ofFaith, 17-18. 
57Ibid., 19. 
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and morphology, of the Christian faith.' 
Postliberal theology may seem to be little more than an argument in a rather 
sophisticated idiom for a return to a traditional view of theology. But as the label 
suggests, the postliberal approach to theology views itself as something rather different. 
This difference might be thought of as literally "post-liberal," in the sense that it does not 
view itself as a return to a premodern stance, but rather a new way that goes beyond what 
it believes are insuperable difficulties in the liberal or modern approach. This attitude is 
evident, for instance, in the acceptance of the findings of historical-critical methods.' 
Postliberal theology, then, is not a "repristination" theology. It is not, however, 
mistaken to view the postliberal approach bascially as an attempt to appropriate precritical 
approaches for the contemporary situation. This may be seen in the priority accorded the 
Scriptures for Christian practice and theology by its stress on an "intratextual" method.' 
'Ibid., 20. 
59Regarding the former trait, George Lindbeck's recent comment is important: "The contemporary 
aspect of the postliberal research program is the acceptance of biblical criticism, but placing it in a very 
subordinate role as far as the theologically significant reading of Scripture is concerned" (George 
Lindbeck in "A Panel Discussion: Lindbeck, Hunsinger, McGrath, and Fackre," in The Nature of 
Confession: Evangelicals and Postliberals in Conversation, ed. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. 
Okholm [Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996], 247.) It is also much in evidence in Hans 
Frei's work on biblical narratives. See The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, especially 10-16; for a specific 
textual instance, see "Of the Resurrection of Christ," in Theology and Narrative: Selected Essays, ed. 
George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 200-
206. Frei frequently stresses the need to distinguish a "literal meaning" of the narrative from the question 
of its "ostensive reference." About the literal meaning, this is a matter of attending to the story, to the 
identity it cumulatively and unsubstitutably depicts. About historical or ostensive reference, on the other 
hand, he agrees with the findings of the historical-critical methods, which questions the historicity of 
much that these narratives depict. The latter trait is evident in Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine, in the 
discussion of the Trinitarian and Christological doctrines (92-96). 
60See especially Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 113-124. Lindbeck notes that his argument can 
be supported with examples as diverse as Aquinas, the Reformers, and Karl Barth. 
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It may also be seen in Lindbeck's suggestion that the postliberal approach to winning 
converts "resembles ancient catechesis more than modern translation."' Also associated 
with this approach is an insistence that scriptural narratives function above all as "identity 
descriptions," and a call for ad hoc rather than systematic apologetics.62 
A Review of Relevant Literature 
While much attention given to the postliberal approach has been in the areas of biblical 
hermeneutics, theological method, and ethics, its importance for the theology of religions 
has also been noted. 
In his book One Earth and Many Religions, Paul Knitter considers postmodern 
objections to the pluralist theology of religions.' As far as Knitter is concerned, the 
postmodernist critique has two basic presuppositions: that all human experience and 
knowledge is filtered, and that these filters are highly diverse. These notions lead Knitter 
to conclude: 
In acknowledging the "time-bound," "situational," "linguistic," "theory-laden," 
"hermeneutical," "constructed" filters with which we experience and comprehend our 
world, postmodernists are really deepening and drawing out the content of what has 
61lbid., 132. 
°On the model of religion, see Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine. On the importance of religious 
doctrines, see again Lindbeck; see also William A. Christian, Sr., Oppositions ofReligious Doctrines, 
and idem, Doctrines ofReligious Communities: A Philosophical Study (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1987). On the importance of narratives as identity descriptions see Frei, The Identity of 
Jesus Christ. On the issue of ad hoc apologetics, see Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine,131-132; Hans 
W. Frei, "Eberhard Busch's Biography of Karl Barth," in Karl Barth in Re-View, ed. H.-Martin 
Riunscheidt (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1981), 114; reprinted in Types of Christian Theology, ed. 
George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 161; 
and Werpehowski, "Ad Hoc Apologetics," 282-301. 
°Knitter, One Earth Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue and Global Responsibility, preface by 
Hans Kung (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1995), 38-53. 
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been called historical consciousness. We are radically and irreducibly historical beings, 
and that means we look out upon our world from one particular historical situation or 
perspective. We can never really grasp the world as it is, but only as we see it through 
our particular historical filters." 
Knitter regards different instances of such postliberal approaches as those of Lindbeck, 
DiNoia, and Griffiths as different versions of this basic postmodern outlook. For instance, 
he considers the critique of George Lindbeck as an instance of "[flaking seriously the 
postmodern awareness of the historical filters that determine what we can know. . ."" He 
understands Lindbeck to claim that it is better to view different religions as being like 
different languages or cultures, which shapes the experiences of individuals, rather than 
being different expressions or thematizations of a common experience. Knitter 
acknowledges that such views confront the pluralist, who believes strongly in the 
possibility of common ground between religions, with a challenging conclusion: that the 
followers of different religions in their beliefs and practices do not exhibit different 
manifestations of the same core experiences, but rather are actually having different 
experiences. 
Knitter calls postliberal alternatives to the pluralist vision like those of Lindbeck and 
Griffiths a "good neighbor policy."' Rather than join in a search for common ground 
among other religions, postliberals propose that Christians act, as it were, like "good 
neighbors": "This will mean, first of all, not that we try to search for some method or 
"Ibid. 
"Ibid., 42. 
66Ibid., 51. 
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foundation on which we can understand each other, but, rather, that we let them know 
who we are. . . . Let them see who we are, understand as they may, and respond as they 
will—this, for postliberals, is the primary responsibility toward persons of other faiths."67 
Knitter does not consider the postliberal and other postmodern objections to be fatal 
to the aim of an open interreligious dialogue. They raise important questions and point 
out serious problems. In the end, however, "the warning signs that these critics are setting 
up should read 'Danger Ahead' rather than 'Road Blocked. '"68 
Knitter's treatment of postliberal theologies of religions is a matter of two concerns: 
first, criticisms to a pluralist approach to theology of religions and second, a postmodern 
perspective. In so doing, he ignores the concerns and aims that are distinctive to the 
postliberal approach, and he plays down their most characteristic features. 
Terrence Tilley offers a more complete examination of postliberal theology. His 
concern, however, is less with the theology of religions than with examining and 
comparing different postmodern strategies. Citing specifically Lindbeck and DiNoia, 
Tilley contends that the key feature of the postliberal position on non-Christian religions is 
its "particularism." As he explains: 
Associated especially with postliberalism, [particularism] takes differences most 
seriously. Like exclusivism, it finds each of the religious traditions substantially 
different. However, a particularist typically does not ask the soteriological question as 
an overarching one. Any complete answer to the question "who can be saved?" will 
be a universal answer which inevitably undermines the particular traditions of some 
religious traditions. Moreover, such an answer is presumptuous in the extreme, 
making a claim to know how God finally disposes of everything there is. Hence, 
68Ibid., 53. 
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particularism rejects reductive pluralism and is suspicious of phenomenal pluralism, 
exclusivism, and inclusivism, much preferring to espouse more modest particular 
theological claims.' 
Lindbeck is understood as a particularist because he regards the differences between 
religions to be real. For him "the real question to be asked is [the religions'] own 
categorical adequacy to meet the challenges of their own particular community," and not 
how each religion reflects or manifests some common core experience or aim. Likewise, 
because he insists that inclusivism and pluralism blurs differences between religious 
communities, DiNoia is also regarded as a particularist. 
More than Knitter, Tilley attends to the distinctive concerns and accents of postliberal 
theology. But his treatment of the postliberal theology of religions lacks detailed 
presentation, analysis, and assessment. 
The literature is also limited on the particular subjects of this study. Karl Barth's 
understanding of the concept of religion and of the historical religions has been discussed 
thoroughly, but discussions informed by a postliberal perspective have been few." Yale 
"Terrence W. Tilley et al, Postmodern Theologies: The Challenge ofReligious Diversity 
(Marylaioll, New York: Orbis Books, 1995), 158-159. 
'His views on other aspects of theology have been examined from a postliberal perspective. See, for 
example, see Hans Frei, "Eberhard Busch's Biography of Karl Barth," in Karl Barth in Re-View, ed. H.-
Martin Rumscheidt (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1981), 95-116; reprinted in Types ofChristian 
Theology, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1992), 147-163; ibid., Types ofChristian Theology, esp. 38-46, 78-91; Hilke, "Theology as 
Grammar"; George Hunsinger, "Beyond Literalism and Expressivism: Karl Barth's Hermeneutical 
Realism," Modern Theology 3 (1987): 209-223; idem, How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape ofHis 
Theology (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); idem, "Truth as Self-Involving: Barth 
and Lindbeck on the Cognitive and Performative Aspects of Truth in Theological Discourse" Journal of 
the American Academy ofReligion 60 (1992): 41-56; George Lindbeck, "Barth and Textuality," 
Theology Today 43 (1986): 361-376; Ronald F. Thiemann, "Response to George Lindbeck," Theology 
Today 43 (1986): 377-382; and Bruce D. Marshall, Christology in Conflict: The Identity of a Saviour in 
Rahner and Barth (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987). 
29 
philosopher of religion William A. Christian, Sr., whose work on religious doctrines has 
influenced the postliberal approach, examined Barth's discussion of truth from non-
Christian sources in volume 4, part 3 of Church Dogmatics specifically for its application 
to the question of alien religious claims.' Christian cites Barth as a clear if surprising 
example of a Christian theologian who proposes that the claims of other religious 
communities may be true or right, but for which Christians are not bound to teach or 
adopt as their own doctrines. In How to Read Karl Barth, George Hunsinger traces out 
six motifs that characterize Barth's theology in Church Dogmatics. The foundational 
motifs are realism and rationalism. Realism refers to the way Barth conceived of 
theological language. This way was neither literal (i.e., univocal) nor symbolic of emotive 
or noncognitive experience (i.e., equivocal), but analogical. In this light, Barth appears to 
anticipate clearly the later postliberal views about biblical narratives and their mode of 
reference. Rationalism refers to the way Barth constructed and assessed doctrine. It was 
rational, but strictly according to the logic inherent in revelation. Doctrines, in this view, 
are assessed by their coherence with the wider scheme of doctrines, not according to 
criteria external to the Christian faith. In this way, too, Barth appears to anticipate the 
later postliberal approach to theology. Hunsinger applies these motifs as he looks at the 
same section that William Christian had examined, but at much greater length.' He 
"Christian, Doctrines of Religious Communities, 212-215. 
nHun.singer, How to Read Karl Barth, 234-280. Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. IV, 3, 1, The 
Doctrine ofReconciliation, trans. G. W. Bromiley (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961), 3-165, esp. 86-
135. 
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concludes that Barth's position may be called "exclusivism without triumphalism."' By 
"exclusivism" he meant that the Christian scheme of doctrine alone was, as a whole, true. 
Any other scheme can only be deemed false, because they organize themselves around 
other doctrines than those of Jesus Christ as the Scriptures attest to him. It is not 
triumphalist, however, in the sense that aspects of another scheme of doctrine may be true 
or right at some points. When Christians come across such truths, they should regard 
them as from the Lord. 
Turning to George Lindbeck, a thorough examination of his views on the world 
religions has been made by Kenneth Surin.' He applauds Lindbeck for repudiating the 
pluralists' assumption of a common core of religious experience in all the world's 
religions, but criticizes him for the "`essentialization' of religions and their discourses."' 
Much of Surin's discussion centers around the implications and perceived shortcomings of 
Lindbeck's "prospective fides ex auditu" approach to the salvation of non-Christians, 
which is his version of post-mortem evangelization. 
Gavin D'Costa discusses Lindbeck's theology of religions as an example of 
exclusivism.' He defines exclusivism as holding that "only those who hear the gospel 
73Hunsinger, How to Read Karl Barth, 278. 
'Kenneth Surin, —Many Religions and the One True Faith': An Examination of Lindbeck's Chapter 
Three," Modern Theology 4 (1988): 187-210. 
'Ibid., 204. See 189-190 for Surin's appraisal of Lindbeck and pluralism. 
76Gavin D'Costa, "Theology of Religions," in The Modern Theologians: An introduction to 
Christian theology in the twentieth century, ed. David F. Ford (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 
1989), 2: 274-290. 
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proclaimed and explicitly confess Christ are saved."' According to D'Costa's analysis, 
Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model is a result of the wish "to retain the solus Christus as 
well as the fides ex auditu (faith by hearing) tradition—that is, one may only come to 
salvation through hearing the Word and confessing Christ's On this basis D'Costa 
concludes that it is exclusivist. 
Michael Barnes and Brad Stetson focus on Lindbeck's proposed cultural-linguistic 
model of religion. Barnes accepts the notion that language precedes a person's 
interpretation of experiences, so that "[language can, very generally, be seen as an 
attempt to organize and classify our patterns of experience."' Accordingly, he believes 
that the central lesson of Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model is that argues that "religion 
introduces people into the shared language or story of the group.' However, Barnes is 
also convinced that the relationship between language and experience is dialectical: not 
only does language precede any person's grasp of experiences, but experiences then go on 
to shape language. Lindbeck's account, in Barnes's view, is deficient because it fails to 
recognize this: 
Lindbeck's distinction [of religion and experience] is misleadingly rigid. Language or 
culture may provide the form in which we come to experience Ultimate Reality, but in 
all religions there is an implicit demand being made to press beyond the limits of 
language, to enter eventually into a silence which recognizes that the Ultimate is more 
than can be spoken of in any human form of words. Whether we speak of the 
nIbid., 274. 
'Ibid., 277. 
'"Michael Barnes, Christian Identity and Religious Pluralism: Religions in Conversation 
(Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1989), 99. 
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transcendent and the integrative, or the prophetic and the institutional, of parable and 
myth, or revelation and religion, the same point is being made: all religion has a 
common dialectical structure. The two have to be held together." 
Brad Stetson concentrates on the regulative or rule theory of doctrine associated with 
the cultural-linguistic model.' He regards it as an important advance for the question of 
interreligious relationships: 
Lindbeck's rich and unique model seems to open up, as it were, the field of truth when 
considering it in relation to religious plurality. No longer is truth purely private, as 
with the experiential epistemology of [John] Hick: it can be assessed by someone 
exterior to the religious believer herself. With his approach the concept of truth 
includes not just simple but also the coherence of each doctrinal statement with all 
other utterances, attitudes, and practices in the religious form of life within which they 
occur.83  
While they highlight important aspects of Lindbeck's position on the relationship of 
Christianity to non-Christian religions, neither Barnes nor Stetson attempt a complete 
account. The same is true of John Sanders's account, which overlooks Lindbeck's 
postliberal critique, cultural-linguistic model of religion, and rule theory of doctrine, and 
devotes itself entirely to his proposal for post-mortem evangelization." 
Finally, with regard to Lindbeck, we should take note of the contributions of two 
Lutheran theologians—Paul Varo Martinson and Theodore M. Ludwig—to the Lutheran 
8tlbid., 107. 
82Brad Stetson, Pluralism and Particularity in Religious Belief(Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 
1994), 42-45. 
'Stetson, 44. 
"John Sanders, No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the Unevangelized, foreword 
by Clark H. Pinnock (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992), 200-205. 
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World Federation publication Religious Pluralism and Lutheran Theology." Both 
appropriate aspects of Lindbeck's proposal in formulating their own discussions of a 
Lutheran response to religious plurality. Both, however, depart crucially from Lindbeck's 
position, which is critical of views that regard different religions as expressions of a shared 
core experience, by maintaining that all religious expressions have a single common 
source.86 
Neither Paul Griffiths nor J. A. DiNoia have received as much attention as Lindbeck, 
and no review of either person's work is detailed. As it turns out, two of the discussions 
are by each on the other." In Griffiths's view, Christian theologies of religions of all kinds 
and commitments have tended toward unconditional statements. He commends DiNoia 
for modalizing the theology of religions, that is, by casting Christian claims regarding non-
Christian religions in terms of possibility and necessity. Griffiths points out that DiNoia 
does this by insisting that it should take seriously the specific aims and commitments of 
non-Christian religions, and by recognizing that non-Christian claims may or may not hold 
significant things in common. The key advance in this is that it is "possible for Christians 
to pay serious attention to the doctrinal specificities of non-Christian communities, and to 
85Paul Varo Martinson, "Speaking the Truth: Contemporary Approaches to Religious Pluralism," in 
Religious Pluralism and Lutheran Theology, ed. J. Paul Rajashekar, LWF Report 23/24 (Geneva: The 
Lutheran World Federation, 1988), 40-73; Theodore M. Ludwig, "Some Lutheran Theological 
Reflections on Religious Pluralism," in Religious Pluralism and Lutheran Theology, ed. J. Paul 
Rajashekar, LWF Report 23/24 (Geneva: The Lutheran World Federation, 1988), 129-158. 
s6See Martinson, "Speaking the Truth," 64; Ludwig, "Some Lutheran Theological Reflections," 136. 
'Paul J. Griffiths, "Modalizing the Theology of Religions," The Journal of Religion 73 (1993): 382-
389; J. A. Dflsioia, 0.P., "Teaching Differences," The Journal ofReligion 73 (1993): 61-68. 
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do so within an intellectual framework that accords with their own self-understanding."" 
Griffiths also commends DiNoia's argument for a realist construal of references and 
predications in religious discourse. 
Paul Varo Martinson gives similar approval to DiNoia's argument concerning religious 
language." He draws attention to the fact that DiNoia's approach "is not the same as in 
foundationalism, which seeks to identify a point of reference from which one can outside 
of any particular religious or philosophical tradition umpire the entire conversation.' In 
other words, he draws attention to a postliberal dimension of DiNoia's argument. 
Martinson does not refer to DiNoia as "postliberal," but Bradford E. Hinze does.' 
According to Hinze, DiNoia "harkens back to Chapter 3 of Lindbeck's Nature of Doctrine 
both in its critique of experiential approaches to other religions and in his advocacy of a 
doctrinally-specific approach to interreligious dialogue."' He finds this stress on a 
"doctrinally-specific" approach compelling. He has reservations, however, about DiNoia's 
objections to the use of soteriological arguments, contending that they "are always 
relevant and sometimes decisive in doctrinal matters."' 
Turning to Griffiths, DiNoia regards his Apology for Apologetics, which sets out the 
asGriffiths, 387. 
89Paul Varo Martinson, "Review Essay," Pro Ecclesia 3 (1994): 110-113. 
"Ibid., 113. 
'Bradford E. Hinze and George P. Schner, S.J., "Postliberal Theology and Roman Catholic 
Theology," Religious Studies Review 21 (1995): 299-310. Only Hinze (299-304) deals with DiNoia. 
"Ibid., 301. 
931bid., 302. 
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conditions for interreligious apologetics and argues for their need, as signalling a change in 
the way theologians and philosophers look at religions." The needed change amounts to 
this: instead of trying to say how things that look different are really the same, Griffiths 
tries to show that things that look the same are really different." The tendency in religious 
studies and the theology of religions has been to look for similarities among religions. 
DiNoia applauds Griffiths for taking seriously the differences among the doctrines of 
different religious communities. 
As this survey shows, there is much room for exploration and appropriation of 
postliberal views in the theology of religions, both as a movement within the field and in 
terms of individual proponents. 
"Paul J. Griffiths, An Apology for Apologetics: A Study in the Logic ofInterreligious Dialogue 
(Marylcnoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991). 
"DiNoia, "Teaching Differences," 61. 
PART ONE 
TOWARD A POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS 
CHAPTER TWO 
RELIGION AND THE LOGIC OF REVELATION: 
KARL BARTH'S POSTLIBERAL THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS 
Under the topic "Postmodern theology" in the "Lexicon" of his book Ethics After 
Babel, Jeffrey Stout writes: 
Also called "postliberal theology"; the quest, initiated in recent years by the most 
interesting American followers of Karl Barth, to get beyond all forms of modernism in 
theology; either a cul de sac or the harbinger of a new theological age (too soon to 
tell).' 
As this observation suggests, no single figure has been more influential to the development 
of postliberal theology than Karl Barth. Others such as William Placher have offered 
similar comments: "Postliberal theology draws on many sources, from Clifford Geertz's 
anthropology to the philosophy of Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle to Thomas Kuhn's 
reflections on the history of science to Eric Auerbach's literary analysis, yet in theology it 
owes most to Karl Barth."' 
Postliberals' interest in and appropriation of Barth has itself drawn fresh attention to 
'Jeffrey Stout, Ethics After Babel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), 301. 
'William C. Placher, "Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies and the Public Character of Theology," 
The Thomist 49 (1985): 394. In a similar way but from a different point of view, Mark I. Wallace, who 
appreciated the postliberal call for theology to center itself once again on the Bible but criticized the 
approach for relativism, comments: "Karl Barth is virtually the only contemporary theologian that Frei, 
Hohner, and Lindbeck mention with common approval" (Mark I. Wallace, The Second Naivete: Barth, 
Ricoeur, and the New Yale Theology, Studies in American Biblical Hermeneutics 6 [Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 1990], 108; see also Wallace, "The New Yale Theology," Christian Scholar's Review 
17 [1987]: 169). 
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and brought forward renewed discussion of his theology. One area toward which fresh 
attention might be turned profitably is his theology of religions.' He has been widely 
recognized as an important figure in the field, but he also has been identified "with the 
worst kind of Christian arrogance."' This judgment is based usually on his discussion in 
volume I, part 2, of Church Dogmatics, where he describes religion as "unbelief"' For 
example, Alan Race, in his influential survey of the theology of religions, states that "the 
most extreme form of the exclusivist theory has been stated by Karl Barth in his Church 
Dogmatics . . . ."6 He concludes that "[i]t is hard not to feel offence at Barth's theory 
because he states it in such extreme forms," and he finds it "disturbing," having "an air of 
3Peter Harrison gives a useful summary and evaluation of different interpretations of Barth's theology 
of religions ("Karl Barth and the Non-Christian Religions," Journal of Ecumenical Studies 23 [1986]: 
206-227; see especially pp. 206-211). 
4Michael Barnes, Christian Identity and Religious Pluralism: Religions in Conversation (Nashville: 
Abingdon Press, 1989), 29. It should be noted that Barnes does not agree with this evaluation. 
'Karl Barth, "Gottes Offenbarung als Aufhebung der Religion," in Der Kirchliche Dogmatik, vol. I, 
Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes, pt. 2 (Zollikon-Ziirich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1948), 327. The English 
translation is Church Dogmatics, vol. I, The Doctrine of the Word of God, pt. 2, ed. G. W. Bromiley and 
T. F. Torrance, trans. G. T. Thomson and Harold Knight (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956). Following 
the usual usage, I shall refer to them as KD (Kirchliche Dogmatik) and CD (Church Dogmatics), 
followed by volume, part, and page number. I usually follow the translations in CD, and in such 
instances I have cited the English translation first and the German edition second. This is also the case 
for citations without quotations. Where I offer my own translations, the German edition is cited first. 
The English translation renders the title of paragraph 17 as "The Revelation of God as the Abolition 
of Religion." The rendering ofAufhebung as "abolition" has occasioned much controversy, mostly 
because of its highly negative connotation. As we shall see, Barth does not regard the revelation of God as 
a pure negation of religion, but, in the specific instance where Christ is known, as an exaltation or 
supercession of religion. This makes "abolition" a problematic translation, and for this reason I shall 
simply leave the word untranslated. 
6Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology ofReligions, 
2d. ed. (London: SCM Press Ltd. and Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1993), 11. Race specifies 
Barth's treatment of revelation and religion in paragraph 17 of CD 1/2. 
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unreality about it," and "hasty."' Others have reacted similarly.' There are at least three 
kinds of objections. Some, like John Hick, who called his position "sublime bigotry" and 
"chauvinism," object because they find it arrogant or intolerant.' Others, like Maurice 
Wiles and Paul Knitter, find Barth's position contradicted by what they might call simply 
the "evidence" or the "facts." Wiles concludes that Barth's claim that revelation stands in 
judgment over all religion "stands against, and in my view is wholly unable to stand up to, 
the whole gamut of evidence as to how religious understanding has actually developed in 
relation to Christian faith or to any other form of faith."' Knitter said that, allowing for 
oversimplification, a major problem with Barth might be summed up as an attitude of "My 
mind's made up. Don't confuse me with the facts.' Knitter also is among those who 
make a third kind of objection, namely, that Barth's view of revelation is too narrow.' 
Although the critical position has been the majority view, a persistent minority has 
argued that Barth's assessment of the world religions was in the end positive. But even 
'Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism, 14, 16, 24, 25; cf. 27. 
8See Harrison, "Karl Barth and the Non-Christian Religions," 206-208. See also Carl E. Braaten, 
No Other Gospel] Christianity among the World's Religions (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 49-
50. 
'John Hick, "Toward a Philosophy of Religious Pluralism," Neue Zeitschrifi fitr systematische 
Theologie and Religionsphilosophie 22 (1980): 132. 
'Maurice Wiles, Christian Theology and Inter-religious Dialogue (London: SCM Press Ltd; and 
Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1992), 30. 
"Paul F. Knitter, No Other Name? A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World 
Religions, American Society of Missiology Series, No. 7 (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1985), 
91. 
"Paul F. Knitter, "Christomonism in Karl Barth's Evaluation of the Non-Christian Religions," Neue 
Zeitschrift systematische Theologie 13 (1971): 99-121; Towards a Protestant Theology of 
Religions: A Case Study of Paul Althaus and Contemporary Attitudes, Marburger Theologische Studien, 
no. 11 (Marburg: N. G. Elwert Verlag, 1974), 20-36; No Other Name?, 92-95. 
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many of them have effectively agreed with the critical assessment of Barth by advancing 
their argument on the basis of later volumes of Church Dogmatics.' In taking this 
position, they also accept the conclusions made by his critics about CD I/2.14 
A few recent observers, however, have viewed Barth's account of religion and the 
religions in CD 1/2 from a different perspective. Missiologist David Bosch insists that 
Barth is the "one important example of an exclusivist position which reveals clearly 
postmodern elements."' Referring specifically to CD 1/2, Bosch concludes: "There can be 
no doubt that Barth's was a bold, innovative, and radical attempt at solving an age-old 
problem.' Central to this attempt was that Barth "turn[ed] consciously against the 
Enlightenment's evolutionary optimism and endorsement of the autonomous human 
being."" This showed particularly in "the way in which he refused to take refuge in the 
age-old strategem of blithely contrasting the Christian religion as true with all others as 
untrue.' From the area of academic religious studies, an unlikely precinct for an 
l'These minority positions are also reviewed by Harrison in "Karl Barth and the Non-Christian 
Religions," 210-211. Although it is now dated, Paul Knitter's (highly critical) evaluation of Barth's 
attitude toward non-Christian religions is still useful (Towards a Protestant Theology of Religions, 32-
36). More recent attempts include Michael Barnes in Christian Identity and Religious Pluralism, 26-44, 
and Carl Braaten in No Other Gospel!, 49-63. 
"For example, in a recent article Anton Houtepen observes that even within Protestant theology 
Barth's position is exceptional, because it rejects "the classical apologetic theory of God's general 
revelation among all nations, which served as a praeparatio evangelica." But he then notes that it would 
be a serious distortion to regard Barth as completely negative about religions. They are gifts of God's 
good creation [KD P//3 850ff] and perhaps other religions know God without awareness [KD IV/4 
213ff]. Houtepen, "Ambiguous Religion and the Authentic Holy," Exchange 25 (1996): 8. 
"David J. Bosch, Transforming Mission: Paradigm Shifts in Theology ofMission, American 
Society of Missiology, No. 16 (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), 479. 
"Ibid., 478. 
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appreciative assessment of Barth, Garrett Green argued that his thoroughly Christian 
theological interpretation of religion exemplified the kind of approach that students of 
religion should examine carefully. While academic religious studies claim to have 
accepted the so-called "postmodern turn," "the field as a whole has so far failed to carry 
out its implications consistently, especially when it comes to theories about the nature, 
function, and value of religion."' This shows in the refusal to consider positions arrived 
at from a definite religious standpoint. Against this, Green contends: "No credible 
argument remains for teaching Durkheim, Freud, or Eliade on religion while ignoring 
Barth and others who speak on the basis of an explicit religious commitment."" He 
concludes not only that Barth's specific proposal should be considered, but the explicit 
religious basis of his investigation puts the unacknowledged commitments of the field into 
much-needed relief. 
In this chapter I try to show something similar to but with different emphases than 
Bosch and Green by drawing attention particularly to postliberal aspects of Barth's 
account of religion and the religions in CD 1/2. Barth's theology is often regarded as 
outdated. Postmodern perspectives, however, encourage a view that considers Barth as 
ahead of his time rather than hopelessly behind it. Postliberals, including leading figures 
like Hans Frei and George Lindbeck, say they have learned much from Barth and adopt 
"Ibid., 479. 
"Ibid. Green uses the term "postmodern" "in a modest sense to indicate any theoretical position that 
eschews the 'modem' assumption of a single, universal order of truth to which one can appeal as a 
criterion in judging particular claims to knowledge" (473, n. 2). 
"Garrett Green, "Challenging the Religious Studies Canon: Karl Barth's Theory of Religion," The 
Journal ofReligion 75 (1995): 474. 
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both specific features and the overall outlook of his theology. Following their lead, I shall 
look at Barth's theological interpretation of religion and the religions from a postliberal 
perspective and try to show that its concerns and approach share much with those of 
postliberalism. We shall see that Barth's account in CD 1/2 shares with the later 
postliberal theology both a similar kind of understanding and criticism of modern theology 
and a similar constructive theological approach. One goal of this chapter is to show that 
this criticism closely anticipates the kind of criticism postliberals characteristically lay 
against modern theology, while another goal is to show how his own approach to the 
problem of religion in Christian theology anticipates the approach characteristically 
advocated by postliberals. 
Toward a Theological Evaluation of Religion 
Postliberal theology is critical of much of theology since the Enlightenment—
especially liberal theology—for its persistent attempts to articulate and substantiate its 
claims in concepts and categories that are external to Christianity. One reason Barth's 
theology of religions can be identified with postliberal approaches is that he anticipates the 
ways of postliberal theology characterizes and criticizes modern conceptions of religion 
and the place modern theologians give these conception in theology. 
Barth begins by acknowledging that religion poses a problem for theology, even in the 
light of the self-revelation of God in Jesus Christ. He maintains that both the objective 
and subjective elements of revelation, that is, both the actuality (Aktualiteit) and the 
potentiality (Potentialitat) of revelation, are "the being and action [das Sein and 
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Handlung] of the self-revealing God alone."' Since the initiative and work of revelation 
are entirely on the side of God, it might be supposed that religion, understood as a human 
activity, does not come together at all with revelation. Revelation, however, is not only 
God making himself known; it also includes God being known by the human creature. 
Thus revelation is always an event which encounters the human creature. For this reason, 
revelation also "has the form of human competence, experience, and activity"; that is, it 
has the form of human religion.' To deny this is to deny revelation as such.' 
The decisive question is "how the statement has to be interpreted and applied. Does it 
mean that what we think we know of the nature and incidence of religion must serve as a 
norm and principle by which to explain the revelation of God; or, vice versa, does it mean 
that we have to interpret the Christian religion and all other religions by what we are told 
by God's revelation?"' Where "what we think we know of the nature and incidence of 
religion" is used to explain revelation, the task of theology is seen as a kind of more 
general investigation. But where we have to interpret Christianity and all religions 
according to what the revelation of God tells us, the task of theology is specific to the 
Christian community." 
Barth anticipates the postliberal approach when he charges that Christian theology of 
'CD 1/2, 280; KD 1/2, 305. 
22KD V2, 305; CD 1/2, 280. 
'CD 1/2, 283; KD 1/2, 309. 
24CD 1/2, 283-284; KD 1/2, 309. 
251CD 1/2, 309; CD 1/2, 284. 
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the nineteenth and twentieth centuries characteristically has taken the first alternative: "It 
was and is characteristic of its theological thinking, so far as it here concerns us (in 
relation to its conception and formulating of the Church and its life), that in its great 
representatives and outstanding tendencies what it has discerned and declared is not the 
religion of revelation but the revelation of religion."' In other words, Barth sees as a 
basic feature of modern Christian theology the priority it gives to a general concept of 
religion over the specific revelation of God in Christ. It is one thing to grant that the event 
of revelation may be viewed as an instance of religion. This is necessary. It is quite 
another thing, however, to regard the religion of revelation as a particular instance of a 
universal phenomenon, namely, human religion, because it undermines the uniqueness of 
God's revelation. "To allow that there is this whole world apart from and alongside 
`Christianity' is to recognise that in His revelation God has actually entered a sphere in 
which His own reality and possiblity are encompassed by a sea of more or less adequate, 
but at any rate fundamentally unmistakable, parallels and analogies in human realities and 
possibilities."27 
Barth further anticipates postliberals when he concludes that this characteristic is 
specifically modem.' For the Scholastics and the Reformers, and for the older Lutheran 
and Reformed Orthodox theologians and for some of the later ones, a general concept of 
religion was foreign. The "catastrophe" in this matter (as in others, Barth notes) came 
26KD 1/2, 309; CD 1/2, 284. 
"CD 1/2, 282; KD 1/2, 307. 
28See the historical survey and discussion of the concept of religion in Christian theology in CD 1/2, 
284-291; KD 1/2, 309-317. 
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with the advent of rational orthodoxy at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Barth 
singles out Reformed theologian Salomon van Til and Lutheran theologian I. Franz 
Buddeus. They were the first to presuppose a universal concept of religion, to which the 
Christian instance corresponded perfectly. With them, human religion 
constitutes, in fact, the presupposition, the criterion, the necessary framework for an 
understanding of revelation. It shows the question which is answered by revealed 
religion as well as all other positive religions, and it is as the most satisfactory answer 
that the Christian religion has the advantage over others and is rightly described as 
revealed religion.' 
While materially their theology did not deviate much from the line of seventeenth-century 
Orthodoxy, their move proved the basic presupposition of the developments that 
followed—from Wolff to Kant to Schleiermacher and through to Feuerbach, Ritschl, and 
Troeltsch. Of course, Barth acknowledges, van Til and Buddheus would have been 
astonished at and disagreed with these developments. Nevertheless, they and their 
contemporaries were the "real fathers" of liberal theology, for they introduced the "one 
simple theme" of which "these more or less radical and destructive movements in the 
history of theology in the last two centuries are simply variations," namely: "that religion 
has not to be understood in the light of revelation, but revelation in the light of religion.' 
Barth, however, insists: "It is always a sign of definite misunderstanding when an 
attempt is made systematically to co-ordinate revelation and religion, i.e., to treat them as 
3°CD 1/2, 289; KD 1/2, 315. 
3°CD 1/2, 290-291; KD 1/2, 316-317. But Barth finds that it has not been only liberal ("Neo-
Protestant") theology that has been gone astray. So has conservative theology, because it has cooperated 
with liberal theology by "making such concessions to the prevailing outlook that in spite of the immanent 
resistance which it has put up it cannot be regarded as a renewal of the Reformation tradition" (CD 1/2, 
291; KD 1/2, 317). 
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comparable spheres, to mark them off from each, to fix their mutual relationship."' This 
is the case whether one's intention is to subordinate revelation to religion or it is to 
safeguard revelation. Whether one treats religion as an equal to revelation, gives priority 
to the concept of religion over revelation, or asks about the relationship between the two 
as different spheres of interest and concern, just "the fact that we can do this shows that 
our intention and purpose is to start with religion, that is, with man, and not with 
revelation."' The problem is that revelation itself is not understood: "Revelation is God's 
sovereign action upon man or it is not revelation."' When revelation is considered an 
open question, then it is no longer truly the revelation of God under consideration. "On 
the other hand," Barth counters, 
if revelation is not denied but believed, if man and his religion are regarded from the 
standpoint of those statements in the Catechism, then to take man and his religion 
seriously we cannot seek them in that form which has already been fixed in advance. 
There can, therefore, be no question of a systematic co-ordination of God and man, of 
revelation and religion. For neither in its existence, nor in its relation to the first, can 
the second be considered, let alone defined, except in the light of the first.' 
In view of this, it becomes clear why, although the actual positions at which Buddeus 
and van Til arrived differed little from the predecessors, such strong objection should be 
made and such stiff opposition should be given to their approach, "why," as Barth asks, 
we have "to judge this development negatively as a disruption of the life of the Church, 
'1CD 1/2, 294; KD 1/2, 320. 
'CD 1/2, 294; KD 1/2, 321. 
"CD 1/2, 295; KD 1/2, 322. 
34CD 1/2, 296; KD 1/2, 323. 
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and ultimately as a heresy which destroys it.' It was not so much what was done as 
what was not done: 
In fact and in practice [theology] ceased to regard the cardinal statements of the 
Lutheran and Heidelberg confessions as definite axioms. Originally and properly the 
sin was one of unbelief. It was that belittling of Christ which begins the moment He is 
no longer accepted as our One and All and we are secretly dissatisfied with His 
lordship and consolation. Without denying the catechetical statements, this later 
theology thought that it should reckon seriously with man from another standpoint 
than that of the kingdom and ownership of Christ. . . The real catastrophe of modern 
Protestant theology was not as it has often been represented. . . . The real catastrophe 
was that theology lost its object, revelation in all its uniqueness." 
The problem of religion is not one that tries to see how religion as previously and 
independently defined concept can be brought into relationship with the revelation of God 
in Jesus Christ. "On the contrary, the question is uninterruptedly theological: What is this 
thing which from the standpoint of revelation and faith is revealed in the actuality of 
human life as religion?"" Barth later shows in another way that he regards this question 
as entirely theological when he offers a critique of religion on its own terms. As we shall 
later see, Barth argues that, from the standpoint of revelation, religion must be regarded as 
unbelief. He justifies this conclusion on grounds internal to Christian beliefs. After this, 
he then argues that religion also calls itself into question." On its own terms religion is 
not necessary and bears an inherent weakness. For these reasons religions, as their 
histories bear out, tend toward a crisis, where they move in the direction either of 
'CD 1/2, 291; KD 1/2, 317. 
"CD 1/2, 293-294; KD 1/2, 320. 
37CD 1/2, 296-297; KD 1/2, 323. 
38KD 1/2, 343-356; CD 1/2, 314-325. 
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mysticism or of atheism. These options, of course, are radically different, but both 
effectively negate the religions from which they stem. It would be beyond the scope of 
this chapter to detail further this "immanent" criticism of religion, but it is very much to 
the point to note how he relates this criticism to the theological evaluation. This, and any, 
critique based on the history (Geschichte) and phenomenology (Phanomenologie) of 
religions can have no more than "immanent significance."" The only decisive 
criticism—that would break religions completely—can come from the side of God in his 
revelation.' However, this kind of application of religious studies is very much the kind 
of ad hoc apologetics advocated by postliberals. Its findings do not establish truth, but 
they may serve to support arguments, just as Barth does here. But just like Barth, 
postliberals insist that such findings, finally, have only relative significance. A theological 
evaluation or position must be theological from beginning to end, or else it is not 
theological. 
This much is clear, then, when Barth summarizes the approach that must be taken 
toward the problem of religion. 
To sum up: we do not need to delete or retract anything from the admission that in His 
revelation God is present in the world of human religion. But what we have to discern 
is that this means that God is present. Our basic task is so to order the concepts 
revelation and religion that the connexion between the two can again be seen as 
identical with that event between God and man in which God is God, i.e., the Lord and 
Master of man, who Himself judges and alone justifies and sanctifies, and man is the 
man of God, i.e., man as he is adopted and received by God in His severity and 
39KD 1/2, 343; CD 1/2, 314. 
401CD 1/2, 355-356; CD 1/2, 324-325. 
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goodness." 
This means, in turn, that "we speak of revelation as the Aufhebung of religion."' 
Barth on the Theological Interpretation of Religion 
Barth devotes the remainder of §17 of Church Dogmatics to explaining this 
proposition in Christian theological terms. This task results in two basic conclusions 
about religion. Negatively, revelation is the abolition of religion: in view of revelation, 
religion is unbelief. Positively, revelation is the elevation of religion: in Jesus Christ, there 
is true religion, and for this reason (and this reason alone) one can say that a true religion 
is possible. 
By no means, however, does Barth let things go with bald assertions. In justifying 
these conclusions, he relates them to the doctrine of the assumptio carnis.' Just as his 
critique of modern theology on the question of religion bears definite similarities to the 
postliberals on modern theology in general, Barth's constructive approach also bears 
strong similarities to the postliberal approach. When he insists that the problem of religion 
for theology is "uninterruptedly theological," he is already aligned with the postliberal 
conviction that theology should be nonfoundational, that it should be, as George Lindbeck 
might well have put it, "intratextual" rather than "extratextual." But by viewing the 
theological interpretation of religion and the religions as an application of the 
41CD 1/2, 297; KD 1/2, 324. 
42KD 1/2, 324. CD I/2, 297. 
43CD 1/2, 297; KD 1/2, 323-324. 
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christological dogma we have the major way in which Barth shares also with postliberals 
in a grammatical understanding of the theological task. 
Barth makes it clear from the outset of Church Dogmatics that he understands 
theology as an "intramural" or "intratextual" activity." According to this conception, 
theologians do not look outside the Christian community to explain, justify, and test its 
language and practice. They do so according to the sources and criteria of the community 
itself. Theologians should never step outside or behind the Scriptures and the language of 
the church based on the Scriptures in performing their task. Theology in the strictest and 
most proper sense is the church's own "task of criticism and correction of her language 
about God (ihres Redens von Gott)."' As Barth explains: 
The Church produces theology in this special and essential sense, in which she takes 
upon herself a self-test. She sets before herself the question of truth, i.e., she measures 
her activity—her language about God—against her existence as Church. Thus there is 
theology in this special and essential sense, because, in the Church, before it and apart 
from it, there is language about God. Theology follows the language of the Church, 
provided that . . . she measures it, not by a standard alien to her, but by her own 
source and object.' 
This source and object is none other than Jesus Christ. For Barth, Jesus Christ is the 
one Word of God. He alone is the self-revelation of God.47 But this one Word of God 
adopt the term "intramural" for Barth's theology from Elsabeth S. Hilke, "Theology as Grammar: 
An Inquiry into the Function of Language in the Theology of Karl Barth," Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 
1976, 1-9, esp. 6; the term "intratextual" from Lindbeck. 
45KD 111, 1; CD 1/1, 1. 
'KD I/1, 2; CD 1/1, 2. 
'Barth follows John 1 and identifies the Word of God with the revelation of God in both the 
objective and subjective sense, so that the revelation of God as the Word of God is the Son of God. The 
revelation of God, then, is the Word of God as God speaking, not merely speech from God. "Even as we 
did not understand the Word of God only as proclamation and Scripture, but the revelation of God in 
proclamation and Scripture, we must understand it in its identity with God himself' (KD I/1, 141). Cf. 
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comes also in the form of Scripture, which is the authoritative human witness to him, and 
in the form of proclamation (Verkundigung) in preaching and the sacrament (i.e., the 
Eucharist), and as it is summarized and delivered in dogmatics through the ages." Thus, 
Jesus Christ stands as both source and object of all the Church's language and activity, 
and thus constitutes the criterion against which the human activity of proclamation must 
be measured. 
Other disciplines such as philosophy, history, and sociology have undertaken to assess 
the Church's language about God. Because they work within their own frameworks, they 
judge the Church's language about God on alien terms, and their criticism and correction 
speak past the problem." Theology must be grounded entirely in Jesus Christ: "[W]hat 
must happen here is that [the Church's] criticism and correction be from the essence of the 
Church: from Jesus Christ as her foundation, her end, and her content.' 
Theology, in Barth's view, is "intramural" in three respects. First, it is intramural 
because it is occupied only with the Church's proclamation of the Word of God, Jesus 
KD IV/3, 1: "Jesus Christ, as he is attested to us in Holy Scripture, is the one Word of God whom we 
have to hear, in whom we have to trust and obey in life and in death" (quoted from the Barmen 
Declaration). Barth is careful to maintain, however, that, as we identify the concept of the Word of God 
with the person of Jesus Christ, we do not lessen in any way the verbal character of the concept (KD I/1, 
143). 
48See "The Word of God in its Threefold Form,"CD 1/1, 98-140; "Das Wort Gottes in seiner 
dreifachen Gestalt,"KD 1/1, 89-128. On the relationship between the concepts of "language about God" 
(Rede von Gott), proclamation (Verkundigung) and dogmatics, see "Church Proclamation as the Material 
of Dogmatics," CD 1/1, 51-97; "Die kirchliche Verkundigung a/s Stoff der Dogmatik," KD 1/1, 47-89. 
49KD 1/1, 4; CD 1/1, 
5°KD 1/1, 4. Cf. KD 1/1, 89: "The presupposition, which makes proclamation to be proclamation and 
with it the Church to be the Church, is the Word of God. It attests itself in Holy Scripture in the word of 
the prophets and apostles, to whom it was originally and once for all spoken through the revelation of 
God" (emphasis added). 
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Christ (understood, however, as not merely personal but also verbal revelation). Second, 
it is intramural because is guided by this very Word of God as its criterion. Third, it seeks 
not to establish the content of Church proclamation, but only to guide and correct this 
activity so that it is true to its source and object, Jesus Christ. In view of these points, it is 
clear that Barth's understanding of theology is consonant with the nonfoundational 
approach characteristic of the later postliberals. Barth's approach does not seek an 
independent standpoint upon which to build theology, nor does it look to external criteria 
for assessment or other disciplines for guidance. On the contrary, Barth opposes such 
moves.51 
Prominent postliberal approaches understand that the theological task is similar to 
uncovering grammar-like relationships and applying them in guiding and correcting the 
first-order language and practice of the Church. In other words, the postliberal 
conception of the theology regards its task as one that seeks and applies rules inherent in 
the language and practices of the Christian community to the very same. Much the same 
holds for Barth. This is seen clearly as he makes the doctrine of the incarnation the key to 
a properly theological interpretation of religion. This move, however, is not peculiar to 
this topic. It is the starting point of all theological reflection on revelation, that is, "of all 
thought and language about [revelation]."52 Indeed, Barth maintains, dogmatics properly 
51"[Other disciplines] judge the Church's language about God on principles foreign to it, instead of 
on its own principles, and thus increase instead of diminishing the harm on account of which the Church 
needs a critical science. And that the more perniciously, when they do it in the name of 'theology'!" (CD 
I/1, 5; KD 1/1, 4). 
'CD 1/2, 124; KD 1/2, 137. 
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"must, of course, as a whole and in all its parts be christologically determined. . ."" If 
dogmatics cannot be regarded as fundamentally Christology, then "it has assuredly 
succumbed to some alien sway and is already on the verge of losing its character as church 
dogmatics. . . . As a whole, i.e., in the basic statements of a church dogmatics, Christology 
must either be dominant and perceptible, or else it is not Christology."' While Barth does 
not claim Christology is only a rule, it certainly does act as "a methodological rule—not an 
a priori principle, but a rule which is learned through encounter with the God who reveals 
Himself in Christ—in accordance with which one presupposes a particular understanding 
of God's Self-revelation in reflecting upon each and every other doctrinal topic."' 
53CD 1/2, 123; KD 1/2, 135. 
54CD 1/2, 123; KD 1/2, 135. Barth goes on to explain: "That is precisely why there has to be a 
special Christology, an express doctrine of the person of Jesus Christ" (ibid.). In other words, the 
christological dogma must exist for the sake of the theological task. This understanding is immediately 
supported by Barth's own qualification about treating Christology, which is that he will treat it only as far 
as is necessary for a complete explication of revelation. 
Barth regards treatment of this doctrine, as is also the case with the trinitarian dogma, as an 
individual statement, "if not as an error, at least as a lurking source of error in earlier Christian doctrine. 
As such, it has had a disastrous effect, and it is our present task to overcome it. After all that has befallen 
it, church dogmatics will not become 'church' again, i.e., free from the alien dominion of general truths 
and free for Christian truth, until it summons up sufficient courage to restore what is specifically Christian 
knowledge, that of the Trinity and of Christology, to its place at the head of its pronouncements, and to 
regard and treat it as the foundation of all its other pronouncements"(CD 1/2, 124; KD 1/2, 136). 
55Bruce L. McCormack, Karl Barth's Critically Realistic Dialectical Theology: Its Genesis and 
Development 1909-1936 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), 454. 
Mc Cormack's study details the development of Barth's thought toward a thoroughly Christological 
concentration. He locates the genesis of this concentration to May 1924, when Barth came upon the 
anhypostatic-enhypostatic Christological dogma of the early Church (327). McCormack shows that its 
influence on Barth's theology is already present in the Gottingen Dogmatics of the mid-1920s, from 
which he brings to light "the extent to which the fundamental dogmatic decisions which control even 
Church Dogmatics 1/1 and 1/2 were already made in 1924-5 Giittingen" (375). McCormack also shows 
that Barth does not work this "Christological concentration" fully until the treatment of election in CD 
1112 (see especially 458-463). For this study, it is important to note that Barth did not set aside the 
methodological commitment described at length in vol. I; on the other hand, it must also be noted that 
"at the point where Barth would seek to correct critically Christian proclamation in the light of a fresh 
hearing of the Word of God, the `christocentricism' so described provides a further concretization of what 
Barth thought that criticism would most likely entail" (454). 
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Therefore Barth is consistent when he states that a theological interpretation of 
religion must be christological: 
The point of view, to which one has to orient himself in this matter, in order to 
maintain the analogia fidei and not to fall into untheological thinking, is christological, 
from the incarnation of the Word as the assumptio carnis. As the unity of God and 
man in Jesus Christ is the unity of a completed event, so also the unity of divine 
revelation and human religion is that of an event—here, to be sure, it has yet to be 
completed. As God is the subject of this one event, so also he is of the other. As the 
man Jesus does not have a prior and abstract existence, but only in the unity of that 
event, whose subject is the Word of God and so God himself—true God and true 
man—so also here man along with his religion is to be seen strictly as one who follows 
God, because God has gone before the one who hears God, because God has 
addressed him, which man comes in only as a counterpart to God. . ." 
In defending this approach, Barth argues that, unlike modern theology, the older 
Protestant theology "did not praise and magnify Christ in word only, as the newer 
theology definitely had done in its own way. It could also praise and magnify Him in 
deed, i.e., by the actual (tatsachliche) ordering of its thinking about God."' That is to 
say, the christological dogma had real practical (praktisch) importance. Modern theology, 
on the other hand, did not hold this dogma "to be the practical presupposition of its actual 
thinking."58  
According to the doctrine of the incarnation, just as the unity of God and man is that 
of a completed event, so it is also with revelation and religion. They come together in a 
union that parallels the personal union. This has two basic implications. First, just as the 
human nature of Christ has no independent existence from the Logos (anhypostasis), so 
'KD 1/2, 323; CD 1/2, 297. 
57KD 1/2, 323; CD 1/2, 297. 
5g1CD 1/2, 324; CD 1/2, 297. 
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also religion considered theologically is not true apart from revelation. Second, just as in 
the unity with the Logos the human nature does acquire existence (enhypostasis), so also 
that religion which is united with revelation also then is true, not of itself, but solely by 
virtue of its "being assumed" by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
This is why Barth assesses religion as unbelief. In view of the doctrine of the 
incarnation applied to the problem of religion, the theologian must assess religion 
negatively, as of itself being false: "We begin by stating that religion is unbelief. It is a 
concern, indeed, we must say that it is the one great concern, of godless man."" Barth is 
quick to point out that this judgment is strictly theological. "It is not a judgment of 
religious science or philosophy based upon some prior negative judgment concerned with 
the nature of religion. . . . Since it aims only to repeat the judgment of God, it does not 
involve any human renunciation of human values, any contesting of the true and the good 
and the beautiful which a closer inspection will reveal in almost all religions, . . . ."" He is 
also careful to warn that a theological evaluation of religion and the religions must be 
cautious and charitable, and marked by forebearance.' As the judgment of God, however, 
"[o]ur whole existence is called in question," and where this is the case, "there can be no 
place for sad and pitiful laments at the non-recognition of relative human greatness."" 
Barth justifies this stance within the logic of Christian doctrine. He notes two basic 
59CD 1/2, 300; KD 1/2, 327. 
6°CD 1/2, 300; KD 1/2, 327. 
61CD 1/2, 297, 299; KD 1/2, 324, 326. 
62CD 1/2, 300; KD 1/2, 327. 
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theological judgments against religion. The first stems from consideration of revelation as 
God's self-offering and self-manifestation (Gottes Selbstdarbietung and 
Selbstdarstellung).' Revelation is totally the action of God in coming to and revealing 
himself to man. In revelation God tells the human creature something that neither is 
known nor can be known apart from revelation. The capacity to know God rests entirely 
on the fact that a person knows God, which itself is God's work. There is no possibility 
from the human side to know God. A person is able to know God only when and because 
he actually does know God." Therefore, from the standpoint of revelation, religion is the 
human attempt to do what God himself seeks to do and in fact does. As Barth explains: 
"It is the attempted replacement of the divine work by a human manufacture. The divine 
reality offered and manifested to us in revelation is replaced by a concept of God 
arbitrarily and wilfully [sic] (eigensinnig and eigenmachtig) by man. . . 'Arbitrarily and 
wilfully' means here by his own means, by his own human insight and constructiveness and 
energy."' In other words, revelation shows religion to be idolatry. 
°CD 1/2, 301; KD 1/2, 328. 
"M George Hunsinger has pointed out and discussed thoroughly in connection with the whole of 
Church Dogmatics, this line of argument is characterstic of Barth (How to Read Karl Barth: The Shape 
of His Theology [New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991], 32-35). Hunsinger calls this 
motif "particularism," where Barth's theology tries always to move from the particular to the general, and 
not vice versa. Hunsinger explains: 
Negatively, this procedure means that Barth does not first ask about what might be true or 
meaningful on general grounds and then move to fit theological statements into that framework. He 
does not first ask, for example, what we might mean by the word "love" and then go on to apply this 
general concept to God. Nor does he amplify this procedure. He does not first decide on general, 
systematic or nontheological grounds what sorts of things are real and what sorts are possible. . . . 
Positively, the motif of particularism means that Barth strove to take his bearings strictly from 
the particularities of the biblical witness, especially its narrative portions (32-33). 
'CD 1/2, 302; KD 1/2, 329-330. 
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Because it is a grasping, religion is the concentrated expression of human unbelief, i.e., 
an attitude and activity which is directly opposed to faith. It is a feeble but defiant, an 
arrogant but hopeless, attempt to create something which man could do, but now 
cannot do, or can do only because and if God Himself creates it for him: the 
knowledge of the truth, the knowledge of God. We cannot, therefore, interpret the 
attempt as a harmonious co-operating of man with the revelation of God, as though 
religion were a kind of outstretched hand which is filled by God in his revelation. 
Again, we cannot say of the evident religious capacity of man that it is, so to speak, 
the general form of human knowledge, which acquires its true and proper content in 
the shape of revelation. On the contrary, we have here an exclusive contradiction." 
This contradiction works both ways. Revelation is the contradiction of religion. Just as 
religion does not link up with revelation, so also revelation does not link up with religion, 
but instead displaces it. 
The second point is seen by considering revelation as the act by which God reconciles 
human creatures to himself: "As a radical teaching about God, it is also the radical 
assistance of God which comes to us as those who are unrighteous and unholy, and as 
such damned and lost. In this respect, too, the affirmation which revelation makes and 
presupposes of man is that he is unable to help himself either in whole or even in part."' 
This work of God, then, replaces all religion as human attempts at justification and 
sanctification. Revelation shows religion as self-righteousness. 
In saying that revelation is the Aufhebung of religion, then, Barth means that it is the 
negation of religion. Revelation judges religion, and it condemns religion as unbelief 
because it is idolatry and because it is self-righteousness. Therefore, revelation and 
religion stand in contradiction and opposition to each other, not in a mutually 
66CD 1/2, 302-303; KD 1/2, 330. 
67CD 1/2, 307; KD 1/2, 335-336. 
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complementary relationship. But as the Aufhebung of religion, Barth also speaks of 
revelation as the elevation of religion, not because it is possible but because it is so. This 
judgment, once again, is grounded in the analogy of faith that relates and views the 
problem of religion from the standpoint of the christological dogma. In Jesus Christ, God 
and the human creature are one person. Their unity is the unity of revelation and religion, 
and so, just as there is the union of God and man in Jesus Christ, so there is also of 
revelation and religion. Just as the human nature in Jesus Christ does not have an 
existence apart or prior to its union with the Son of God, so also religion has no truth or 
true existence apart from or prior to its union with revelation. But just as the human 
nature in Jesus Christ exists by virtue of the personal union, so also does religion where it 
is assumed by revelation. In this case—and in this case alone—one can and must speak of 
the true religion. 
As in the case of religion as unbelief, Barth discusses this by relating it to other aspects 
of Christian doctrine. In this case, he turns to the doctrine of justification. From the 
standpoint of revelation, all religion is unbelief, that is, a lack of faith. Religion in and of 
itself is never true, nor is it in any respect capable of becoming true. How is it possible to 
speak of "true" religion? Only in the sense that one speaks of a justified sinner: "There is 
a true religion: just as there are justified sinners. If we abide strictly by that analogy—and 
we are dealing not merely with an analogy, but in a comprehensive sense with the thing 
itself—we need have no hesitation in saying that the Christian religion is the true 
religion.' According to this analogy, the true religion—the Christian religion—is true 
68CD 1/2, 326; KD 1/2, 357. 
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strictly by grace. There is nothing in the Christian religion that justifies it over against 
other religions, in the same way that justified sinners are in no respect to themselves 
superior others. As he explains: 
We must insist, therefore, that at the beginning of a knowledge of the truth of the 
Christian religion, there stands the recognition that this religion, too, stands under the 
judgment that religion is unbelief, and that it is not acquitted by any inward worthiness, 
but only by the grace of God, proclaimed and effectual in His revelation." 
This conclusion, however, does not stand alone, because it 
affects the whole practice of our faith: our Christian conceptions of God and the things 
of God, our Christian theology, our Christian worship, our forms of Christian 
fellowship and order, . . . in short our Christianity, to the extent that it is our 
Christianity, the human work which we undertake and adjust to all kinds of near and 
remote aims and which as such is seen to be on the same level as the human work in 
other religions." 
This judgment, in turn, means that Christianity, no less than any other religion, stands 
under the judgment of unbelief. To be sure, it is unbelief in a different way, because 
Christians have a clear knowledge of God, but it is no less serious. But this judgment 
does not mean that the Christian faith is weak or uncertain relative to other religions. 
Rather, it means that in the Christian church all must be made relative to the revelation of 
God in Jesus Christ. 
Another way to describe the emphasis of this discussion is to say that the knowledge 
or doctrine of grace has for Barth definite pragmatic implications. It affects the whole 
practice of the faith, putting all human efforts under the judgment of God. It has other 
pragmatic implications as well. Before we look at these, however, it should be mentioned 
69CD 1/2, 327; KD 1/2, 358. 
70CD 1/2, 327; KD 1/2, 358. 
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that this emphasis on the connection between belief and practice is also characteristic of 
postliberal theology. As the quotation shows, "practice" means more than activity; it 
includes all that Christians think, say, and do. It is this not only to which theology always 
depends for both Barth and postliberals; it is also this for which theology serves as guide 
and correction. 
To return, then, to the implications for the knowledge of grace, it is important for the 
proper understanding of non-Christian religions. All attempts to secure the superiority of 
Christianity to other religions on human grounds or by human argument stand under the 
judgment of God as unbelief. To live by grace means to live in faith. This means that the 
security of the Christian before God depends completely on God. All human efforts and 
anything that may be found in the human creature are excluded. Barth finds it 
objectionable when Christianity neglects this and consequently tries to present itself as 
superior in itself. To accent this point he discusses three major periods in church history 
where this has taken place: the early church, the church after Constantine, and the modern 
era.' While its minority status compelled Christianity to rely on grace and live by faith, 
the church did turn to apologetics, commending itself over its heathen rivals. In these 
efforts it conceived itself as the best way to salvation. While Barth admits that the 
advantages Christianity cited for itself were uncontestable, they were also not ultimately 
decisive. After Constantine, the status of the Christian church in the world changed 
greatly. Now allied with political powers, the church's ambition was often to become the 
first and real world power, as shown in matters such as the investiture controversy and the 
"CD 1/2, 333-337; KD 1/2, 365-369. 
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crusades. The relatively recent collapse of the unity of Church and state signals the 
modern period of Christianity. Against claims that the human creature no longer need 
have anything to do with Christianity, the Christian response has largely been one of 
engaging the skeptical on their own terms. The apologetical task has again taken center 
stage, now in the form of demonstrations that Christianity can provide human creatures 
ways to achieve or realize the goals and purposes which they have already recognized in 
themselves. In this way, Christianity is presented as the fulfillment of an already conceded 
general religious possibility.' 
Since it is by grace alone that the Christian religion is true, these efforts, which rely on 
human efforts, contradict revelation and so are in themselves unbelief, "[fJor contradiction 
against grace is unbelief, and unbelief is sin, indeed it is the sin. It is, therefore, a fact that 
we can speak of the truth of the Christian religion only within the doctrine of the 
iustificatio impii."" The justification of the sinner is a matter of grace, where "we can 
and must perceive that for our part we and our contradiction against grace stand under the 
even more powerful contradiction of grace itself. We can and must—in faith."' In the 
same way, the reality of grace rules out any religion's inherent rightness or superiority 
over against others, including that of the Christian religion. 
This is not to say that Barth rules out apologetics altogether. Rather, as he says earlier 
in Church Dogmatics, "Apologetics and polemics can be only an event; they cannot be a 
9n this we see another variation of Barth's criticism of modem theology on the problem of religion. 
See above, pp. 44-47. 
'CD 1/2, 337; KD 1/2, 370. 
74CD 1/2, 338; KD 1/2, 370. 
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program."' Where apologetics is a program, Barth objects. As an ad hoc procedure, 
however, even he is willing to use apologetics. In all cases, however, care must be taken 
not to distort the gospel. The gospel does not need our help, and it is possible for us to 
defend it so well that it falls down.' 
Barth further clarifies what it means that in the knowledge of grace lies the truth of the 
Christian religion.' It is not by the sheer fact or concept of grace that the Christian 
religion is true, but solely by the name of Jesus Christ. To illustrate this, Barth discuses 
the relationship between Christianity and Pure Land Buddhism (Jodo-Shu and Jodo-Shin-
Shu), which, in Barth's view, provides the most illuminating parallel to Christianity, 
especially with regard to the concept of grace." The Jodo school (founded by Honen) 
insisted that salvation (as they understand it) comes by way of the grace of the Amida 
Buddha. The Jodo-Shin school (founded by Honen's disciple Shinran) went further and 
stressed that salvation was unattainable by human effort or merit, and that it comes only 
through faith in the Buddha. To be sure, there are significant differences between 
Christian and Pure Land Buddhist teachings on salvation and grace, and Barth recognizes 
them." This Buddhist teaching, however, shows that the concept of grace does not 
belong to Christianity alone, and therefore, that even in the concept of grace as such the 
75ICD 1/1, 30; CD 1/1, 33. 
76KD 1/1, 30; CD 1/1, 33. 
"CD 1/2, 339-346; KD 1/2, 371-379. 
78KD 1/2, 372-377; CD 1/2, 340-344. 
"In fact, Barth readily admits that increasingly closer examination of the two reveals ever greater 
differences. 
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Christian religion cannot be judged as true. The decisive factor cocnerning truth is no 
concept at all, but a name: 
Concerning truth and error only one thing is really decisive. . . . the name of Jesus 
Christ. . . . the truth of the Christian religion is in fact enclosed in all the formal 
simplicity of this name as the very heart of the divine reality of revelation, which alone 
constitutes the truth of our religion. It is not enclosed, therefore, in its more or less 
explicit structure as the religion of grace, nor in the Reformation doctrines of original 
sin, representative satisfaction, justification by faith alone, the gift of the Holy Ghost 
and thankfulness." 
With this, Barth brings not only human religion but the religions of the world under a fully 
theological and exclusively Christological interpretation.' 
The True Religion and Truth in Other Religions 
Now that we have seen how Barth's theological interpretation of religion and the 
religions is congruent with postliberal approaches to theology, it may be asked whether it 
makes much difference. If it does not suggest shortcomings or oversights in the usual 
evaluations of Barth's views, then this insight has little more than curiosity value. Let us 
consider the three kinds of objections raised in the opening of the chapter. 
The first objection is that Barth's view is arrogant. This may be answered in three 
ways. First, Barth himself was aware that just such a charge might be laid against him. 
For this reason, he stresses that the judgment of religion as unbelief is strictly a theological 
judgment and is not meant as a judgment against human values. Second, as a religion, 
Christianity fares no better than any other religion. On human grounds, there are no 
'CD 1/2, 343; KD 1/2, 376. 
810sgood Darby Cannon, III, "The Concept of Religion in the Theology of Karl Barth," Ph.D. diss., 
Drew University, 1975, 124. 
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definite reasons to assert the superiority of Christianity over other religions. In fact, 
Christian attempts to do so can be understood as a denial of grace and therefore unbelief. 
Third, Barth's discussion of the problem of religion for theology is not the treatment of an 
independent topic. It develops in close connection with a detailed explication of the 
nature, basis, and scope of theology. Barth is not trying to justify a position arrived at 
intuitively; rather, he is following a very definite and wholly unique logic, and his 
discussion is nothing other than an explicit tracing out of this logic and its consequences 
for this issue. 
The second objection is that Barth does not account for the evidence presented by the 
other religions. As Paul Knitter explains: 
A case in point is [Barth's] verdict on Amida Buddhism. What both the scholar of 
religious history and the Christian theologian see in this form of Buddhism is, as Barth 
admits, the very same belief and practice of "salvation through faith alone." But our 
eyes and mind deceive us, Barth tells us. Why? Because the Bible tells us that 
salvation through faith is possible only in Jesus Christ.' 
Knitter sees this as a clear example of Barth's refusal to allow any finding of the study of 
religions to enter into a theological evaluation of religion and the religions. According to 
the logic of Barth's own argument, however, any concession to another point of view 
involves a denial of the theological nature of such an evaluation. Barth does not deny that 
such findings have relative significance and may prove helpful. But they must not be 
allowed independence from theology. To do so is effectively to deny a theological 
evaluation, because it makes theology relative to a viewpoint independent of Jesus Christ. 
Such findings must rather be made relative to the Christian perspective. To argue as 
Knitter, No Other Name?, 91. 
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Knitter does, that Barth does not allow "the facts" to speak needs to address not simply 
his findings on this particular topic but Barth's understanding of the very nature, purpose, 
and sources of theology. 
In fairness, it must also be noted that, after raising this objection, Knitter does discuss 
Barth's method. But there is no argument with Barth; he simply asserts that the 
Scriptures cannot be understood in themselves but must be related to present-day 
experience: 
. . . any viable method of theology will have to make use of two sources—Christian 
tradition (scripture and its living interpretation through history) and human experience 
(which includes both thought and praxis). . . . Applying the two-source approach to a 
method for a theology of religions, we must recognize that a Christian understanding 
of and approach to other religions cannot be fashioned only from the fabric of 
Christian beliefs." 
This constitutes only disagreement with Barth, but no argument. Clearly a major reason 
for doing so was that Barth's position ran directly counter to prevailing trends. In view of 
this, it is difficult to maintain the objection that his approach is inadequate because it fails 
to account for evidence from the religions themselves. In fact, even raising such an 
objection shows a basic misunderstanding of Barth's approach. 
The third objection is that Barth holds too narrow a view of revelation. Because he 
maintained that God reveals himself only in Jesus Christ, many have concluded that Barth 
denies any revelation outside the historical person of Jesus Christ or the ongoing 
testimony to him in the Scriptures and through the proclamation of the Church. Barth 
himself, however, noted repeatedly that God can and does reveal himself through the 
83Ibid., 91-92. 
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living Lord Jesus Christ outside the church. It is God who must be acknowledged as the 
only one who can set limits on himself. For this reason, Barth not only recognizes that 
"God may speak to us through Russian communism or a flute concerto, a blossoming 
shrub or a dead dog. . . . God may speak to us through a pagan or an atheist" but he also 
insists that we do well to listen." Therefore, the objection that understands Barth to 
restrict revelation to the historical person of Christ, the Christian community, and 
Christian sources, is met. 
At the same time, does this put Barth's conclusion that there is only one true religion 
in jeopardy? To answer this, it is crucial to understand the difference between a religion 
being true and a religion possessing truth. Barth argues that only the religion of 
revelation—only the religion which is made true by Jesus Christ—is indeed true. The 
problem for Barth is to explain how truth can occur in non-Christian writers "given the 
sheer exclusivity of truth in Jesus Christ."' It would be a mistake, however, "to conclude, 
as is too often done by superficial readers of his theology, that his exclusivist Christology 
is incompatible with recognizing truth (i.e., theological truth) in non-Christian sources and 
writers."" On the contrary, given that the risen and ascended Lord Christ is Lord of all, 
one may find and even expect to find that there is truth in other religions. 
In the fourth volume of Church Dogmatics Barth explains the theme of Jesus Christ as 
84CD I/1, 60-61; KD 1/1, 55-56. 
85Hunsinger, How To Read Karl Barth, 234-235. Much of the following discussion is indebted to 
Hunsinger's detailed discussion in this book of this problem (pp. 234-280). 
86Ibid., 235. 
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the light of life." As is the one and only light of life, Jesus Christ is the sole source of 
knowledge of God. This truth, however, may be found outside the words of the Bible and 
the Christian Church. As Barth puts it, there are "lights, words, and truth" that may be 
"spoken in the secular world and addressed to the community from it." While it seems 
that what he has in mind specifically are truths from a secular, non-religious sphere, there 
is nothing that rules out the possibility that some of these truths are found in the teachings 
of non-Christian religions, and it would seem from the citation above, where Barth links 
politics, music, and non-Christian religions together as places in which truth might be 
revealed, that this extension is entirely allowable." 
This possession of knowledge does not make these religions true, nor do these words 
assume equal standing with the testimony of the Scriptures. But they still can prove 
valuable for the Christian community, which should make use of them: 
If they are really true, and we have certainly to reckon with this possibility, why should 
they not do this without being given any canonical or dogmatic status? Their work 
will consist in leading the community at all times and places, and in all its members, 
more deeply into the given word of the Bible as the authentic attestation of the Word 
of Jesus Christ Himself. They will make a contribution to the strengthening, extending 
and defining of the Christian knowledge which draws from this source and is measured 
by this norm, to the lending of new seriousness and cheerfulness to the Christian life 
and new freedom and concentration to the delivery of the Christian message. We may 
let them do this work without the pretension of acquiring from them new tables or of 
being empowered and obligated by them to proclaim such tables. They do not need 
this to accomplish what they can and should accomplish. Why should not those to 
whom it is given to receive these true words confess them with gratitude, sincerity and 
resolution, yet also with the humility which is required at this point too?" 
'CD IV/3, 38-165; KD IV/3, 40-188. 
88William A. Christian, Sr., Doctrines ofReligious Communities: A Philosophical Study (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 213. 
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Seeing how reading Barth's theology of religions from a postliberal perspective does 
in fact answer common objections, three things might follow. First, a more thorough 
study of Barth on the problem of religion from a postliberal perspective might yield a 
fairer, more complete picture and assessment of Barth's theology of religions than has 
been usual in the field. This would include not only looking at other sections of Church 
Dogmatics that bear on the issue, but also a more detailed consideration of his conception 
of the theological task, especially the nature and extent of its logic. Second, it suggests 
that the postliberal perspective may call into question some key aspects or tenets of major 
positions current in the theology of religions, just as it calls into question their evaluations 
of Barth. Third, it might give new or clearer insights into viewing the problem of religion 
from a theological perspective, including what it means even to do so. These insights, 
moreover, would not have to be limited to those who materially agree with Barth. 
CHAPTER THREE 
GEORGE LINDBECK AND A CULTURAL-LINGUISTIC APPROACH 
TO THE RELATIONSHIP OF CHRISTIANITY TO OTHER RELIGIONS 
During the past four decades, dialogue on doctrinal topics has become a prominent 
feature in inter-Christian relationships. Repeatedly dialogue participants have issued 
reports that many find hard to believe. On the one hand, they have claimed agreement on 
doctrinal matters which had been regarded as divisive—matters such as the Lord's Supper 
and the doctrine of justification. On the other hand, each side still held to their traditional 
formulations. How could these things be? 
This question set George Lindbeck in search of a new understanding of doctrine.' 
When he realized that other ways could not account for the outcome that doctrines could 
be reconciled while not being changed, he sought a different way: 
It has become apparent to me, during twenty-five years of involvement in ecumenical 
discussions and in teaching about the history and present status of doctrines, that those 
of us who are engaged in these activities lack adequate categories for conceptualizing 
the problems that arise. We are often unable, for example, to specify the criteria we 
implicitly employ when we say that some changes are faithful to a doctrinal tradition 
and others unfaithful, or some doctrinal differences are church-dividing and others not. 
Doctrines, in other words, do not behave the way they should, given our customary 
suppositions about the kinds of things they are. We clearly need new and better ways 
'George A. Lindbeck is professor emeritus at Yale Divinity School, where he taught historical theology. 
He has also long been active as a observer of ecumenical developments and as a Lutheran participant in 
ecumenical debates, particularly with Roman Catholics. Along with Hans Frei, he is widely acknowledged 
as the most influential of postliberal thinkers. The term "postliberal" is his coinage. 
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of understanding their nature and function.' 
The most detailed results of this search are found in The Nature of Doctrine, in which 
he lays out an account combining a "cultural-linguistic" model of religion, a "regulative" 
understanding of doctrine, and a "postliberal" approach to theology. This book has been 
among the most influential and widely discussed postliberal accounts. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to find that his approach to questions concerning the relationship of Christianity 
to non-Christian religions exhibits some of postliberalism's most widely known and 
discussed features. We should note, however, that Lindbeck had already addressed some 
of these questions several years before he published The Nature of Doctrine.' Still, it is in 
this book that he discusses most extensively issues involved in the field of the theology of 
religions, and so it will be central to the presentation here. 
2George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984), 7. Lindbeck goes on to explain that his "inquiry is very much 
a matter of seeking concepts that will remove anomalies." (8). The anomalies here "have to do especially with 
the interrelationship of doctrinal permanence and change, conflict and compatibility, unity and disunity, and 
variety and uniformity among, but especially within, religions" (9). Lindbeck owes the conception of an 
inquiry seeking to remove anomalies to Thomas S. Kuhn in his book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
2d. ed. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970). Cf. Lindbeck, "Theologische Methode and 
Wissenschafistheorie," Theologische Revue 74 (1978): 266-280. Hans Frei has stressed this point as well: 
"Doctrinal reconciliation without doctrinal change is what Lindbeck reports from his large ecumenical 
experience: How to understand or account for 'the intertwining of variability and invariability in matters of 
faith' (p. 17 [of The Nature ofDoctrine])? The whole book is governed by that question." Hans W. Frei, 
"Epilogue: George Lindbeck and The Nature of Doctrine," in Theology and Dialogue: Essays in 
Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce D. Marshall (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1990), 277. 
'His earlier writings in the field of the theology of religions are "Fides ex auditu and the Salvation of 
non-Christians: Contemporary Catholic and Protestant Positions," in The Gospel and the Ambiguity of the 
Church, ed. Vilmos Vajta (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974), 122-157, and "Unbelievers and the Sola 
Christi," Dialog 12 (1973): 182-189, which is a revised and condensed version of portions of the former 
essay. 
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Lindbeck on Models of Religion 
According to Lindbeck, Christian theologians since medieval times have viewed 
religion and doctrine basically along two lines, which he calls "cognitivist" and 
"experiential-expressive."' The cognitivist approach, which Lindbeck identifies with 
premodern theology, "emphasizes the cognitive aspects of religion and stresses the ways in 
which church doctrines function as informative propositions or truth claims about 
objective realities."' In this view, religion is analogous to classical conceptions of science 
and philosophy, consisting essentially in accepting sets of propositions as objectively and 
immutably true.6 
In many quarters of Christianity, the cognitivist view has been superseded by an 
experiential-expressivist view of religion, which regards doctrines "as noninformative and 
nondiscursive symbols of inner feelings, attitudes, or existential orientations."' The 
"crucial affirmation" of experiential-expressive accounts has been that of "the basic unity 
of religious experience."' Although they differ on specific matters, these accounts share 
the conviction of locating "ultimately significant contact with whatever is finally important 
tindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 30. Cf. p. 16, where he find three, not two, types of views on 
religion. Two correspond exactly to the cognitivist and experiential-expressive, while the third is a hybrid 
of these two. He cites Roman Catholic theologians Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan as having probably 
the most influential versions of this "two-dimensional" view. But he immediately notes that he will subsume 
this view under the cognitivist and experiential-expressivist views. 
Ibid., 16. 
6Ibid., 21. 
'Ibid., 16. 
8lbid., 32. 
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to religion in the prereflective experiential depths of the self and regard the public or outer 
features of religion as expressive and evocative objectifications (i.e., nondiscursive 
symbols) of internal experience."' 
The appeal to an individual's experience characterizes much of contemporary Christian 
practice and theology, conservative and liberal.' Quite apart from philosophical and 
theological trends of the past two centuries, individualism, rapid change, and an awareness 
of religious plurality have made it increasingly difficult to understand religion in the 
cognitivist fashion. In response to these factors, many have come to understand religion 
as a personal and internal affair: 
It is much easier in our day for religious interests to take the experiential-expressive 
form of individual quests for personal meaning. This is true even among theological 
conservatives, as is illustrated by the stress placed on conversion experiences by the 
heirs of pietism and revivalism. The structures of modernity press individuals to meet 
God first in the depths of their souls and then, perhaps, if they find something 
personally congenial, to become part of a tradition or join a church. Their actual 
behavior may not conform to this model, but it is the way the experience themselves. 
Thus the traditions of religious thought and practice into which Westerners are most 
likely to be socialized conceals from them the social origins of their conviction that 
religion is a highly private and individual matter.' 
As the appeal to experience first developed, the search for religious meaning was thought 
to lie within the confines of the Christian tradition in its many forms. In recent years, 
however, the boundaries have expanded in the view of many people to include non-
Christian religions. 
9Ibid. 
19Ibid., 21-22. 
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Most theologians following an experiential-expressivist view have assumed rather than 
shown that the apparent evidence from actual religious communities supports the key 
affirmation of a unity of religious experience.' This, however, is the most problematic 
element in the experiential-expressivist account." Experiential-expressivism involves itself 
in a very basic dilemma. The claim of universal religious experience must be balanced 
against the variety of religious expressions. Therefore characterizations of this common 
experience must be vague. Yet in doing so, the claim that religious experience is universal 
becomes empty. As Lindbeck explains: "Because this core experience is said to be 
common to a wide diversity of religions, it is difficult or impossible to specify its 
distinctive features, and yet unless this is done, the assertion of commonality becomes 
logically and empirically vacuous."' 
Instead, it seems that primary movement in the relationship between religion and 
experience is from the outside in: "in the interplay between 'inner' experiences 
and 'external' religious and cultural factors, the latter can be viewed as the leading 
partners, . . . Instead of deriving external features of a religion from inner experience, it is 
the inner experiences which are viewed as derivative."' Lindbeck calls this alternative 
view of religion a "cultural-linguistic" approach. The term itself suggests what he readily 
acknowledges, namely, that recent approaches in cultural anthropology, sociology, and 
12Ibid., 32. 
'5lbid., 33-34. 
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philosophy have inspired this account of religion: 
The elements of this approach are relatively recent but not unfamiliar, and yet they 
have been neglected by theologians when dealing with anomalies such as the one with 
which we are now struggling. It has become customary in a considerable body of 
anthropological, sociological, and philosophical literature . . . to emphasize neither the 
cognitive nor the experiential-expressive aspects of religion; rather, emphasis is placed 
on those respects in which religions resemble languages together with their correlative 
forms of life and are thus similar to cultures (insofar as these are understood 
semiotically as reality and value systems—that is, as idioms for the constructing of 
reality and the living of life).' 
The cultural-linguistic approach views religion as a framework that makes it possible 
to formulate beliefs and to experience inner attitudes and feelings. As Lindbeck explains: 
. . . a religion can be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework or 
medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought. It functions somewhat like a 
Kantian a priori, although in this case the a priori is a set of acquired skills that could 
be different. It is not primarily an array of beliefs about the true and the good (though 
it may involve these), or a symbolism expressive of basic attitudes, feelings, or 
sentiments (though these will be generated). Rather, it is similar to an idiom that 
makes possible the description of realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the 
experiencing of inner attitudes, feelings, and sentiments. Like a culture or language, it 
is a communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of individuals rather than 
being primarily a manifestation of those subjectivities. It comprises a vocabulary of 
discursive and nondiscursive symbols together with a distinctive logic or grammar in 
terms of which this vocabulary can be meaningfully deployed. Lastly, just as a 
language (or "language game," to use Wittgenstein's phrase) is correlated with a form 
of life, and just as a culture has both cognitive and behavioral dimensions, so it is also 
in the case of a religious tradition. Its doctrines, cosmic stories or myths, and ethical 
directives are integrally related to the rituals it practices, the sentiments or experiences 
it evokes, the actions it recommends, and the institutional forms it develops. All this is 
involved in comparing a religion to a cultural-linguistic system!' 
161bid., 17-18. Although Lindbeck traces the roots of the cultural-linguistic approach to religion on the 
cultural side to Karl Marx, Max Weber, and Emile Durkheim and on the linguistic side to Ludwig 
Wittgenstein, only recently has a programmatic approach to the study of religion based on these developments 
emerged. Lindbeck acknowledges that for his views on the development of the cultural side the statements 
of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann have been crucial (ibid., 27, n. 10). Lindbeck cites philosopher Peter 
Winch and cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz as having given examples of the programmatic use of a 
cultural-linguistic outlook for understanding religion (ibid., 20). 
"Ibid., 33. 
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The cultural-linguistic model does not so much replace as relativize both cognitive 
and experiential dimensions of religion to a more basic linguistic or cultural level. The 
religious person does not so much choose and explicitly follow known propositions or 
directives as learn how to think, feel, and act in conformity with the grammar or logic of a 
given religious tradition. Another way to view this is to regard a religion as "above all an 
external word, a verbum externum, that molds and shapes the self and its preconceptual 
experience.' Without this "external word," it would be impossible to identify or describe 
experience qua experience. 
At the same time, the cultural-linguistic model is like the cognitivist account in that it 
maintains that there are meaningful claims about reality. The cultural-linguistic model, 
however, holds that religion in its most comprehensive dimension is a framework for 
thought and life, not a set of claims about reality, because the framework determines the 
kinds of claims that even can be made meaningfully (i.e., consistent with the religion). 
Thus the cognitive dimension of a religion, while important, is not basic but stands in a 
subordinate relation to the cultural-linguistic framework. 
Lindbeck links the cultural-linguistic model of religion with a particular understanding 
of theology. He recognizes that if this view of religion is not useful in the understanding 
of and faithful to the practice of theology, then it must be judged inadequate.' He argues, 
however, that it can be seen as both useful and faithful. This argument inverts the modern 
'Ibid., 34. 
19Ibid., 112. 
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priority of theory over practice." An approach to theology consonant with a cultural- 
linguistic view of religion would look like this: 
Investigators would look at the communal traditions of the first-order use of the Bible 
in worship, preaching, piety and life (and also in theology in its more kerygmatic or 
proclamatory modes). They would then seek to find the second-order concepts and 
theories which make maximum sense of these actual practices. Perhaps the most 
obvious analogy is to the linguistic study of the grammar of natural languages. In both 
instances, the test of theory is whether the distinctions between acceptable and 
unacceptable usage it mandates fit the consensus intuitions of competent speakers of 
the natural or biblical language.21 
The proper method of theology should be "intratextual," not "extratextual."22 In the 
latter type of theology, religious meaning is sought outside the religion. This type is 
characteristic among both those with modern cognitivist and experiential-expressivist 
understandings. In an intratextual theology, meaning is immanent. Like languages, 
meanings in a given religion are understood as constituted by the uses to which terms, 
concepts, and categories are put. "[T]he proper way to determine what 'God' signifies, 
for example, is by examining how the word operates within a religion and thereby shapes 
reality and experience rather than by first establishing its propositional or experiential 
meaning and reinterpreting or reformulating its uses accordingly.' In this sense, 
intratextuality is characteristic of many forms of behavior: 
Hammers and saws, ordinals and numerals, winks and signs of the cross, words and 
"George Lindbeck, "Atonement and the Hermeneutics of Intratextual Social Embodiment," in The 
Nature ofConfession: Evangelicals and Postliberals in Conversation, ed. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis 
L. Okholm (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 222-231. 
2IT. • ima , 222. Lindbeck adds parenthetically that the question of a competent speaker is another issue. 
'Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 114. 
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sentences are made comprehensible by indicating how they fit into systems of 
communication or purposeful action, not by reference to outside factors. One does 
not succeed in identifying the 8:02 to New York by describing the history or 
manufacture of trains or even by a complete inventory of the cars, passengers, and 
conductors that constituted and traveled on it on a given day. None of the cars, 
passengers, and crew might be the same the next day, and yet the train would be self-
identically the 8:02 to New York. Its meaning, its very reality, is its function within a 
particular transportation system. Much the same can be said of winks and signs of the 
cross: they are quite distinct from nonmeaningful but physically identical eye twitches 
and hand motions, and their reality as meaningful signs is wholly constituted in any 
individual occurrence by their intratextuality, by their place, so to speak, in a story.' 
Religions, moreover, are like languages or cultures in that they are not only intratextual to 
a very high degree, but they also embrace all reality and possess what Lindbeck calls the 
"property of reflexivity." This illustration make these notions clearer: "One can speak of 
all life and reality from French, or from an American or a Jewish perspective; and one can 
also describe French in French, American culture in American terms, and Judaism in 
Jewish [terms]."' Theology may be intratextual not only in the sense that it explicates a 
religion from within but in the stronger sense that its description and interpretation 
embraces all things, and that this is done according to concepts shaped by the religion 
itself. This understanding, in turn, has great importance for understanding the theological 
task properly: "In view of their comprehensiveness, reflexivity, and complexity, religions 
require what Clifford Geertz . . has called 'thick description,' which he applies to culture, 
but with the understanding that it also holds for religion."' As a "thickly descriptive" 
241bid
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'Ibid., 115. The term "thick description" is borrowed from Gilbert Ryle. On the notion of thick 
description, Lindbeck cites Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 
3-30. 
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venture, theology requires a close acquaintance with all aspects that the religious 
community undertakes or proposes, and then to explain various features in view of other 
features, not on the basis of external criteria. 
Intratextual theology, then, is non- or antifoundational.' It appeals neither to 
universal structures or features (such as common religious experience) nor to universal 
standards of judgment. A crucial question is whether it implies relativism and fideism, 
because, as Lindbeck admits, these would exact too dear a cost for most religious 
traditions. The issue, however, "is not whether there are universal norms of 
reasonableness," which would make relativism and fideism inevitable, "but whether these 
can be formulated in some neutral, framework-independent language."' In holding that 
the intratextuality of a religion means that its description and interpretation can embrace 
all reality, the cultural-linguistic approach affirms standards of judgment and claims about 
reality that apply universally. What is denied is the possibility of a neutral language into 
which all religions can be translated and thus compared. In this sense (and not in the 
wider, relativistic sense) intratextual theology is nonfoundational. 
The cultural-linguistic view also carries a distinctive view of doctrine. In this view, the 
most prominent aspect of doctrines is their use, not as in the cognitive view as truth claims 
nor as in the experiential-expressive view as symbols, but "as communally authoritative 
rules of discourse, attitude, and action."' Lindbeck acknowledges that the view of 
"Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 130. 
"Ibid., 18. 
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doctrines as rules is not new. The early church regarded its deposit of faith as regulative, 
as the label regulae fidei suggests. Later theologians have also "often recognized in 
varying degrees that the operational logic of religious teachings in their communally 
authoritative (or, as we shall simply say, doctrinal) role is regulative.' That is to say, 
theologians have often recognized that at least one task of doctrines has been to permit 
and exclude "certain ranges of—among other things—propositional utterances or 
symbolizing activities."" The novel aspect of Lindbeck's proposal is that this regulative 
function is the only one that doctrines perform "in their role as church teachings."' He 
admits that it may seem odd to suggest that, for instance, the Nicene Creed "in its role as a 
communal doctrine does not make first-order claims," but this is precisely what he argues: 
"Doctrines regulate truth claims by excluding some and permitting others, but the logic of 
their communally authoritative use hinders or prevents them from specifying positively 
what is to be affirmed."' 
It is important to recognize, however, that the specific sentences in which doctrines 
are put forward, such as those of the Nicene Creed, may themselves also be first-order 
claims. While it may seem that Lindbeck is setting out a theoretical position, on closer 
inspection it is evident that the distinction between first- and second-order relgious 
"Ibid., 18-19. 
'Ibid., 19. Lindbeck defines church doctrines as "communally authoritative teachings regarding beliefs 
and practices that are considered essential to the identity or welfare of the group in question" (ibid.; emphasis 
added). 
'Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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language is based on observation and not absolute. For instance, Lindbeck says about the 
relationship between theology and doctrine on the one hand and direct religious statements 
on the other: 
Technical theology and official doctrine, in contrast, are second-order discourse about 
the first-intentional uses of religious language. Here, in contrast to the common 
supposition, one rarely if ever succeeds in making affirmations with ontological 
import, but rather engages in explaining, defending, analyzing, and regulating the 
liturgical, kerygmatic, and ethical modes of speech and action within which such 
affirmations from time to time occur. Just as grammar by itself affirms nothing either 
true or false regarding the world in which language is used, but only about langauge, 
so theology and doctrine, to the extent that they are second-order activities, assert 
nothing either true or false about God and his relation to creatures, but only speak 
about such assertions.' 
At the same time, however, it is clear that Lindbeck is convinced that for the most part 
"technical theology and official doctrine" are in fact used not to make claims but to 
explain, analyze, or regulate them, and for this reason he speaks of doctrine qua doctrine 
as purely regulative in function.' 
The Cultural-Linguistic Approach and the Theology of Religions 
In The Nature of Doctrine, Lindbeck discusses the relationship of Christianity to non-
Christian religions not out of direct concern for the field but in the interest of defending 
the viability of the cultural-linguistic approach. His model or theory of religion is, in his 
own words, "nontheological." If it is to find theological use, then it must be able to make 
sense of theological issues and concerns. If it cannot do so, then, from a theological 
"Ibid., 69. Emphasis added. 
'Lindbeck discusses thoroughly the regulative or rule theory of doctrine at pages 73-111 of The Nature 
of Doctrine. 
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perspective—and this is ultimately his concern—the cultural-linguistic approach must be 
considered a dead end. What he tries to do, in other words, is to give priority to practice 
over theory and show that his proposed theory fits with the actual practice of Christians.36 
The Christian "practice" that Lindbeck selects is what we have been calling the 
theology of religions, the Christian theological reflection about other religions and the 
relationship of Christianity to them. As he himself admits: "If a cultural-linguistic 
approach cannot make at least as good sense of these emphases as do alternative theories 
of religion, then it will be rightly regarded as theologically uninteresting."" Lindbeck 
discusses three issues in particular: unsurpassability, interreligious dialogue, and the 
salvation of non-Christians. He chooses them because they raise important questions that 
the cultural-linguistic approach must answer adequately if it is to be regarded as 
theologically useful: 
Can the possible truth of one or another of these assertions of unsurpassability be 
admitted; or, more precisely, what could such an assertion mean? Could it be 
interpreted in such a way as to allow for the desirability of nonproselytizing 
interreligious dialogue and cooperation, and for the possibility of salvation, however 
IsLindbeck, "Atonement and the Hermeneutics of Intratextual Social Embodiment," 222. It may seem 
that is Lindbeck arguing for a better theory as such. This, however, is not the case. Hans Frei discerns rightly 
what Lindbeck is doing: "To be sure, Lindbeck thinks of [the cultural-linguistic approach] in its own right 
as a better theory for the general academic study of religion than its nearest rivals, but that's not the point in 
this book: The cultural-linguistic theory or approach to religion is there solely for the service it can render to 
the ongoing description or self-description of the Christian community and, by extension, to conversation in 
which members of various religions would be making grammatical remarks to each other about living, 
believeing, and ritually enacting what their religion is about" (Frei, "Epilogue: George Lindbeck and The 
Nature ofDoctrine," 277. Emphasis original.) Frei goes on to make the point that Lindbeck's ecumenical 
experience indeed plays a crucial role in the argument of the book. "Without the absolute priority of that 
Christian-ecumenical reality, without its reality, forget the 'rule' or regulative approach, forget the 
cultural-linguistic theory—forget the book" (iibid., 278. Emphasis original.). In other words, it is the actual 
practice that is given priority, not the cultural-linguistic theory. My point is that this same general pattern 
is followed in his discussion on the cultural-linguistic approach and issues in the theology of religions. 
37Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 46-47. 
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defined, outside the one true faith, if there is such a thing?38 
Underlying these distinct issues, however, is the question of truth, as the title of the 
chapter itself suggests: "Many Religions and the One True Faith." The reason is that a 
cultural-linguistic approach does not seem well suited to accounting for the claims to truth 
that characterize at least some actual religious communities. Therefore, he also discusses 
the implications of the cultural-linguistic model for the nature of truth and truth claims. 
Religions and Their Claims to Unsurpassibility 
Lindbeck recognizes that the cultural-linguistic model would likely prove unconvincing 
unless it were able to allow religions to claim superiority to other religions. "It must not, 
in other words, exclude the claims religions make about themselves, and it must supply 
some interpretation of what these claims mean."" Lindbeck recognizes that theologians 
have overlooked the cultural-linguistic perspective because it seems unsuited to allowing 
for the possibility that one faith is superior to another. The reason has to do with apparent 
meaninglessness of asking whether a language or a culture is more true than another: "One 
language or culture is not generally thought of as 'truer' than another, much less 
unsurpassable, and yet that is what some religions profess to be."" If a religion is likened 
to a language, then is it even meaningful to ask whether one religion can be truer than 
another? A cultural-linguistic model may seem to suggest that it is not, and if this is so, 
38Ibid., 46. 
Ibid., 46. Here Lindbeck observes: "The claim to finality is widespread in Western (or, more precisely, 
Middle Eastern) monotheisms, whether Jewish, Christian, or Islamic, and it appears to be at least implicit 
in Buddhism and some forms of Hinduism . . ." 
'Ibid. 
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then it has limited usefulness at best. 
The different models of religion imply different terms of understanding and comparing 
religious truth claims. The cognitivist model regards the propositional truth of religious 
statements as the basic point of comparison. A proposition either corresponds to a state 
of affairs and thus is true, or fails so to correspond and thus is false. Religious statements 
are either always true or always false. A given religion, however, is composed of many 
such statements, and so at least some, and perhaps all, will be composed of mixtures of 
true and false statements. Accordingly, the basic question when comparing religions 
according to the cognitive approach "is the question as to which faith makes the most 
significant veridical truth claims and the fewest false ones."'" 
Truth in an experiential-expressive model of religion is a function of symbolic efficacy, 
that is, "according to how effectively they articulate or represent and communicate that 
inner experience of the divine (or, perhaps, of the 'unconditioned') which is held to be 
common to them all."' Experiential-expressivism holds that all religions are different 
manifestations of a common, prereflective experience, and so function in a nondiscursive, 
symbolic sense. Therefore the key to comparison cannot be whether a certain religion 
works in this way, because by definition they all do. Comparisons of truth can only be 
drawn with regard to the degree to which they actually function in this way, that is, to the 
degree that they are symbolically efficacious. 
Since the cultural-linguistic approach regards religions "primarily as different idioms 
411bid., 47. 
42Thid. 
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for construing reality, expressing experiences, and ordering life," the question of truth 
among religions accordingly focuses on the categories "in terms of which truth claims are 
made and expressive symbolisms employed."' In other words, the question of truth asks 
about the adequacy of the "grammar" that a religion employs when it deploys its 
vocabulary of propositional claims and representations of inner religious experiences. This 
question is not so much an option distinct from the other two as an inquiry more basic to 
the truth of religions than those of the correspondence of truth claims to reality or of the 
efficacy of religious statement to symbolize prereflective experiences. The categorical 
adequacy of a religion means that it is possible for a religion to express truth in 
propositional, symbolic, or practical terms, but it does not guarantee that this happens or 
fails to happen. For instance, it is impossible to say whether one thing is larger than 
another if one lacks the categorical concept of size. But having this concept still does not 
insure that a given claim or judgment regarding size is indeed correct. Possession of the 
concept only guarantees that conceptually meaningful statements are possible. In the same 
way, "a categorically true religion would be one in which it is possible to speak 
meaningfully of that which is, e.g., most important; but meaningfulness, it should be 
remembered, makes possible propositional falsehood as well as truth."" 
These three notions of truth in turn yield correspondingly different notions of the claim 
that a religion is unsurpassable. Traditionally Christians have understood their faith to be 
unsurpassed in the propositional sense. Most religions are thought of holding both truth 
°Ibid., 47-48. 
441bid. 
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and error, while the Christian faith alone is both perfectly and entirely true, that is, that 
each of its truths is indeed perfectly true and that its truths as a whole comprise the 
fullness of truth that can be known. The notion of an unsurpassably true religion is more 
difficult to grasp under the experiential-expressive model, which views religions as 
expressively rather than propositionally true. When truth is understood as symbolic 
efficacy, "it is a variable quality without any logically intrinsic upper limit (though it may 
have a de facto one)."' A religion can be expressively unsurpassable, but only in the 
narrow and weak sense that, if there exists a religion that is most true and human history 
ends with it unsurpassed, then it will be at that point also unsurpassable.' The categorical 
understanding, however, can be stronger not only than the expressive understanding, but 
also than the propositional understanding. In its strong version, "there is only one religion 
that has the concepts and categories that enable it to refer to the religious object."' This 
religion would alone be capable of both propositional and expressive truth, because it 
alone would have the categorical means to make meaningful truth claims and make 
possible meaningful experiences. Other religions would lack certain of these categories 
and so would be false in the categorical sense. In fact, the very notion of a different 
religion would hinge on differences in categories. Lindbeck compares the categorical 
understanding to a map. A map becomes a kind of proposition when it shows how to go 
from one place to another. If it is misread and misused, however, then it is a kind of false 
"Ibid., 50. 
`'This kind of unsurpassibility would be "a mere historical accident." Ibid. 
'Ibid. 
88 
proposition, no matter how accurate and detailed the map itself may be. Even if it poorly 
represents the area it purports to map, it still can be a true proposition when it guides 
people to their destinations. The categorically and unsurpassably true religion is like a 
map: it is capable of being used rightly and thus guide thoughts and actions in ways that 
correspond to what is truly and ultimately real, but it does not guarantee such right use. 
But if it is a map of some other terrain or territory, then it cannot even be called true or 
false. 
Religions, then, which are different would better not spoken of false in either the 
propositional or expressive senses, because they would lack ways even to conceive of and 
speak of truth. Rather, their discourse would be better understood as meaningless. In 
this way, the categorical understanding of unsurpassable truth is stronger than either 
expressive or propositional terms admit. Lindbeck concedes, however, that the 
categorical understanding of truth and unsurpassibility is in a sense also weaker than the 
propositional understanding. Categorical truth does not rule out propositional error; 
rather, it makes possible both truth and error. For instance, "Even if there is only one 
religion in which reference to God can occur (if there is such a being) yet it will be open to 
all sorts of falsehoods in what it affirms of him."" 
In this way, the cultural-linguistic model allows for the possibility of a religion (and, 
moreover, is consonant with the actual) making of a meaningful claim to unsurpassibility. 
"Ibid., 51. 
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Christians and Interreligious Encounters 
In the cultural-linguistic view, religions may also differ in that they hold 
incommensurable terms. Extending the analogy to mathematics, Lindbeck likens such 
differences between religions to differences between mathematical and nonmathematical 
descriptions of reality. 
"Larger" cannot be translated by "redder," for example, because that would result in 
descriptive nonsense: e.g., the red flag is larger than the Red Square in Moscow 
because it is redder, and vice versa. Similarly, the means for referring in any direct 
way to the Buddhist Nirvana are lacking in Western religions and the cultures 
influenced by them and it is, therefore, at least initially puzzling how one can say 
anything either true or false about Nirvana, or even meaningfully deny it, within these 
latter contexts. Or, to push the same point farther, many Christians have maintained 
that the stories about Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and Jesus are part of the referential 
meaning of the word "God" as this is used in biblical religion and have therefore 
concluded that philosophers and others who do not advert to these narratives mean 
something else by "God."' 
For Lindbeck, the crucial advantage or distinction of the cultural-linguistic notion of 
categorical adequacy is that it recognizes that different religions "may have 
incommensurable notions of truth, of experience, and of categorical adequacy, and 
therefore also of what it would mean for something to be most important (i.e., `God')."5°  
Both cognitive and experiential-expressive approaches must propose or suppose a 
framework held in common by all religions by which differences may be identified and 
adjudicated. For the cognitive approach, it would be the concept of propositional truth. 
For the experiential-expressive approach, it would a notion of common religious 
"Ibid. Regarding the last sentence, Lindbeck in a note refers to Pascal as supporting such a position, 
and further cites Thomas Aquinas: "Unbelievers do not 'believe that there is a God' in the sense in which this 
can be regarded as an act of faith. They do not believe that God exists under the conditions which faith 
defines. Hence they do not really believe that there is a God" (Summa Theologiae ad 3). 
"Ibid., 49. 
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experience. A cultural-linguistic approach, however, presupposes no such common 
framework. Thus it is open to the possibility that religions are incommensurable in terms 
of propositional truth, religious experiences and their symbolisms, and categories for 
identifying and communicating about both. 
Such a possibility would strike many involved in the theology of religions as troubling. 
The reason is the widely held desire to allow for interreligious dialogue. It is precisely in 
this area, however, that the cultural-linguistic model would seem to be at a distinct 
disadvantage, especially when compared to influential inclusivist and pluralist accounts 
that assume an experiential-expressive view of religion. This view suggests that dialogue 
should explore the core religious experience that supposedly lies beneath the diverse 
expressions of different religious communities. The cultural-linguistic approach, on the 
other hand, leaves open the possibility of incommensurability between religions. A key 
challenge for the cultural-linguistic approach is also to accomodate the desire for dialogue. 
Lindbeck's basic argument is that it can indeed allow a strong case for dialogue, but, 
unlike experiential-expressivist accounts, it does not suggest any particular approach to 
conversation or seek any particular kind of results. 
Lindbeck's argument draws first on biblical considerations. One reason to argue that 
dialogue need not depend on the presupposition of a common core of religious experience 
is that the Scriptures teach Christians to imitate Christ in selfless service to others whether 
or not this service happens to promote conversion. A second biblical reason is that 
passages such as Amos 9:7-8 authorize the view "that nations other than Israel—and, by 
extension, religions other than the biblical ones—are also peoples elected (and failing) to 
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carry out their own distinctive tasks with in God's world.' If this view is indeed correct 
(Lindbeck does not pursue an argument), then it follows that the coming of the kingdom 
of God in part is entrusted to those who are outside the explicit witness of this coming 
kingdom, that is, non-Christians. He contends that it further follows "that Christians may 
have a responsibility to help other movements and other religions make their own 
particular contributions, which may be quite distinct from the Christian one, to the 
preparation for the Consummation.' Thus the traditional understanding of mission as 
evangelization is sharply changed. Under the cultural-linguistic model, the "missionary 
task of Christians may at times be to encourage Marxists to become better Marxists, Jews 
and Muslims to become better Jews and Muslims, and Buddhists to become better 
Buddhists (although admittedly their notion of what a 'better Marxist,' etc., is will be 
influenced by Christian norms)" 
Lindbeck argues that this view of interreligious relationships is no novel innovation on 
his part. For instance, the Second Vatican Council's declaration on non-Christian 
religions makes it clear that the purpose of dialogue need not be conversion but for the 
benefit of other religions.' What is new in his proposal is contending that this kind of 
understanding is made more convincingly under a cultural-linguistic approach than an 
experiential-expressive one. The cultural-linguistic model does not presuppose a common 
"Ibid., 54. 
Ibid. 
'Lindbeck cites Nostra Aetate (Declaration on the Relation of the Church to non-Christian Religions) 
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core, and for this reason does not assume that religions are in varying degrees aiming 
toward the same goal or saying the same things. "One can admit the unsubstitutable 
uniqueness of the God-willed missions of non-Christian religions when one thinks of these 
faiths, not as objectifying poorly what Christianity objectifies well (as Karl Rainier 
proposes), but as cultural-linguistic systems within which potentialities can be actualized 
and realities explored that are not within the direct purview of the peoples of Messianic 
witness, but that are nevertheless God-willed and God-approved anticipations of aspects 
of the coming kingdom."' In this way, Christians are better able to show respect to other 
religions. 
Lindbeck admits that the Bible nowhere discusses this move, but if it is not approved, 
neither then is it prohibited. Because it draws on biblical considerations, however, it 
cannot be recommended to non-Christian religious communities for adoption. They must 
develop their own rationales, if they even wish to do so. This condition is at once a 
weakness and a strength. In terms of weakness, it means that no common foundation or 
warrants can be assumed in interreligious dialogues. But this is a strength in that it means 
that dialogue partners do not begin by assuming that they "really" agree. Therefore, the 
dialogue partners, while not beginning with a conviction that they all agree, "are not 
forced into the dilemma of thinking of themselves as representing a superior (or an 
inferior) articulation of a common experience of which the other religions are inferior (or 
superior) expressions. They can regard themselves as simply different and can proceed to 
explore their agreements and disagreements without necessarily engaging in the invidious 
55Ibid., 54-55. 
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comparisons that the assumption of a common experiential core make so tempting" 
Thus a cultural-linguistic outlook means there is "no blanket endorsement of the 
enthusiasm and warm fellow-feelings that can be easily promoted in an experiential-
expressive context," but it certainly permits the development of theological warrants and 
resulting commitment to serious interreligious dialogue and cooperation.' 
Lindbeck's views on dialogue, however, do not imply an outright denial of an 
evangelistic understanding of mission, whose task is proclamation and whose aim is 
conversion. The missionary task, as Lindbeck understands it, is only at times possibly to 
encourage members of other religious communities to be better members. This 
understanding, however, does not rule out for Lindbeck a kind of evangelism. He 
conceives it, however, quite differently than a modern extratextual view would see it. 
Postliberals, he admits, are skeptical about modern projects, but it is not missions but 
apologetics and foundations over which they have their doubts." Their doubts come in 
the conception of the evangelistic task, not over the task itself. Liberals, committed to the 
foundationalism of experiential-expressivism, see the task as translating the Christian 
message into categories and concepts current in the prevailing culture. From the 
postliberal perspective, however, communicating the Gospel is like the offering and the 
sharing of a language." Thus, "[t]o the degree that religions are like languages and 
'Ibid., 55. 
58Ibid., 129. 
"Ibid., 61. 
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cultures, they can no more be taught by means of translation than can Chinese or French. 
What is said in one idiom can to some extent be conveyed in a foreign tongue, but no one 
learns to understand and speak Chinese by simply hearing and reading translations."' The 
postliberal approach would be more like catechesis in the ancient church than a program 
of translating Christian concepts and categories into those of other conceptual 
frameworks: "Instead of redescribing the faith in new concepts, it seeks to teach the 
language and practices of the religion to potential converts."61 This approach is more like 
the early church than contemporary Christendom. Drawing on his own experience, 
however, he has pointed out that this approach is also very much like the one taken in 
China relatively recently: 
I spent seventeen years of my life in China, growing up as the child of missionaries. I 
have been reminded frequently of the Chinese situation, which as I experienced it was 
very much like that of the early church. In the first three centuries of the Christian era 
evangelism took place because people wanted to associate themselves with this 
community of Christians that they found attractive. Years of catechesis preceded 
baptism. In China it took years and years, as the Chinese themselves would later say, 
for them to absorb the language, the understanding ("the worldview," to use abstract 
Christian terms) that enabled their minds to become conformed to the mind of Christ 
well enough for them to begin thinking like Christians.62 
It sees the Christian religion like a language, and like a language it cannot be reduced or 
translated without remainder into another language. Moreover, like a language, it can 
only be acquired over time, and like a language, it results finally in the ability to use it. 
°Ibid., 129. 
"Ibid., 132. 
'Lindbeck, in "A Panel Discussion," 251. 
95 
Salvation of Non-Christians 
The understanding that a religion is an external word (verbum externum) is not simply 
interesting from a nontheological point of view but (more importantly from a Christian 
theological perspective) is congruent with a basic conviction of the Christian faith, that 
faith comes by hearing (fides ex auditu). This bears on the important question of the 
salvation of non-Christians. 
It might seem from his cultural-linguistic understanding of religion that Lindbeck 
would maintain an exclusivist understanding of salvation.63 But, as is the case elsewhere, 
his theological motives are ultimate. His motive here is to try to give an account that is 
compatible with (if not implied by) a cultural-linguistic model of religion (which, as we 
have already seen, he advances for definite theological reasons), and also will allow for 
salvation outside the cultural-linguistic system that usually called Christianity. As he sees 
it, "when the whole of Western society was professedly Christian, it was easy to make 
harsh judgments about the distant and unknown adherents of other religions; but now that 
the world is becoming smaller and more unified and the non-Christians are our neighbors 
and our kinsmen, this is impossible.' 
The problem for Lindbeck is how best to understand the way God works out salvation 
for non-Christians. The prevailing view of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century 
liberalism was that different religions are simply different paths to the same goal. While 
63As Gavin D'Costa concludes ("Theology of Religions," in The Modern Theologians: An introduction 
to Christian theology in the twentieth century, ed. David F. Ford [Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 
1989], 2, 274-290). 
"Lindbeck, "Fides ex auditu," 98. 
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even today many Christians find this view persuasive, there are significant difficulties. The 
crucial problem is that evidence from the different religions themselves that make this 
position implausible. Recognition of such difficulties probably explains in part the success 
of the dialectical and kerygmatic theologies earlier in the twentieth century which sharply 
distinguished Christianity from other religions. One consequence of this shift, however, 
was that for some time it was mostly Roman Catholic theologians who expressed a 
positive theological appreciation for non-Christian religions.' Only in more recent years 
have many Protestant theologians also viewed the relation between Christianity and non-
Christian religions positively.' 
Lindbeck sees two basic types of explanations for the salvation of non-Christians. One 
sees God's saving work in Christ as effective for all human beings in the present life, while 
the other sees the question of final salvation being decided in or beyond death with an 
encounter with Jesus Christ in the life to come.' The first type corresponds to the 
prevailing views among inclusivists and currently is held much more widely. This type 
identifies a prereflective experience of the divine in every religion; that is to say, they are 
experiential-expressive accounts." For instance, according to the influential "anonymous 
Christian" proposal of Karl Rahner, even the non-Christian religions are means by which 
the grace of Christ is made available to their followers, so that the same salvation that 
"Lindbeck singles out Karl Rainier. 
"Lindbeck singles out Paul Tillich and Wolthart Pannenberg. 
'Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 56. 
"Ibid. 
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Christians know explicitly is being worked in non-Christians through their religions. While 
non-Christians have.no conscious connection with Christ, he is "both the ultimate source 
and the only fully and finally appropriate objective correlate of their inner experience of 
salvation."' 
From the cultural-linguistic perspective, the difficulty with such approaches is not so 
much with "ecclesiological triumphalism," that is, that Christians "appear to reflect an 
arrogant claim that whatever is true, good and beautiful in non-Christians is 'really' 
Christian.' Rather, it is that faith cannot be entirely "anonymous" or implicit. It must be 
in some part explicit. These experiential-expressivist accounts, in other words, are 
inconsistent with the fides ex auditu—the conviction that faith comes by hearing. 
Concepts such as "anonymous Christianity" are hard to reconcile with the conviction that 
saving faith comes through the external word of the Gospel, not on the basis of some 
common feature. 
Because of this requirement Lindeck argues that the second type of salvation, namely, 
the prospective or eschatological view, should be preferred!' According to this view, a 
person makes a final decision either for or against Christ only upon death, and this is true 
for unbelievers as well as believers. All previous decisions taken in one's earthly life, or 
failures or the inability to take one at all, are preliminary. "The final die is cast," says 
Lindbeck, "beyond our space and time, beyond empirical observation, beyond all idle 
69Ibid., 57. 
"Lindbeck, "Fides ex auditu," 106. 
'It should be noted, however, that Lindbeck acknowledges that the fides ex auditu interpretation does 
not require an eschatological fulfillment scheme. 
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speculation about 'good' or 'bad' deaths, when a person loses his rootage in this world 
and passes into the inexpressible transcendence surpassing all worlds, images, and 
thoughts."' 
Lindbeck finds this view consistent with the cultural-linguistic model. The early 
Church coined the phrase extra ecclesiam nulla salus: outside the church there is no 
salvation. While agreeing, Lindbeck turns it around and insists that outside the church 
there is no damnation.73 Lindbeck draws out the implication that just as one becomes 
Christian only as one learns the language of faith, so also apart from this knowledge one 
cannot knowingly reject it and thus be lost. One becomes Christian only by acquiring this 
peculiar language. Without this knowledge, neither the language nor the realities of which 
it speaks can be understood. Because of this Lindbeck reasons that neither is it possible to 
reject salvation and so be condemned. 
Truth among Religions 
A leading concern about postliberal theology has to do with propositional truth. 
Alister McGrath, for example, put this question to George Lindbeck: "[W]hat reasons 
might I give for saying to, for example, a Muslim, that I believe that the community, the 
narrative, within which I stand has merit over his or hers?"' Lindbeck responded: 
Why Christianity rather than another faith? The answer would depend on the 
character of the questioner and the character of the questions he or she raises. In 
72Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 59. 
nIbid. 
'Alister McGrath in "A Panel Discussion," 252. 
99 
regard to some Muslims you might say, Look, this is why I recommend Christ rather 
than Muhammed to you. To other Muslims you might present a different set of 
reasons. As Hans Frei expressed it, there is no single logic of coming [to faith]. There 
is a logic of belief. There is a structure of Christian faith. But the ways in which God 
calls us through the Holy Spirit to come to believe are so varied that you cannot 
possibly make generalizations. I would add: people are invariably committed to 
working within a given conceptual cultural language system. We Christians think, 
look and argue from within the faith. There's no way of getting outside the faith to 
objectively compare different options." 
As McGrath's question shows, a key concern over the cultural-linguistic approach is 
whether it allows for truth claims. As Lindbeck's response shows, he believes it can. 
The question is "how?" A cultural-linguistic understanding allows that a certain 
religion might be categorically true, but can it allow that it be propositionally true; that is, 
can it allow that the making of claims that correspond to some external reality?' The 
advantage of a cognitivist view over an experiential-expressivist view is that the cognitivist 
allows for the possibility of such truth, "and a crucial theological challenge to a cultural- 
"Lindbeck in "A Panel Discussion," 252. 
'As Lindbeck observes: 
Christians, for example, generally act as if an affirmation such as "Jesus Christ is Lord" is more than a 
categorical truth: Not only do the stories about Jesus define a singular concept of Lordship (including 
as it does a unique notion of "nonmasochistic" suffering and obedient servanthood); but this concept of 
Lordship—so a theology of the cross maintains—is alone adequate to what is indeed most lordly in 
reality. Nor do Christians stop with symbolic truth, viz., the claim that these stories can efficaciously 
express and communicate the genuine lordliness that Tillich calls "the power of the New Being"; but they 
go on and assert that it is propositionally true that Christ is Lord: i.e., the particular individual of which 
the stories are told is, was, and will be definitively and unsurpassably the Lord (The Nature ofDoctrine, 
63). 
Lindbeck also notes: Languages and cultures "do not make truth claims, are relative to particular times and 
places, and are difficult to think of as having transcendent rather than this-worldly origins," and so seem poor 
"analogues for religions such as Christianity which, as traditionally interpreted, claim to be true, universally 
valid, and supernaturally revealed" (ibid., 23). 
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linguistic approach is whether it also can do so."" 
In mounting his argument, Lindbeck distinguishes between the "intrasystematic" and 
the "ontological" truth of statements." Intrasystematic truth has to do with the coherence 
of statements with other statements, while ontological truth has to do with 
correspondence to reality. The intrasystematic truth of a religious statement does not in 
itself guarantee its ontological truth. If a given religion is not entirely incoherent, then 
intrasystematically true statements are possible. Such statements, however, must also 
correspond to reality if it is to be ontologically true. As Lindbeck explains: "An 
intrasystematically true statement is ontologically false—or, more accurately, 
meaningless—if it is part of a system that lacks the concepts or categories to refer to the 
relevant realities, but it is ontologically true if it is part of a system that is itself 
categorically true (adequate)."" 
Lindbeck, however, contends that the ontological truth of religious utterances "is not 
an attribute that they have when considered in and of themselves, but is only a function of 
their role in constituting a form of life, a way of being in the world, which itself 
corresponds to the Most Important, the Ultimately Rear" Ontological truth depends 
not simply the correspondence of the utterance with the reality spoken of, but also that the 
context in which the utterance is made. In the case of a religion, a statement is 
"Ibid., 64. 
78Ibid. 
"Ibid., 64-65. 
80Ibid., 65. 
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intrasystematically true when it fits with this total context or form of life, and it is 
intrasystematically false when it does not. As Lindbeck explains: 
Thus for a Christian, "God is Three and One," or "Christ is Lord" are true only as 
parts of a total pattern of speaking, thinlcing, feeling, and acting. They are false when 
their use in any given instance is inconsistent with what the pattern as a whole affirms 
of God's being and will. The crusader's battle cry "Christus est Dominus," for 
example, is false when used to authorize cleaving the skull of the infidel (even though 
the same words in other contexts may be a true utterance). When thus employed, it 
contradicts the Christian understanding of Lordship as embodying, for example, 
suffering servanthood." 
The cultural-linguistic perspective is critical of a cognitive-propositional view of 
religious truth because it tends to ignore the crucial if complex connection between 
religious statements and particular ways of thought and life. Speaking specifically about 
Christianity, Lindbeck contends that it is constituted 
not in purely intellectual terms by axioms, definitions, and corollaries, but by a set of 
stories used in specifiable ways to interpret and live in the world. The mistake of a 
primarily cognitive-propositional theory of religion, from a cultural-linguistic 
persepctive, is to overlook this difference. It is unable to do justice to the fact that a 
religious system is more like a natural language than a formally organized set of 
explicit statements, and that the right use of this language, unlike a mathematical one, 
cannot be detached from a particular way of behaving.' 
Lindbeck believes this view is congruent with the suggestion that religious utterances 
acquire propositional force only through what he calls a "performatory" use of language.' 
In this view, a religious utterance "acquires the propositional truth of ontological 
correspondence only insofar as it is a performance, an act or deed, which helps create that 
'Ibid. 
'Ibid. 
mlbid. Lindbeck takes the term from J. L. Austin and refers to his essay "Performative Utterances," in 
Philosophical Papers, 2d. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 232-252, and How to Do Things with 
Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962). 
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correspondence.' He finds support for this in St. Paul's claim in 1 Corinthians that no 
one can say "Jesus is Lord" except by the Holy Spirit (1 Cor. 12:3), and Luther's similar 
claim one cannot affirm that Christ is Lord unless he affirms Christ as his own Lord. 
While Paul and Luther hold that Christ is Lord no matter what any person says or hears, 
Lindbeck finds them also supporting the claim "that the only way to assert this truth is to 
do something about it, i.e., to commit oneself to a way of life."" 
The difference between the cognitive-propositional and the performative-propositional 
views of truth is subtle. It does not involve the correspondence to reality itself; which 
both affirm. From the cultural-linguistic side, the correspondence of a statement with 
reality is not merely a matter of the statement in itself, in isolation, fitting to a certain 
reality, as it is in the cognitive-propositional view. Rather, the statement must also 
correspond to the context in which the utterance is made. This context includes the way in 
which one's life and self is conformed to God. The point, in other words, has to do not 
with the truth itself of religious utterances but rather with their justification ." Lindbeck 
is not disputing with cognitivists that religious utterances may or may correspond to an 
external reality, but he does take issue with the conditions in which one is justified in what 
one claims. One is justified not only when what is said holds corresponds to reality, but 
'Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 65. 
85Ibid., 66. 
86Bruce D. Marshall, "Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," The Thomist 53 (1989): 353-370. See also 
Lindbeck's endorsement of Marshall in "Response to Bruce Marshall," The Thomist 53 (1989): 403-406. 
See also Jeffrey Hensley, "Are Postliberals Necessarily Antirealists? Reexamining the Metaphysics of 
Lindbeck's Postliberal Theology," in Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm, eds. The Nature of 
Confession: Evangelicals and Postliberals in Conversation, (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 
1996), 69-80. 
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when the context of the utterance, including the disposition and actions of the utterer, 
coheres with what is claimed. So, going back to the example of the crusader, his cry did 
indeed correspond to reality and so in this sense was true, but his actions made the 
utterance unjustified. 
It must also be noted, however, that Lindbeck views the correspondence with external 
reality in a highly limited fashion." Here he relies on a highly agnostic reading of 
Aquinas." In this reading, Thomas held that the human mode of signifying (modus 
significandi) does not correspond to anything in the divine being, but that which is 
signified (significatum) does. For instance, when one says "God is good," this is not 
saying that any human concepts of goodness apply to God. Rather, it is to say that God's 
own understanding of goodness applies to God. In this way, to say "God is good" is to 
say something that is meaningful and true, but without knowing the meaning of "God is 
good." 
If the cognitive content of such truth claims about God is so slight, then what is the 
function of these claims? Their function is pragmatic. 
[D]espite its informational vacuity, the claim that God truly is good in himself is of 
utmost importance because it authorizes responding as if he were good in the ways 
indicated by the stories of creation, providence, and redemption which shape believers' 
thoughts and actions; or, to put the same point in another way, seriously to commit 
'Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 66-67. 
'Lindbeck attributes this reading to David Burrell in Aquinas: God and Action (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1979) and in Analogy and Philosophical Language (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1973). He also notes Victor Preller with a parallel account (Divine Science and the Science 
of God [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967]). See The Nature of Doctrine, 71-72, n. 26. Kathryn 
Tanner adopts the same agnostic stance in God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or 
Empowerment? (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 12-13. She also cites Burrell and Preller 
(p. 171, n. 5). 
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oneself to thinking and acting as if God were good in relation to us (quoad nos) in 
ways indicated by the stories involves asserting that he really is good in himself (in se) 
even though, as the canonical texts testify, the meaning of this latter claim is utterly 
beyond human comprehension.' 
Lindbeck, moreover, extends the use of analogy beyond God himself to acts of God like 
the resurrection, creation, and the final consummation. For instance, about the 
resurrection he says: "the significatum of the claim that Jesus truly and objectively was 
raised from the dead provides the warrant for behaving in the ways recommended by the 
resurrection stories even when one grants the impossibility of specifying the mode in 
which those stories signify.' Moreover, only as one learns to use such language does 
their cognitive content, such as it is, become evident. "One must be, so to speak, inside 
the relevant context; and in the case of a religion, this means that one must have some skill 
in how to use its language and practice its way of life before the propositional meaning of 
its affirmations becomes determinate enough to be rejected."' One learns to use such 
language in activities such as worship. Only in this way, through these first-order 
activities, does the cognitive content also become apparent. 
Thus, Lindbeck is able to accomodate the possibility of ontological truth claims within 
a cultural-lingiustic framework. This possibility is not implied by the cultural-linguistic 
model, but then neither is it excluded. The function of such claims, however, seems much 
different than that in a cognitivist model. For the cognitivist, the assertion of 
"Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 67. 
"Ibid., 67. 
91Ibid., 68. 
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propositional truth is the basic function of claims to truth. For the cultural-linguist, 
however, claims to truth are basically categorical and function much differently. They 
provide categories in which claims to propositional truth are rightly made. The function of 
propositional truth, however, is independent of this function. This independence gives 
Lindbeck a warrant for supposing the pragmatic function of propositional truth claims and 
for suggesting the slightness of their cognitive content. 
This, in turn, supports both his understanding of truth being primarily categorical and 
his proposal regarding the salvation of non-Christians. On the one hand, the categorical 
understanding of truth remains basic; truth claims are permitted but not required under this 
view. With regard to salvation, this view of truth further supports the notion that outside 
the church there is neither salvation nor judgment: "nonbelievers are not yet confronted by 
the question of salvation because it is only by acquiring some familiarity with the 
determinate settings in which religious utterances acquire propositional force that one can 
grasp their meaning well enough genuinely to reject (or accept) them."' 
nIbid. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
DOCTRINE AND THE UNIQUENESS OF RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES: 
PAUL GRIFFITHS ON RELIGIOUS PLURALITY 
Hans Frei and George Lindbeck are likely the most influential and best known 
postliberals, with such Yale professors as Paul Holmer and David Kelsey and such former 
Yale students as William Placher, Ronald Thiemann, Bruce Marshall, George Hunsinger, 
and Kathryn Tanner also prominent. A less prominent but nonetheless influential figure 
has been philosopher of religion William A. Christian, Sr.' For instance, Placher noted 
that while Holmer's studies on Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein influenced both colleagues 
and students, it was Christian who had the deeper philosophical influence.' Elsewhere 
Placher singled out Christian's philosophical analysis of interreligious dialogue as a key 
contribution to the postliberal project.' The importance of his contribution for this study 
becomes clear when one realizes that all three of the contemporary postliberal approaches 
examined here are indebted significantly to Christian. George Lindbeck, at whose views 
'Key works include William A. Christian, Meaning and Truth in Religion (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1964); idem, Oppositions of Religious Doctrines: A Study in the Logidc of Dialogue 
among Religions (London: Herder and Herder, 1972); and idem, Doctrines of Religious Communities: A 
Philosophical Study (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987). 
'William C. Placher, "Postliberal Theology," in Modem Theologians, vol. 2, ed. David S. Ford 
(New York and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 126, n. 2. 
'William C. Placher, "Revisionist and Postliberal Theologies and the Public Character of 
Theology," The Thomist 49 (1985): 393. 
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we looked in the last chapter, acknowledged him as contributing to the cultural-linguistic 
model of religion proposed in The Nature of Doctrine.' J. A. DiNoia, at whose views we 
shall look in the next chapter, wrote his doctoral dissertation under Christian and Lindbeck 
at Yale and credits Christian as a key influence.' Christian has also influenced the subject 
of this chapter, Paul J. Griffiths. Unlike either Lindbeck or DiNoia, however, Griffiths has 
no direct connection to Yale.' Nevertheless, he repeatedly acknowledges and appropriates 
insights, concepts, and terms from Christian.' 
Griffiths commends the study of Christian's analyses of religious doctrines in 
Doctrines of Religious Communities to theologians wrestling with questions raised by 
°George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984), 20. In the accompanying endnote Lindbeck notes that it is 
the "relatively greater emphasis on the internal logic or grammar" put on the analysis of religions that puts 
Christian's account among what Lindbeck called "cultural-linguistic" approaches. 
'Joseph A. DiNoia, "Catholic Theology of Religions and Interreligious Dialogue: A Study in the 
Logic of Christian Doctrines about Other Religions," Ph.D. Diss., Yale University, 1980; idem, The 
Diversity ofReligions: A Christian Perspective (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America 
Press, 1992), 
6Paul J. Griffiths, An Apology for Apologetics: A Study in the Logic ofInterreligious Dialogue 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1991), xii. Unlike many postliberals, Griffiths has not taught or 
been a student at Yale University. He was born hi England and studied theology, Sanskrit, and Indian 
philosophy at Oxford before moving to the United States, where he received his doctor's degree in 
Buddhist philosophy from the University of Wisconsin in Madison. He now teaches philosophy of 
religion at the Divinity School of the University of Chicago, which, ironically, is usually regarded as the 
center of revisionist theology. 
7In addition to the book An Apology for Apologetics (see above, n. 6), see also Paul J. Griffiths, 
"Religious Diversity," The Thomist 52 (1988): 319-327; idem, "An Apology for Apologetics," Faith and 
Philosophy 5 (1988): 399-420, esp. 417 n. 4, which explicitly relates the article "Religious Diversity" to 
the present article and the book of the same title; idem, "The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine 
Defended," in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered: The Myth ofa Pluralistic Theology ofReligions, ed. 
Gavin D'Costa (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990), 162-170 and 171 n. 16; idem, ed. 
Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990), 4-9 and 247, n. 
5; idem, "Doctrines and the Virtue of Doctrine: The Problematic of Religious Plurality," in Religions and 
the Virtue ofReligion, ed. Therese-Anne Druart and Mark Rasevic, Proceedings of The American 
Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 65 (Washington, D.C.: The American Catholic Philosophical 
Association, 1992), 29-44, esp. 32-38. 
108 
religious plurality.' Christian explores first what doctrines are and how they are used, and 
then asks about the kinds of relationship that might be found in a religious community 
between a doctrine's truth and its authenticity and the implications of these relationships, 
and about religious communities' positions with regard to alien claims, i.e., claims from 
outside a given religious community. This work, in Griffiths's estimation, has much to 
offer the theologian: 
Christian's sensitive and precise delineation of the ways in which religious doctrines 
may and do function for religious communities provides a detailed intellectual agenda, 
both for those theoreticians who wish to explore the structural and substantive 
significance of religious doctrines in communities other than their own, and for those 
who wish to explore what the inner logic of their own tradition requires them to say 
about alien religious claims. And both these tasks, perhaps more especially the former, 
are of urgent importance for the Christian theological community today.' 
Griffiths both relies on Christian's analyses of doctrine in basic and crucial ways and also 
follows his own advice and undertakes both tasks. 
We shall see this more clearly throughout the chapter. Before we do so, however, it 
might be helpful to give reasons why Griffiths's approach can be counted as postliberal. 
One reason, as I have just been suggesting, is because Griffiths himself is indebted to 
important postliberal influences and views. In addition to William Christian, Griffiths 
acknowledges a significant debt to George Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic approach. Along 
the lines of both Christian and Lindbeck, he stresses the importance of recognizing the 
regulative dimension of doctrine." Like the Yale postliberals, Griffiths views religions not 
8Griffiths, "Religious Diversity," 319-327. 
9lbid., 326-327. 
'See, for example, ibid., 36-44 and 110, n. 2 and 3; Griffiths, "An Apology for Apologetics," 
406-412; idem, "The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended," 162-170 and 171 n. 16. 
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as expressions of a common experience or quest but as each having its own distinctive 
aims. Also like the postliberals, he contends that the dominant or primary direction in the 
relationship of experience to language (including doctrine) is from language to experience, 
and not vice versa. Finally, like postliberals, he argues against the systematically 
apologetical approach characteristic of theological liberalism and argues for an ad hoc 
apologetics. 
Doctrine and the Problem of Religious Plurality 
In Griffiths's view, Christian reflection on religious plurality has grown increasingly 
sterile. The discussion has "hardened into an apparently endless rehearsal of the merits 
and disadvantages of the standard positions: exclusivism, inclusivism, pluralism, and all 
their varieties and subvarieties."" The non-Christian religions—which are supposed to be 
the object of study in the theology of religions—effectively are being ignored: 
There is usually comparatively little discussion of what any non-Christian tradition 
actually asserts, values, and practices. That is to say, Christian theologians, whose 
major speciality is theologizing about non-Christian religions, have entered into the 
realms of secondary, or even tertiary, processing; they have made the enterprise of 
theologizing about these religions a purely abstract a priori intra-Christian enterprise, 
constrained not by the religions themselves, as they impinge upon and make claims 
upon members of the Christian community, but rather by presuppositions drawn only 
from some particular reading of the Christian tradition.' 
Griffiths does acknowledge that the theology of religions has both a priori and a 
posteriori dimensions; that is, he recognizes that the theology of religions can rightly draw 
on its own presuppositions and reflect according to the accepted teachings and logic of its 
"Griffiths, "Doctrines and the Virtue of Doctrine," 29. 
'Griffiths, "Religious Diversity," 319. 
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own tradition." Repeatedly, however, he stresses that the field's focus on a priori 
reasoning in framing questions and putting issues has meant that concerns about other 
religious communities in themselves have largely been bypassed." 
For Griffiths, the way out of this serious difficulty begins by recognizing that the 
problematic of religious plurality is more complex than usually understood. As the 
typology of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism shows, the field generally understands 
the basic problem as the question of salvation. Griffiths argues, however, that at least 
three questions are involved." One indeed does concern "salvation—or with whatever is 
term is taken by the religious community discussing the question to denote the proper goal 
of the religious life."" Another dimension is related to questions of the attitude one 
should take toward other religious communities. A third concerns the "status, function, 
and significance of doctrines—both the community's own and those believed and taught 
"Paul J. Griffiths, "Modalizing the Theology of Religions," The Journal ofReligion 73 (1993): 
382. 
"For example, see Griffiths, "Doctrines and the Virtue of Doctrine," 29; idem, "Encountering 
Buddha Theologically," Theology Today 47 (1992): 39-40; idem, "Religious Diversity," 319-320. 
"Griffiths, "Doctrines and the Virtue of Doctrine," 29. 
"Ibid. See also Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes, 4-11. As Griffiths recognizes, the 
term "salvation"is problematic: "'salvation' is, after all, an explicitly Christian term, freighted with a 
great deal of theological and metaphysical baggage. It might be thought that by introducing the term here I 
am loading the dice improperly, bringing in by subterfuge a Christian theological term that will prejudice 
the results of the enquiry." He stresses, however, that he introduces the term as a formal designation for 
"the religious goal that each religious community regards as desirable for its members." Christians call 
their goal "salvation," while Buddhists may refer to their goal as "Nirvana." By speaking of both goals as 
salvation, however, he does not mean to suggest or imply that they are identical, analogous, or related in 
substance or result. On the other hand, by using the term, he is assuming that every religious community 
indeed has some goal, purpose, or end in mind for its members, that is to say, has some notion of what he 
calls "salvation" (An Apology for Apologetics, 17). 
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by other communities.' 
Griffiths's own work focuses on this third question, the question of doctrine. He is 
convinced that widespread neglect of the entire category of doctrine has had serious 
consequences, and he contends: 
[p]roper attention to the question of doctrine can only lead to striking advances in the 
understanding possessed by Christians of both their own doctrinal commitments and 
those of others. Both kinds of understanding are badly needed and can only be 
hindered by basing oneself upon the usual a priori [sic] positions developed by 
Christian theologians to think about non-Christians!' 
Accordingly, a basic objective of his work has been "to rehabilitate the category of 
doctrine as a useful one for further analysis of the problematic of religious plurality and in 
so doing to argue that doctrines have virtues perhaps unsuspected by those who identify 
interest in them with a rigid and unbending dogmatism.' 
The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine 
We find a detailed example of giving attention to the question of doctrine in Griffiths's 
contribution to Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered.' Here he puts the category of 
doctrine to use to defend the uniqueness of Christian doctrines and press the point that 
they are central to a proper Christian understanding of encounters with non-Christians and 
their religious communities. This view, however, runs counter to the prominent views 
advanced by pluralist theologies of religions. Their basic argument requires drastic 
"Griffiths, "Doctrines and the Virtue of Doctrine," 30. 
18Ibid., 41. 
19Ibid., 29. 
"Griffiths, "The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended." 
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revisions to central Christian doctrines. As he observes about The Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness, a landmark collection of essays advocating pluralism: 
One of the assumptions shared by many of the contributors to the recent volume 
entitled The Myth of Christian Uniqueness is that certain particularist, exclusivist, and 
absolutist doctrines which have been of great importance to Christianity cannot be true 
in at least some of the ways in which their formulators, propounders, and professors 
have often taken them to be true. It follows from this that many traditional Christian 
attitudes toward non-Christians must be abandoned, that missiology must be 
rethought, and that much Christian doctrine (especially Christological and Trinitarian) 
must be reconstructed almost from the foundations. Among many other things, any 
and all claims as to the normative superiority of Christian doctrines over those 
constructed and professed by non-Christian religious communities must be rejected. 
Such a rejection is the starting point of any attempt to construct a (Christian) pluralist 
theology of religions, and that attempt is, in turn, the central agenda of the 
contributors to The Myth of Christian Uniqueness.' 
Griffiths admits that if the pluralist position were true, then such revisions would be 
inevitable.' But pluralists have assumed rather than argued that this is the case. Further, 
while it is mentioned, it is not "sufficiently stressed" that "the doctrines, self-
understandings, and attitudes of many non-Christian communities will require equally 
drastic revision if pluralism should turn out to be true."' Among other things, "the 
understanding of the nature and functions of religious doctrine presupposed and shared by 
many [pluralists] is jejune, especially in its lack of sensitivity to the wide range of functions 
"Ibid., 157. 
Griffiths illustrates this rejection with a quotation from the preface of The Myth of Christian 
Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology ofReligions (ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter [Maryknoll, 
New York: Orbis Books, 1986]): "In much Christian discourse, the 'uniqueness of Christianity' has taken 
on a larger mythological meaning. It has come to signify the unique definitiveness, absoluteness, 
normativeness, superiority of Christianity in comparison with other religions of the world. It is this 
mythological sense of the phrase, with all that goes with it, that we are criticizing in this book" (vii). He 
further substantiates the point with citations in the collection from John Hick (16-17), Langdon Gilkey 
(37), and Wilfred Cantwell Smith (53-54). 
22Griffiths, "The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended," 158. 
23Ibid., 157. 
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that doctrines actually serve for religious communities."' 
Many pluralists have adopted a narrow functionalist view of doctrine, where attention 
focuses on but a single function: "the transformative effects of professing any given 
religious doctrine (or set of such) upon the individual or community that professes it."25 A 
typical example is John Hick.' He contends that the early church formulations are 
substantially different from what one can conclude about Jesus' own thought from the 
New Testament. He regards the Christological doctrines as "rigid and literal dogma," but 
finds Jesus' own thought "poetry" and "living metaphor."" This very language suggests 
Hick's preference for an "inspiration Christology," which understands Jesus as one but not 
necessarily the unique instrument of the divine purpose. But why this preference? "Hick 
241bid. 
'Ibid., 159. In an accompanying footnote, Griffiths acknowledges that his analysis applies 
directly to John Hick. However, he also applies it to other pluralists, with appropriate "It also applies, in 
varying degrees, to other pluralists. As with all generalizations, there are dangers, and so he asks that 
these generalizations be taken as of heuristic value rather than as precise descriptions of every member of 
the 
"The following largely follows Griffiths's analysis in "The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine 
Defended," in Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered. The summary of John Hick's position is taken from 
"The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity," in The Myth ofChristian Uniqueness, 16-36, especially 30-34. 
"See Hick, "The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity," 31. It may be helpful to cite the passage 
more completely: 
The "son of God" title, which was to become standard in the church's teholgoy, probably began 
in the Old Testament and wider ancient Near Eastern usage in which it signified a special servant 
of God. I this sense kings, emperors, pharaohs, great philosophers, miracle workers, and other 
holy men were commonly called son of God. But as the gospel went out beyond its Hebraic 
setting into the gentile world of the Roman Empire, this poetry was transformed into prose and 
the living metaphor congealed into a rigid and literal dogma. It was to accomodate this resulting 
metaphysical sonship that the church, after some three centuries of clashing debates, settled upon 
the theory that Jesus had two natures, one divine and the other human, being in one nature of one 
substance with God the Father and in the other of one substance with humanity—a philosophical 
construction as far removed from the thought world and teaching of Jesus himself as is the in 
some ways parallel Mayahana [sic] Buddhist doctrine of the Trikaya from that of the historical 
Gautama. 
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takes this line just because it is 'compatible with the religious pluralism being advocated in 
this book.'"' He does not claim that the doctrines comprising an inspiration Christology 
are true, nor does he think that assent to them is preferable to those of the Chalcedonian 
definition; he adopts the position because it is "functionally preferable." 
More explicitly, assent to the sentences expressive of an inspiration Christology make 
possible the realization of theological and practical goals of which Hick approves on 
quite other grounds, and since these goals are less easily realized—and perhaps 
actively obstructed by—assent to the Chalcedonian formulae, assent to the former is to 
be preferred to assent to the latter on that ground alone. The goals in which Hick is 
interested are, briefly: the removal of traditional Christian antisemitism; the removal of 
Christian patriarchalism; the removal of traditional Christian attitudes about missions 
and the inferior status of potential converts; and, finally, the removal of the traditional 
connections between Christianity and expansionist Western capitalism. Profession of 
an inspiration Christology is efficacious in aiding the removal of these things; 
profession of Chalcedonian orthodoxy is not. Therefore the latter is to be rejected.29 
The pluralist understanding sees questions about the cognitive content of doctrines as 
unimportant. In the case of Hick, he does acknowledge that religious communities regard 
at least some of their religious doctrines as making substantive truth claims. Nevertheless, 
his view of doctrine permits him to conclude that differences and conflicts between 
doctrines of different religious communities are ultimately insignificant, even when the 
incompatibilities between doctrines are recognized as genuine and deep, such as the 
disagreements between Asian religions and Christianity regarding post-mortem existence." 
'Griffiths, "The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended," 159. Quotation from Hick, "The 
Non-Absoluteness of Christianity," in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, 32. 
"Griffiths, "The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended," 159-160. The summary of Hick's 
goals is taken from Hick, "The Non-Absoluteness of Christianity," in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, 
20-21 (see Griffiths, 171, n. 9). 
"As an example Griffiths cites the incompatibility between the cycle of birth, death, and rebirth 
taught in Hindu and Buddhist communities with the Christian view of a single afterlife. 
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He argues that, since such disagreements can be resolved only eschatologically, they 
cannot be of decisive significance. Thus, Hick in fact "does not allow the possibility that 
there are genuine, deep-going, cognitively significant incompatibilities among the doctrines 
espoused by religious communities about trans-historical matters that are both taken by 
the communities in question to be highly salvifically significant, and actually are.' 
This view of doctrine has far-reaching consequences for Hick's theology of religions: 
These convictions enable him to do, with apparent sang-froid, what only the most 
assured of traditionally exclusivistic apologists is able to do; that is, to judge that 
certain key doctrines of major religious communities are clearly false, and to do so 
without engaging them upon their own terms, without discussing their cognitive merits 
or the epistemic respectability of those who profess them, but rejecting them solely by 
pointing to a contingent and in many cases weak connection between their profession 
and certain modes of conduct and attitudes that Hick finds reprehensible.32 
But is Hick's view of doctrine correct and complete? Griffiths argues that it is neither. 
And if his view of doctrine is incomplete, "then it is not likely that his easy pragmatic 
rejection of all particularist and exclusivist doctrines will stand."' The radical changes 
proposed by pluralists are "akin to asking a native speaker of English to please try and do 
without nouns, since we have reason to think that using them leads to an inappropriately 
reified view of the world."' Such changes require pressing reasons, but none are offered. 
Vital and pressing reasons are needed for such changes, since they will almost always 
mean, for those who make them, death—or such a radical transformation that the new 
is not recognizable as the old. And pluralists, and here Hick is entirely typical, give us 
no such pressing reasons, nothing more, in fact, than a weak pragmatic argument 
"Griffiths, "The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended," 161. 
'Ibid., 161. 
'Ibid., 162. 
"Ibid., 168. 
116 
based upon an impoverished understanding of what doctrine is and how it functions.' 
Griffiths's response begins with a more complete analysis of religious doctrine. He 
characterizes doctrines in terms of what he believes are their most important dimensions.' 
He finds five important dimensions or aspects to doctrines of religious community: as 
community rules; as definitions of community boundaries; as shaped by and formative of 
religious experience; as instuments of catechesis and evangelism; and as truth claims.' 
These dimensions cannot be rigidly separated and so they overlap to some extent. But as 
a heuristic device, this characterization of doctrine permits a more complete and defensible 
analysis of doctrine. 
For the question of religious plurality, the most important dimensions of doctrines are 
as community rules and as truth claims.' By referring to doctrines as community rules 
Griffiths is saying that religious doctrines have a regulative dimension. This means that 
religious doctrines function as rules governing the life of the communities that profess 
them. Among other things they delineate the kinds of conduct that are appropriate for 
and required of members; provide rubrics for the ritual acts of the community; supply 
conceptual categories to be used by members in thinking about and analyzing their 
religious lives; and, most generally, structure and order the intellectual, affective, and 
36For a parallel but more technical consideration of the nature and uses of doctrine, see especially 
Griffiths, "Doctrines and the Virtue of Doctrines." For this characterization he relies heavily on the work 
of William Christian, especially in his books Oppositions ofReligious Doctrines and Doctrines of 
Religious Communities. He also acknowledges George Lindbeck's proposal in The Nature of Doctrine, 
although, as helpful as he finds it, he notes that he has "significant disagreements" with Lindbeck's 
analysis ("Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defendecl,"171, n. 16). Here, as I have already claimed, one 
can see a definite connection with and debt to Yale's postliberals. 
37Ibid., 162-168. 
'These two dimensions correspond closely to William Christian's distinction of primary and 
governing doctrines. See Christian, Doctrines ofReligious Communities, 1-2, 219-220. 
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practical life of the community." 
In this regard, doctrines are like the syntax of a language. Just as a language has both 
semantic and syntactical aspects, so also a doctrine-expressing sentence may function both 
semantically and syntactically. It functions semantically when it makes "a substantive 
claim with cognitive content"; it functions syntactically when it is "a rule supplying a 
category to be employed in metaphysical discourse!' 
Griffiths believes that the syntactical dimension is "perhaps the most basic of all; from 
it the others flow, . . ."`" He illustrates the syntactical aspect of doctrine by considering 
one of the Thirty-Nine Articles: 
They also are to be had accursed that presume to say, That every man shall be saved 
by the Law or Sect which he professeth, so that he be diligent to frame his life 
according to that Law and the light of Nature. For Holy Scripture doth set out to us 
"Ibid., 162. 
'Ibid., 163. 
'Ibid., 162. In an accompanying endnote (p. 172, n. 19), Griffiths cites George Lindbeck's 
discussion on truth in The Nature ofDoctrine (p. 50) and comments: "Lindbeck goes too far, I think, in 
saying that the regulative function, the marking-out of proper categories for the use of the community, is 
the only job that doctrines do (p. 19), but this certainly is one function that doctrine-expressing sentences 
of the kind under discussion here." Both his agreement and disagreement with Lindbeck is discussed 
most fully in An Apology for Apologetics, 39-44. Basically, Griffiths regards Lindbeck's position (the 
regulative or rule theory) as ruling out theoretically any cognitive content for doctrine-expressing 
sentences. While he fully agrees that doctrine-expressing sentences can and do act regulatively, he finds 
no reason to believe a priori that they can only act in this way. As he explains: 
The doctrine-expressing sentences of an averagely sophisticated religoius community can still 
(and should still) be seen as capable of bearing truth, and this in no way hinders their ability to 
function as rules. Taking this view also leaves open the possibility of interesting empirical 
enquiries into the question of how specific doctrine-expressing sentences do in fact function for 
specific religious communities. 
I suspect, against the rule theorist, that there is no useful a priori answer to this 
question. It is likely that some doctrine-expressing sentences function both regulatively and 
propositionally for some religious communities, some only regulatively, and some only 
propositionally (43-44). 
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only the Name of Jesus Christ, whereby men must be saved.' 
These sentences regulate what the Anglican community says about salvation. As he 
explains: 
The two doctrine-expressing sentences given in this article regulate what it is possible 
for the community to say about salvation; they reject, in very clear terms, the 
application of the category "salvation" to those outside the community, and in so 
doing tell the community that the category can be applied only to those inside. This is 
the syntactic function of the doctrine; it provides the community with rules for the 
employment of a conceptual category." 
Turning again to the example of the Eighteen Article, it can be seen that it also makes 
substantive truth claims, and in this way it is said to function semantically." The article 
proposes something; it has cognitive content. As Griffiths sees it, most religious 
communities regard doctrines of theirs as truth claims: ". . . , almost all religious 
communities take most of their doctrines—at least those that make prima facie claims 
about the nature of human persons and the world in which they live, as well as those that 
make recommendations about what kinds of actions are desirable—to have cognitive 
content and to be expressive of salvifically significant truths."45 We have already 
considered Griffiths's use of the term "salvation" and seen how he means not salvation 
according to any particular community but as a designation for its ultimate aim or purpose. 
In the same way, a "salvifically significant" statement is one that has to do with the goal, 
'Ibid., 163. 
"Ibid., 163. 
"Griffiths notes that the substantive claim, that is, the semantic function, of these sentences is 
exactly of the kind that John Hick would reject as necessarily false. Griffiths further adds that it was 
partly for this reason that he chose this article as an example. Ibid., 172, n. 21. 
°Ibid., 167. 
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aim, or purpose of a religious community. Every religious community "judges that 
membership in it will issue in (or, perhaps, constitute) something that is qualitatively better 
than the other available options and every religious community judges that assent to its 
doctrine-expressing sentences will serve (or, perhaps, constitute) that something."' That 
is to say, not all truth claims are salvifically significant and thus sentences expressive of 
doctrines of a given community. For example, most American members of religious 
communities would assent to the sentence "Michael Jordan was one of the ten best players 
in the NBA [National Basketball Association] in 1989."47 Few, however, would want to 
claim that it is doctrinally expressive, for the reason that it is of no salvific significance and 
has no clear uses or functions in the life of their respective communities. An example of a 
salvifically significant claim to truth, however, is again the eighteenth of the Thirty-Nine 
Articles, which clearly makes claims as to what really is, in this case, that salvation lies 
truly and solely in the name of Jesus Christ. 
As "definitions of community boundaries," doctrines "exclude what is unacceptable to 
the community, reject heresy and so define, conceptually and practically, the bounds of the 
community."" In Griffiths's view, it is clear that doctrines of most religious communities 
often have been formulated specifically for the purpose of excluding things false, 
inadequate, or misleading. For example, most Christological doctrine-expressing 
"Ibid. 
'Griffiths, An Apology for Apologetics, 11. The relationship between a sentence's authenticity 
as a doctrine and its truth or rightness, of which Griffiths here is briefly commenting, is explored at length 
by William Christian in Doctrines ofReligious Communities, 12-34. 
48Ibid., 164. 
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sentences came about as a result of answering and excluding "partial, mistaken, or simply 
inappropriate delineations of the person and work of Jesus Christ.' 
A fourth dimension of doctrines is that they "are both shaped by and formative of the 
spiritual experience of the communities that profess them."5° For Christians, this 
dimension comes through in the saying lex orandi, lex credendi—the law of praying is the 
law of believing. It would be too much to say that what one believes is controlled simply 
by how one prays; many other things may influence belief. It is true, however, that 
worship and devotional practice does influence what is taught and then believed 
(doctrine), and it is conversely true that doctrine, once formed, may in turn later influence 
what one experiences in liturgy and at prayer. 
The fifth dimension is that religious doctrines are used to make members of religious 
communities. There are at least two ways of making members, corresponding to what the 
Christian tradition calls catechesis and evangelism. Both modes, however, are also evident 
in other religious communities. The catechetical mode of making members has a doctrinal 
dimension that is apparent even in the etymology. 
This analysis of doctrine suggest that the functionalist view of prominent pluralist 
accounts is inadequate, because it gives basic reasons why the Christian community at 
least cannot easily give up their central doctrines. One reason is that central doctrines play 
a key role in catechesis and so are regarded to the identity of the community. Another is 
that doctrines are often rooted deeply in the history of the religious tradition through 
5°Ibid., 165. 
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repeated attempts by the community to exclude unacceptable claims and teachings. 
Doctrines are also central and therefore not easily given up because they are related 
closely and symbiotically with the worship and devotional life of the community. Finally, 
they are very often taken simply and without question as true. Given these reasons, it 
would seem difficult, if not impossible, in at least most instances "for the kind of 
superficial and pragmatic reasons suggested by Hick and others" for a religious 
community to give up its central doctrines.' 
If this is the case, then it has important implications for the interreligious relations. In 
maintaining doctrines such as the Trinitarian and Christological dogmas, Christians 
maintain claims that are both fully universal and highly particular. Such doctrines, for 
instance, attribute ultimate salvation for all humankind specifically to the person and work 
of Jesus of Nazareth, the Christ and the Son of God. These doctrines are also central in 
that they serve as rules about how Christians should think and speak. Griffiths concedes 
that the universalistic and particularistic doctrines of the Christian church may turn out to 
be false and so need to be given up. Pluralist thinkers like Hick certainly think so, but they 
show no awareness of "how such claims function for Christians and are rooted in and 
definitive of their communities.' Without such pressing and detailed reasons, however, 
these claims, in both their semantic and syntactical functions, should be preserved. If they 
are preserved, then it will mean an engagement with non-Christians carried out in terms 
quite different from those envisioned by pluralists. It will mean "that the Christian life will 
51Ibid. 
52Ibid., 170. 
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continue to be structured around and given meaning by a certain kind of universalism and 
exclusivism, and this must therefore be a constitutive factor in the Christian engagement 
with religiously committed non-Christians."53 Griffiths acknowledges that universal and 
exclusivist claims may have negative effects on interreligious relations, effects like 
arrogance toward and intolerance of other communities.' But these effects do not 
necessarily follow from these kinds of claims. In fact, insists Griffiths, such an 
acknowledgement "will lead to the crossing of new frontiers in interreligious dialogue, 
frontiers inaccessible from within the pluralist paradigm, . . . ."" 
Doctrine and Interreligious Dialogue 
Griffiths considers the category of doctrine important for a clearer understanding of 
religious plurality and for an adequate Christian approach to relations with other religious 
communities. One benefit is as "an aid in coming to a more accurate understanding of 
one's own doctrinal commitments, as well as of the ways in which ones own doctrines are 
derived, ordered, argued for, and related one to another."' The foregoing discussion 
about the uniqueness of Christian doctrine is an example of this sort of work. It permits 
one to understand one's own tradition in deeper and more ways. This, in turn, can help 
sort out issues surrounding interreligious situations. Another benefit is that it "can provide 
one with a range of legitimate questions to ask about the doctrinal commitments of the 
"Ibid. See also Crriffiths, An Apology for Apologetics, 60-63. 
'Griffiths, "Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended," 170. 
'Griffiths, "Doctrines and the Virtue of Doctrine," 39-40. 
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alien religious communities with which one is engaged.' We shall examine his reasons 
supporting this claim shortly, but first let us consider more fully why he raises these 
concerns at all. 
Basically, he does so for the same reason that he pursues issues in the field at all: 
because the discussion in the Christian theology of religions has become largely a matter 
of a priori reasoning. In this case, he is convinced that the widespread tendency toward a 
priori reflection on non-Christian religions has effectively decided the outcome of 
encounters before they even start. 
If I already know that my Buddhist interlocutors are anonymous Christians; or that 
their faithful appropriation of their tradition relates them to the same transcendent 
reality as does my appropriation of mine; or that they are part of the massa 
perditionis, outside the elect group of the saved—if I know any of these things before 
I begin, I will neither be able to hear clearly nor respond theologically to what my 
interlocutors are saying. Christian theologizing about non-Christians has for too long 
been focussed upon the abstract a priori to the detriment of theological thinking about 
concrete examples of non-Christian religious phenomena." 
Against this tendency Griffiths argues that Christians can and should enter into 
encounters with non-Christian religious communities in an attempt to understand them on 
their own terms and in the expectation that these encounters may be theologically 
meaningful." Understanding them on their own terms means suspending judgments as 
much as possible as one seeks to comprehend their teachings, practices, symbolism as My 
57Ibid., 40. 
'Griffiths, "Encountering Buddha Theologically," 39-40. The three different a priori positions 
are the inclusivist anonymous Christian proposal of Karl Rahner; the pluralist proposals of Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith and John Hick; and a traditional exclusivist view, such as summarized in the phrase extra 
ecclesiam nulla salus. 
59Ibid., 39. 
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as possible. In the case of the world's major religious communities, the amount of effort 
required even for a preliminary understanding likely will be very great. This, however, 
should be no excuse for at least beginning the task. The benefit, moreover, is, in 
Griffiths's view, likely to be great. This will be true even where one must ultimately find 
the other's views or teachings basically unacceptable for appropriation to one's own 
tradition, and even more valuable where it is recognized that something can be learned." 
When engaged with another religious community, attention to doctrine and doctrinal 
features may result in one of three outcomes." First, one result may be incomprehension. 
That is to say, one will be led to 
an acknowledgement of otherness that goes very deep, a realization that there do 
indeed seem to be religious communities in the world whose doctrinal commitments 
are neither congruent with nor opposed to one's own but are simply irrelevant to 
them. Different questions are asked, different concerns are evident, and the overall 
result can be like the feelings produced in a lover of Bach's organ music by listening to 
Indian raga: respectful incomprehension.' 
When one comes to this point, of course, there really is nowhere else to go with 
respect to doctrine. The other two results, however, do suggest further paths to pursue. 
Cases of Recognition 
One such result would be recognition; that is, one sees that "[a]n alien doctrinal 
system may be trying to achieve something recognizably similar to the goals of one's own 
and may, at points, seem to one to be substantively identical in conclusions and even in 
°Griffiths, "Doctrines and the Virtue of Doctrine," 50. 
61Ibid., 41-42. 
62/bid. 
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argument-forms to one's own or even to offer conclusions preferable to one's own."' In 
saying this, however, Griffiths is not presuming to know what these aspects might be 
ahead of investigation; rather, he is encouraging theologians to look carefully and 
thoroughly at other communities' sets of doctrines and discover where similarities actually 
might lie. 
Griffiths has repeatedly pursued the question of whether and to what extent non-
Christian communities may have features similar to those of Christian communities in their 
speaking about God." Christian speech about God is a difficult, complex enterprise. 
Much of it has been undertaken with tools taken from Greek and Semitic sources. Even 
when these tools have been rejected, 
the conceptual rules of the game have still usually been set by the heritage of the 
Hellenistic world, modified, of course, by the Semitic origins. The ideas of substance 
and accident, necessity and possibility, Incarnation and Trinity—these are inescapable 
parts of the Christian theological tradition: one cannot effectively speak of God within 
that tradition without taking account of them.65 
While Griffiths readily agrees that this has had many good results and help to sustain a 
very large and long-lived effort, he also suggests that other conceptual categories and 
different methods might be helpful, too. 
My suggestion is that Christian theologians will benefit from looking in a close and 
critical way (but with intellectual humility and genuine willingness to learn) at 
discourses every bit as long-lived, sophisticated, and productive of texts as their 
"Ibid., 42. 
"For these efforts, see Paul J. Griffiths, "John Vattanky's Gange‘a's Philosophy of God," 
Theological Studies 48 (1987): 687-696; idem, "Buddha and God: A Contrastive Study in Ideas about 
Maximal Greatness," The Journal ofReligion 69 (1989): 502-529; idem, "Encountering Buddha 
Theologically,"39-51. 
'Griffiths, "John Vattanky's Gange.Oa's Philosophy of God," 687. 
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Christian counterparts, discourses which appear to be aimed toward at least some of 
the same goals and which developed historically almost completely outside the 
Christian sphere of influence." 
These discourses might help theologians by providing an example of doing so a similar 
kind of work, namely, "delineating, describing, and arguing for the existence of a 
maximally great being," but conducted with very different categories.' This, in turn, 
might suggest new ways to consider old problems. Or such an encounter might raise 
pressing questions to the theologian, like question a long-supposed universality of certain 
concepts or categories. 
As a suggestion for a starting point, Griffiths has considered some implications for 
Christian theology of an Indian debate between Buddhists and the adherents of the Nyiya 
school (so-called Naiyayikas) over the idea of .1.41/ara, that is, "God."" In this debate 
Buddhists strongly denied both the logical necessity of such a being and its "soteriological 
desirability," while the Naiyayikas affirmed both.' Looking at a few Naiyayika arguments 
of the existence of "God," he concludes: 
The standard-issue Naiyayika position on God's relation to the world is that the 
former is the latter's instrumental or efficient cause. God arranges and shapes the 
world; he supervises the operation of the causal forces that keep it functioning. But he 
66Ibid., 688. 
"Ibid. 
Griffiths explains that the idea of Livara is closely analogous to the concept of God, being "the 
owner, the lord, the powerful one, that being to whcih all great-making properties naturally belong" (ibid., 
689). Similarly, Griffiths explains, IsVaravada—literally, the "debate about isVara"—would be translated 
well as "theology" (ibid., n. 11). Griffiths' account itself is taken from a secondary source, John 
Vattanicy, S.J., Gange.frt's Philosophy of God: Analysis, Text, Translation and Interpretation of 
isrvaravada Section of Gangeda 's Tattvacintamani with a Study on the Development ofNyaya Theism 
Adyar Library Series 115 (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre, 1984). 
"Ibid. 
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is not the direct material cause of the existence of every object in it, and is not 
responsible for either the creation of, or every detail of, the operations of the world's 
causal operations." 
This view comes through most clearly in discussions of karma, which is understood as 
"that force whereby a human's volitional actions have appropriate effects on his or her 
future." The Naiyayikas hold that God's activity in ordering the universe is limited by 
the nature and quantity of karmic activity of human beings. 
The initial Christian response might be to conclude that Nyaya theism is basically (from 
a Christian point of view) an unusual form of deism, and Griffiths concedes that further 
examination may well bear this conclusion out. On the other hand, he asks, "Is it possible 
that, by taking an appropriately developed and complex karmic theory into both their 
theological anthropology and their cosmology, Christian theists might find their sermo de 
Deo enriched?" Perhaps yes; perhaps no. In either case, however, Griffiths believes much 
might be gained by the effort to learn the answer, and this (and not for reasons such as 
reaching agreement or finding common ground between religions) is finally the reason he 
advocates the effort. 
Dealing with Difference: An Apology for Apologetics 
The most likely result, however, probably would be to find that alien doctrinal 
commitments, while comprehensible, relevant, and interesting, are ultimately incompatible 
with and therefore unacceptable to one's own. In this case, one is obliged to consider 
70Ibid., 695. 
71Ibid. 
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engaging in apologetics. 
Consistent with its nonfoundational stance, postliberals advocate ad hoc apologetics.' 
Postliberals are not opposed to all apologetics. They basically agree with Karl Barth that 
"[a]pologetics and polemics can only be an event, they cannot be a programme.' This 
means that apologetics should be conducted on terms specific but shared by the parties 
involved: "we should let the common ground we share with a given conversation partner 
set the starting point for that particular conversation, not looking for any universal rules 
or assumptions for human conversation generally."' 
Griffiths agrees that apologetics should be ad hoc: "apologetics is an occasional 
discipline, not a systematic one."75 For Griffiths, however, the discipline also serves as an 
entry into a much-needed discussion of the status of truth claims in the situation of 
religious plurality. 
. . . a proper understanding of the status and importance of interreligious apologetics is 
essential to a clarification of the significance of religious claims to truth made in a 
context of radical religious pluralism. Religious claims to truth are typically absolute 
claims: claims to explain everything; claims about the universal rightness and 
20n ad hoc apologetics, see especially Hans W. Frei, "Eberhard Busch's Biography of Karl 
Barth," in Karl Barth in Re-View, ed. H.-Martin Rumscheidt (Pittsburgh: Pickwick Press, 1981), 114; 
reprinted in Types of Christian Theology, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1992), 161; William Werpehowski, "Ad Hoc Apologetics," The 
Journal ofReligion 66 (1986): 282-301; William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology: A Christian 
Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), 167-168. 
"Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. I, The Doctrine of the Word ofGod, pt. 1, trans. G. T. 
Thomson (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1956), 33. 
'Placher, Unapologetic Theology, 167. 
'Griffiths, An Apology for Apologetics, 78. Cf. p. 15: apologetics should be "occasional and 
polemical," by which he means that it is "typically occasioned by a specific challenge of some kind, or by 
awareness that the ordered set of sentences for which the apologia is being undertaken is not the only one 
in the field." 
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applicability of a certain set of values together with the ways of life that embody and 
perpetuate them; and claims whose referent possesses maximal greatness. These 
tendencies to absoluteness, although they have certainly been typical of Christian 
doctrines, are not typical only of them; they are characteristic also of many of the most 
interesting claims made by the religious virtuosi of non-Christian traditions. . . . It is 
just this tendency to absoluteness that makes religious truth-claims of such interest and 
gives them such power; to ignore it is to eviscerate them, to do them the disservice of 
making them other than what they take themselves to be.76 
But to ignore this tendency to absoluteness is just what has become the orthodoxy among 
theologians on the goals and functions of interreligious dialogue. "This orthodoxy 
suggests that understanding is the only legitimate goal; that judgement [sic] and criticism 
of religious beliefs or practices other than those of one's own community is always 
inappropriate; and that an active defense of the truth of those beliefs and practices to 
which one's community appears committed is always to be shunned."' The casualty has 
not been simply the practice of apologetics, but much of the theological benefit that may 
be gained through dialogue.' For this reason, Griffiths argues that apologetics "can be of 
enormous philosophical and theological benefit to Christians; even the realintion that it is 
a possibility is an advance over the current theological orthodoxies on these matters.' 
Griffiths explores potential benefits of and major objections to apologetics through a 
careful defense of what he calls the necessity of interreligious apologetics (NOIA) 
principle. Formally put, it asserts: 
"Ibid., 2-3. 
"Ibid., xi. 
""Intellectual challenge and the response it brings is almost always more productive of 
understanding and knowledge than the pallid, platitudinous, degutted discourse in which so much 
contemporary inter-religious 'dialogue' consists." Griffiths, "An Apology for Apologetics," 416. 
'Griffiths, "Encountering Buddha Theologically," 50. 
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If representative intellectuals belonging to some specific religious community come to 
judge at a particular time that some or all of their own doctrine-expressing sentences 
are incompatible with some alien religious claim(s), then they should feel obliged to 
engage in both positive and negative apologetics vis-à-vis these alien religious claim(s) 
and their promulgators." 
By negative apologetics Griffiths means the effort to defend one's doctrines against 
criticisms; by positive apologetics he means the effort to argue that one's doctrines are 
superior to comparable or opposing ones in another religious community. 
There are many objections to the conduct of apologetics. Among the most serious 
objections are those concerning the requirement that at least some doctrine-expressing 
sentences have cognitive content. The importance of answering these objections is 
magnified when it is realized that they are widely held in the theology of religions. 
Moreover, these objections also happen to be among the most important from the 
standpoint of a discussion of postliberal theology. Griffiths's responses to these objections 
will help us discern more precisely the postliberal aspects of his approach as well as locate 
him more definitely with respect to other postliberals, in particular George Lindbeck. This 
locating, in turn, will later help us to identify a key issue with regard to an assessment of 
the postliberal approaches. 
One objection comes from the view of conceptual relativism. This accepts what 
'Griffiths, An Apology for Apologetics, 3. Cf. Griffiths's earlier article "An Apology for 
Apologetics" (of which the book of the same title is largely an expansion), where he defines the principle 
as follows: 
For any two religious communities, R, and R2, any two ordered sets of sentences, Si and S2, and 
at any time, T: If S, and S2 are doctrines of R, and R2, and if, at T, representatives of R, come to 
judge that some members of S2 incompatible with some members of Si (or that S2 and S, in toto 
incompatible), then the representative intellectuals in questions should feel obliged to engage in 
both positive and negative apologetics vis-à-vis S2. (p. 400) 
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Griffiths calls a "principle of equivalence," which might be expressed in this way: 
All doctrine-expressing sentences are equal with respect to the causes of their 
credibility for those who believe in them; talk of the truth of doctrine-expressing 
sentences can be reduced, without remainder, to talk of the causes of their credibility 
for those who believe in them." 
The cognitive relativist and the cognitive realist both acknowledge that there are causes 
that make belief credible. Causes here are understood as any factors that make doctrines 
credible to those who hold them; they may include psychological, sociological, economic, 
political, and cultural factors. The principle of equivalence, then, says that all talk of a 
doctrine's truth may be reduced exactly (without remainder) to such causes of credibility. 
The cognitive realist, however, insists that talk about a doctrine's truth goes beyond 
contingent causes of credibility to non-contingent reasons for truth. Griffiths 
acknowledges that no demonstrative argument for such reasons exists. But he also argues 
that the burden for argument should fall to the relativist and not the realist. The actual 
practices of many religious communities shows that a widespread intutition that there is a 
difference between causes and reasons. "[This intution appears to have been shared by 
the vast majority of the representative intellectuals of religious communities throughout 
human history, and that pursuing it has the major conceptual and interpretive advantage of 
adequately representing doctrine-expressing sentences as they were (and are) understood 
by their promulgators."' Therefore, the burden of proof rests on the cognitive relativist 
to show that their position is indeed more credible than cognitive realism. 
slIbid., 32. 
'Ibid., 35. 
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The position of cognitive relativism denies even the possibillo,  that doctrines have 
cognitive content, and for this reason there is no possible incompatibility between religious 
communities regarding their doctrines. Some influential pluralists do not press the 
impossibility of incompatibility between sentences, but still maintain for other reasons that 
no incompatibility need ever be realized. One such reason stems from a position that 
Griffiths calls "universalist perspectivalism."83 This position basically holds that different 
religions are different limited perspectives on a single, ultimate, and ineffable reality. From 
the usual vantage point of individual communities, doctrines come into frequent and 
serious conflict. When one recognizes, however, that the different religions lead toward 
the same goal or reality, however, these apparent incompatibilities can be seen as different 
ways of expressing or mediating this single ineffable reality. The pluralistic hypothesis of 
John Hick exemplifies this position." 
Griffiths responds by noting that the typically-offered reasons for this position are not 
compelling, and that there are serious problems with the position. One problem is that it 
requires an apologetic discourse anyway. "The thrust of the position is to remove the 
need for excluding as false or inadequate any doctrine-expressing sentence of significance 
to any community. And yet this leads rather rapidly to very undesirable conclusions.' 
For example, the Jonestown community, which brought itself to an end in murder and 
suicide, would have held a doctrine resembling the sentence God is such that God wants 
8 3Ibid., 46-51. 
84Griffiths refers the reader especially to John Hick's Gifford Lectures, An Interpretation of 
Religion (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). 
uGriffiths, An Apology for Apologetics, 49. 
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God's followers to drink cyanide now.86 Griffiths presumes that even advocates of 
universalist perspectivalism would want to exclude this sentence as congruent with an 
adequate description of the ultimate reality. To do so, however, would require some form 
of apologetics. A second difficulty is that the position would seem to require it to hold 
that any claims to cognitive superiority by a religious community for its doctrines would 
be false. This, however, would be to claim that certain doctrines are false, exactly a claim 
that universalist perspectivalism would not want to make. In brief, universalist 
perspectivalism does not offer a convincing case against the position that doctrine- 
expressing sentences are capable of having cognitive content or, by extension, against the 
NO1A. principle. 
A second major challenge to cognitive realism is what Griffiths refers to as 
"experiential expressivism."87 Experiential-expressivism claims that doctrine-expressing 
sentences are expressions of "a single, unique, transculturally, and translinguistically 
available religious experience. This view calls into question the cognitive content of most 
doctrine-expressing sentences because it reduces them to reports of the occurrence and 
(presumably) the nature of certain experiences.' Such a position might be advanced by 
adherents of what Griffiths calls "esoteric perspectivalism," the position that within every 
religious community there is an elite whose experience of the ultimate reality differs from 
9bid. 
'Ibid., 36-39. The term and also Griffiths's characterization and critique are taken directly from 
Lindbeck in The Nature of Doctrine (see ibid., 110). 
'Ibid., 36. 
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the majority of the community but is basically identical to those of other religious elites." 
Griffiths cites two reasons against experiential expressivism. The first is characteristic 
of postliberals: that the position views the relationship between experience and discourse 
wrongly. 
For the experiential expressivist, the relation between religious experience and the 
construction of doctrine-expressing sentences is one-way: the former produces the 
latter, and the function of the latter is simply to express the core attributes of the 
former. This view flies in the face of all that we know from historical, anthropological, 
and psychological studies about the complex phenomenon of becoming and remaining 
a member of a religious community.' 
Such studies, to be sure, show the relationship between experience and doctrine to be 
highly complex and reciprocal, "but if there is a dominant direction of influence it is from 
doctrine to experience, not vice versa. Assent to a given set of doctrine-expressing 
sentences . . . makes possible the occurrence of certain kinds of experience, and may at 
times act as both necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of that 
experience."' The second reason is that the claim that all doctrines are expressive of 
experience is implausible. The sentences for which it is most plausible that they derive 
from and are expressive of experience are first-person reports. Such sentences are not 
typically those expressing doctrines, although there may be some, or they might serve as 
the basis from which doctrine-expressing sentences are derived. 
'Ibid., 51-59. In the endnotes Griffiths cites Aldous Huxley and Seyyed Hossein Nasr as 
examples of esoteric perspectivalism (111). While not cited, Frithjof Schuon would appear an obvious 
example (The Transcendent Unity ofReligions [New York: Harper and Row, 1975]). Even the terms of 
his central distinction, which is not between obvious religious boundaries but across all religious 
communities into "exoteric" and "esoteric" believers, reflects the position. 
"Ibid., 37. 
911bid. 
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It already may have been noticed that while Griffiths agrees with Lindbeck about 
experiential expressivism, he uses Lindbeck's critique in the service of cognitive realism, 
about which Lindbeck was also critical. From the preceding section, however, we have 
already seen that Griffiths recognizes that doctrines have a regulative or syntactical 
dimension. This view parallels Lindbeck's own rule theory of doctrine, which regards 
doctrines in their doctrinal significance and use as purely regulative in nature. Griffiths 
acknowledges that the views of religion and theology associated with the rule theory of 
doctrine, such as the cultural-linguistic model of religion and intratextuality in theology, 
offer "very valuable insights" and their use is "very fruitful."' The earlier discussion of 
the uniqueness of Christian doctrine shows some benefits of these insights. Where he parts 
company is in the purportedly logical claim that doctrines function only regulatively and 
not propositionally. As he reports in An Apology for Apologetics, 
There is nothing in the exposition of rule theory given here that suggests that a specific 
doctrine-expressing sentence cannot possess ontological truth (or be fully 
comprehended) outside the (almost) closed, intratextually constituted, circle of a 
particular religious form of life. Much of it suggests that such sentences are very often 
not fully understood outside the circle, and this is almost certainly correct; but that is a 
very different matter from claiming that they cannot be.93 
 
From our previous examination, however, we must conclude that Griffiths claims more 
for Lindbeck that Lindbeck himself claims. First, the rule theory applies not to doctrine-
expressing sentences, which, actually, Lindbeck clearly insists can operate both cognitively 
and symbolically. This was, after all, the very point of discussing the question of truth. 
92Ibid., 43. 
93Ibid. 
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Rather it applies to the doctrine expressed in these sentences. Second, the regulative view 
of doctrine is an empirical claim, not an absolute or theoretical claim. 
Having said this, however, there is still the question of discerning what really is the 
regulative function or the cognitive content of any given doctrine. Practically, Griffiths 
and Lindbeck may be quite far apart. One suggestion why this may be the case is the 
stress that Griffiths puts on cognitive content. For Griffiths, it is the fact that doctrines are 
often used as truth claims which makes oppositions with the claims of other religious 
communities worth investigating and why the topic of apologetics needs to be reopened. 
But Griffiths and Lindbeck, at least in the basic outlook, stand close together when 
compared to (to borrow Lindbeck's terms) traditional cognitivists and liberal experiential-
expressivists. 
While he defends the apologetical task, Griffiths is also ready to admit that it has only 
a relatively small part of the theological task in today's situation of religious plurality: 
"The NOIA principle simply represents one modality under which theological thinking in a 
religiously plural context must operate if it is to stay honest."94 But it does have important 
practical consequences. As we have seen, it challenges much of the current thinking in the 
theology of religions about doctrine and other religious communities. At the same time, it 
also revives a very useful way for a theologian to learn about not only the claims but the 
internal logic of other religious traditions, an activity that may both polemical and 
constructive implications. 
'Griffiths, "An Apology for Apologetics," 416. 
CHAPTER FrVE 
J. A. DINOIA ON THE DIVERSITY OF RELIGIOUS AIMS 
J. A. Dil\Toia has summed up the situation in the philosophy and theology of religions 
in this way: "Until fairly recently, most philosophers of religion and theologians have 
seemed to want to say that things that look different are really the same."' DiNoia, 
however, now sees "signs of a gathering wave of interest in showing that things that look 
the same are really different.' 
DiNoia's own work is part of the same wave.' He believes that more adequate 
strategies for theology may be found among an emerging postmodern trend: "some of the 
A. DiNoia, O.P., "Teaching Differences," The Journal of Religion 73 (1993): 61. 
'Joseph A. DiNoia, O.P. received his doctorate from Yale University, writing his dissertation under 
the direction of George Lindbeck and William Christian about the Catholic theology of religions (Joseph 
A. DlNoia, "Catholic Theology of Religions and Interreligious Dialogue: A Study in the Logic of 
Christian Doctrines about Other Religions," Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1980. This essay focused on 
the proposal of Karl Rainier). He now teaches at the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, D.C. 
and is editor-in-chief of The Thomist, a Catholic journal of theology whose pages have contained (among 
many other things) some lively and extended discussions of postliberal theology. Beside his teaching and 
editorial duties, DiNoia has also written repeatedly on the theology of religions. DiNoia's most important 
work is The Diversity of Religions: A Christian Perspective (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 1992), which incorporates and extends in a single argument several earlier writings, 
including "The Doctrines of a Religious Community about Other Religions," Religious Studies 18 
(1983): 293-307; "Implicit Faith, General Revelation and the State of Non-Christians," The Thomist 47 
(1983): 209-241; "Philosophical Theology in the Perspective of Religious Diversity," Theological 
Studies 49 (1988): 401-416; "Pluralist Theology of Religions: Pluralistic or Non-Pluralistic?" in 
Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered, ed. Gavin D'Costa (Marylcnoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1990), 
119-134; and "Varieties of Religious Aims: Beyond Exclusivism, Inclusivism, and Pluralism," in 
Theology and Dialogue: Essays in Conversation with George Lindbeck, ed. Bruce D. Marshall (Notre 
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990), 249-274. 
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most creative initiatives on the American theological scene are those that seek to 
transcend the agenda posed for Christianity by modernity."' While not all involved would 
want to be called postmodern, "it is clear that a series of converging developments is 
pushing the frontier of theological reflection beyond engagement with the characteristic 
agenda of modernity."' 
According to DiNoia, a leading characteristic of this postmodern theology is its 
confidence in the Christian tradition. It does not begin with skeptical questions about the 
Christian tradition. Instead it assumes that a religious doctrinal scheme and the pattern of 
life it commends make good sense and has its own unique logical structure. "If in modern 
theology the basic question was, how can a modern person believe this doctrine? then in 
postmodern theology the basic question has become, how can the deep intelligibility of 
this doctrine be exhibited?"' According, a major task of theology is "to discern and 
exhibit this structure," which it does by explicating "the inherent intelligibility of a 
particular doctrine within the whole body of Christian doctrines."' 
This feature is evident in Dflsloia's own approach to the question of religious plurality. 
He insists that the unique aims, assertions, proposals, valuations, and practices that any 
scheme of religious doctrines puts forward should be taken seriously. This means not only 
4J. A. DiNoia, 0.P., "American Catholic Theology at Century's End: Postconciliar, Postmodern, 
Post-Thomistic," The Thomist 54 (1990): 512. 
5lbid, 513. DiNoia counts among those involved such postliberal figures as Hans Frei, George 
Lindbeck, Stanley Hauerwas, and William Christian. 
'Ibid., 516. 
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that individual claims be reckoned with, but that the entire body of doctrine be taken into 
account. This approach relies on the analysis of religious doctrines and arguments 
proposed by Yale philosopher of religion William Christian.' DiNoia find that his "analysis 
of some general features of the logic of [doctrines about other religions] brings a much-
needed perspective to the study of Christian theology."' The results of this analysis leads 
in two directions: they question the outlook of many current proposals in the theology of 
religions, and they provide a starting point to work out alternate approaches. 
Theology and Dialogue 
DiNoia shares two assumptions in common with much of the current thinking in the 
theology of religions: 1) he affirms the availability of salvation to followers of non-
Christian religions; 2) he supports efforts to engage in interreligious dialogue. He justifies 
the claim that salvation is universally available by asserting that it is the position of "the 
historic mainstream forms of Christianity" and refers to the conviction about it as "an 
unexpungeable feature of Christian confession."10 As he further explains: 
93iNoia acknowledges his debt to Christian repeatedly, most fully in The Diversity of Religions, 
172. See also J. A. DiNoia, "The Universality of Salvation and the Diversity of Religious Aims," in 
Mission in Dialogue, ed. Mary Motte, F.M.M. and Joseph R. Lang, M.M. (Marylcnoll, New York: Orbis 
Books, 1982). 390 n. 1. Other philosophical analyses that DiNoia acknowledges dependence upon 
include J. M. Bochenski, The Logic ofReligion (New York: New York University Press, 1965) and 
Ninian Smart, Reasons and Faiths (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). Aspects of both of the 
these works have been dealt with by William Christian, the former in William A. Christian, "Bochenski 
on the Structure of Schemes of Doctrines," Religious Studies 13 (1977): 203-219, and in Christian, 
Doctrines ofReligious Communities: A Philosophical Study (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1987), 30-33; the latter in Christian, Oppositions ofReligious Doctrines: A Study in the Logic of 
Dialogue among Religions (London: Herder and Herder, 1972). 11-12 
9DiNoia, Diversity, 172. 
'Ibid., 70, 94. 
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Mainstream Christian communities have for the most part been confident that, through 
the grace of God, persons can receive and develop the dispositions conducive to and 
necessary for the enjoyment of the true aim of life. They can do so even independently 
of membership in the Christian community, which devotes itself explicitly to the 
cultivation of such dispositions. This confidence is based on the doctrines of the 
unrestricted scope of the divine salvific will and the universality of the redemption won 
for humankind by Jesus Christ." 
His commitment to dialogue stems from the determination of the Roman Catholic church, 
beginning with the Second Vatican Council to commit to dialogue. He sees that Catholic 
theology 
plainly support[s] the attitudes of respect and esteem supposed by the determination to 
engage in interreligious dialogue. Faith in God's all-embracing providential care for 
the human race would seem to require of Christian communities that they admit 
that their own traditions could not have a monopoly on religious truth and virtue. 
Charity and justice demand that Christians appreciate the goodness of other religious 
people; . . . 12 
According to DiNoia, the Christian theology of religions has been occupied above all 
with questions about salvation, questions such as: "Can non-Christians attain salvation?" 
and "Do other religions aim at salvation?' The concentration on salvation shows in the 
predominance of the typology of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism, which, regardless 
of other issues involved, puts the question of salvation foremost. The tendency in the 
field, moreover, has been to allow that salvation is possible for non-Christians: 
"Ibid., 94. Conversely he explains that "[i]t is no part of the Christian story (at least in its 
mainstream versions) that only members of the particular Christian community will enjoy the final 
consummation with which God has promised to end the world's story" (90). Cf. DiNoia, "The 
Universality of Salvation," 377-391, and ibid., "Christian Universalism: The Nonexclusive Particularity 
of Salvation in Christ," in Either/Or: The Gospel or Neopaganism, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Robert W. 
Jenson (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1995), 37-48. 
"DiNoia, Diversity, 32. 
*DiNoia, "Varieties of Religious Aims," 249. See also DiNoia, Diversity, 36. 
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Prevailing positions in the field of theology of religions for the most part focus their 
energies on allowing for the possibility of salvation outside the ambit of Christianity. 
Allied in their rejection of exclusivism (the view that salvation requires explicit faith in 
Christ prior to death), incluvisists (e.g., Karl Rahner and Jacques Dupuis) and 
pluralists (e.g., John Hick and Paul Knitter) deploy various theological and 
philosophical strategies to allow for the salvation of the members of other religious 
communities.' 
Both inclusivists and pluralists usually agree that exclusivist Christian claims about 
salvation are likely to cause offense, and for this reason they reject such claims." As they 
see it, "[tjo ascribe a uniquely salvific role to Jesus Christ would constitute a denial of the 
salvific role of other religious founders (like the Buddha and Muhammed) and thus would 
be an affront to their communities."16 
DiNoia finds no reason to think this must be the case. He asks: suppose a Buddhist 
were to warn him (a Christian) that he would never attain Nirvana by following the course 
of life laid out by the Christian community." Would he feel anxious about this? No, 
because he has not been persuaded that he should be seeking Nirvana in the first place. Of 
141bid
., 
 i
x. 
 
""An important aspect of the relations of Christians in the United States (and in the West generally) 
with other religious people is the determination to be respectful of the values enshrined in other traditions 
and of the upright life of their adherents" (DiNoia, "The Universality of Salvation," in Mission in 
Dialogue, 377). "The esteem that many Christian theologians have come to feel for other religions 
inclines them to dismiss the exclusivism associated with the notorious formula extra ecclesiam nulla 
salus as offensive to other communities and inconsistent with central Christian doctrines" (DiNoia, 
Diversity, 36). "Is Jesus Christ the unique mediator of salvation? I was one of five panelists assigned to 
address this question at a recent meeting of Catholic theologians. I was the first to speak and, as it turned 
out, the only panelist prepared to advance an unqualified affirmative response to the question. Why is 
this? . . . As the session unfolded, it became clear that their reluctance to do so was motivated at least in 
part by a desire to avoid giving offense to religious people of other traditions" ("Christian Universalism," 
in Either/Or, 37). 
'6DiNoia, "Christian Universalism," 37. 
"Ibid., 40-41. 
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course, were he to begin to be persuaded that he should be seeking Nirvana, then he 
should try to find out the path leading to it and start up it. But if he were to remain 
convinced that he should seek Christian salvation, then he would remain on the Christian 
path. This hypothetical situation illustrates that religious communities are indeed quite 
different, not only in certain features, but in central ways. Going back to the example, 
DiNoia concludes: "I could say that the Christian community and the Buddhist community 
(with their various subcommunities) both seem to have some conception of an ultimate 
aim of life and have developed a pattern of life geared toward attaining el' 
On this fundamental point DiNoia agrees with other postliberals. He has quoted 
approvingly William Christian's Doctrines of Religious Communities: "There seems to be 
a deep-seated tendency in the major religious communities to develop a comprehensive 
pattern of life . . . which bears on all human interests . . . and on all situations in which 
human beings find themselves."' He has also noted that George Lindbeck makes a similar 
point by way of his cultural-linguistic scheme, where he draws "attention to the ways in 
which religious traditions mold the whole of the life and experience of their adherents.' 
The point, as DiNoia sees it, is this: "Each of the world's great religions seems to direct its 
adherents to some ultimate aim of life, and each proposes some pattern which life as a 
whole ought to take in view of that aim.i2' Thus, the Christian community is understood 
"Ibid., 41. 
'Christian, Doctrines ofReligious Communities, 186. Quoted from DilNloia, "Christian 
Universalism," 41, n.5. 
"DiNoia, Diversity, 9. 
21Ibid. 
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to shape the outlook of the individual Christian by 
the fundamental conviction that a good life is one lived in seeking to be in union with 
God and with other human beings in him. In effect, the whole burden of the message 
of the Scriptures as these have come to be interpreted in the traditions of his 
community is to foster this aim across all the interests and occasions of life. The 
prayers and stories, customs and rites, beliefs and ethical teachings of the Christian 
community have the Triune God as their focus and aim.' 
It also teaches that this aim is intended for all humankind: 
The Christian community teaches that the aim of life it fosters is worthy of pursuit by 
all human beings without exception. Generally speaking it has not taught (and in view 
of its central doctrines probably could not consistently teach) that salvation constitutes 
the aim of life only for some limited group of human beings or only during some one 
segment of the course of world history. On the contrary, . . . the Christian scheme of 
doctrines is ordinarily understood to include doctrines about the universality of 
salvation.' 
While DiNoia has been careful to note that he is not arguing that an "aim of life" is a 
defining feature of a religion, nor that within large communities does a single precise 
conception of this aim necessarily exist, he does claim that such aims do figure 
prominently in existing religious communities.24 He further observes that religious 
communities generally advance their distinctive aims of life and foster their corresponding 
patterns of life through teaching specific doctrines, which he defines as "those elements of 
discourse in religious communities in which some truth is proposed for belief, or some 
good as worth seeking, or some course of action for adoption."' As a whole, the set of a 
nDiNoia, "The Universality of Salvation," 378. 
24DiNoia, "Varieties of Religious Aims," 269. 
25"DiNoia, Diversity, 10. Other forms of discourse in religious communities might include stories, 
prayers, and blessings. A Christian example of a belief would be Jesus Christ saves us from our sins." A 
Christian example of a valuation would be "God alone is holy." A Christian example of a recommended 
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religious community's doctrines (its "body" or "scheme" of doctrines) can be said to teach 
the pattern of life distinctive to the community. 
When this is realized, the criticism of inclusivists and pluralists is undermined: there 
appears to be nothing unusual about a religious community, Christian or otherwise, 
claiming uniqueness. 
Each of the world's major religious traditions seems to claim that the aim of life it 
proposes is the one most worthy of pursuit by all human beings without exception. A 
claim of this sort appears to be implied by the respective basic religious valuations that 
analysis suggests are ingredient in the doctrinal schemes of these traditions. To ascribe 
an unrestricted inherent or intrinsic value to some existent (as do Christianity and 
Islam, for example) or to some state of being (as does Theravada Buddhism, for 
example) is to propose that something be valued in a certain way not only by the 
members of a particular religious group but by human beings generally. It would be 
odd (though naturally not impossible) for a religious community—in view of its 
definition of that on which its pattern of life is centered—to manifest indifference with 
regard to the courses of action and particular valuations and beliefs that are 
understood to foster attainment of the true aim of life.' 
It would be no more strange for Christians to claim that there is no salvation outside the 
Church than for a Buddhist to teach that Nirvana can be attained in no other way than the 
Excellent Eightfold Path. While it is true that such claims may be made in an arrogant 
tone and without respect for the members of other religious communities, "no religious 
community deserves to be accused of arrogant exclusivism for being consistent and 
serious in its teachings about the aim of life it proposes and the means it regards as 
necessary to reach it."' 
course of action would be "Strive to live in union with the Holy Trinity." 
26DiNoia, "The Universality of Salvation," 380. 
nfbid., 381. 
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Far from being an advantage or virtue, the prevailing focus on salvation obscures 
rather than clarifies the relationship of Christianity to non-Christian religions: "By framing 
the agenda of theology of religions primarily in terms of the possibility of extra-Christian 
salvation, pluralists and inclusivists often fail to give enough weight to the specificity and 
distinctiveness of religious aims."' The problem with the inclusivist position as advanced 
by leading advocates like Karl Rahner and Jacques Dupuis is that they attempt "to field an 
entire interpretive framework for the understanding and assessment of other religious and 
cultural traditions."' Usually this framework is Christian; Christian categories such as 
revelation, salvation, and grace and theories on possibilities such as implicit faith figure 
prominently in inclusivist accounts. The result is that the distinctive features of non-
Christian religions fade: when Christian categories such as revelation and salvation are 
introduced even when they are partially or completely inapplicable, then "the distinctive 
strands of other religious traditions, woven into the integral fabric of their particular 
doctrinal schemes, are never permitted to emerge in the clarity of their intractable 
otherness.' 
Pluralists, on the other hand, fail by regarding "salvation" as a concept that embraces 
all the different aims held and commended by the various religious traditions.' To be 
sure, pluralists recognize that different communities propose and commend different 
'DiNoia, "Christian Universalism," 39-40. 
"DiNoia, "The Church and Dialogue with Other Religions," 81. 
30Ibid., 82. 
'DiNoia, "Christian Universalism," 40. 
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"salvations," if the term can be used broadly to designate ultimate religious aims. They 
argue, however, that all such specific aims are ways of seeking after a "more ultimate" or 
truly ultimate but ineffable aim. Thus pluralists also effectively efface the distinctive aims 
and patterns of life held and promoted by different religious communities. 
Given, however, the current acceptance of inclusivism and pluralism, DiNoia 
concludes: "The great challenge facing present-day Christian theology of religions and 
interreligious conversation is to avoid minimizing distinctive features of the major religious 
traditions through a well-intentioned universalism."' 
The Diversity of Religious Aims and the Universality of Salvation 
A major characteristic of postliberal theology is its view that doctrines function 
regulatively. So it was with Barth, Lindbeck, and Griffiths. So it is also with DiNoia 
about the possibility of universal salvation: 
In the Catholic community, no theology of religions is likely to be regarded as fully 
consistent with central Christian doctrines if it does not permit a strong affirmation of 
the universality of salvation at least as a possibility. This doctrine rules assertions of 
the doctrines of grace and salvation in this way: no doctrines of grace and salvation 
can be genuinely Christian that in principle exclude any segment of humankind from 
the possibility of reaching its true and divinely promised destiny. The doctrine of the 
divine salvific will thus has a global or overall regulative force for the construal of 
central Christian doctrines and, by implication, of doctrines about other religions and 
their adherents' 
DiNoia, however, is critical of the usual inclusivist and pluralist approaches, even 
though they affirm this possibility. His reason is that their focus on the possibility of 
32Ibid., 48. 
"DiNoia, Diversity, 107-108. Emphases added. See also DiNoia, "Implicit Faith," 240-241. 
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salvation plays down the unique aims of religious communities and the distinctive patterns 
of life they propose for attaining these aims. His alternative is summarized in the answer 
to this self-posed question: 
Rather than ask whether non-Christians can attain salvation or whether their religions 
aim at salvation, Christian theology of religions might ask: How do the soteriological 
programs of other religious communities promote the pursuit and enjoyment of the 
distinctive overall aims they propose for human life? Questions about salvation would 
continue on the menu, so to speak, but they would take second place to questions 
about the varieties of aims proposed by religious communities and the patterns of 
dispositions and actions they elicit.' 
Although he does not speak in these terms, we can say that the conviction about the 
variety of aims and patterns of life in religious communities also acts regulatively. The 
basic task, then, is to work out a theological position regarding salvation that, on the one 
hand, conforms to the rule that the possibility of salvation is universal, and, on the other 
hand, conforms to the rules that there are different religious aims and that these aims 
should be respected. 
The inclusivist and pluralist positions assert a present salvific value to other religions. 
Pluralists do so by seeing that other religions are possibly equally valid paths to ultimate 
salvation. The distinctive aims and doctrines of Christian and non-Christian religions alike 
are made relative to a more basic religious or soteriological movement held to be common 
to all. Under the rule that the distinctive aspects of religious communities should be 
respected, this position cannot stand. Inclusivists recognize the uniqueness of the 
Christian claims, but they attribute to non-Christian religions not only the possibility that 
they teach true and right things, but that they contribute to salvation in the specifically 
'DiNoia, Diversity, 55. 
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Christian sense. For example, Karl Rahner's so-called "anonymous Christian" proposal 
does not simply teach that non-Christian religions have aspects of truth and rightness 
among their doctrines, but that they actually contribute toward salvation as Christians 
understand and pursue it. His proposal ascribes a hidden fellowship of non-Christians with 
God, regarding the followers of non-Christian religions as "anonymous Christians." In 
this way he attributes a present salvific value to these religions. 
By contrast, DiNoia proposes an eschatological or providential salvific value to other 
religions. In this way, he acknowledges the possibility that other religions may participate 
in the divine plan of salvation, but he recognizes that the way and extent to which they do 
cannot be specified presently. It will only be apparent eschatologically. This view 
preserves the recognition that other religious conununities are not necessarily aiming for 
the same goal as the Christian community. They are not, as a pluralist would claim, 
roughly equivalent ways to salvation, nor, as an inclusivist would hold, imperfect and 
inadequate ways to salvation, of which Christianity is perfect. Rather, the eschatological 
view permits one to ascribe to and recognize in distinct aims of life and patterns of life 
meant to lead a person to these different aims. As Dfisloia explains: 
A theology of religions in this vein expresses the presumption that the members of 
non-Christian communities could give an adequate description--in terms of the basic 
valuations, practical doctrines, and central beliefs--of the dispositions that are fostered 
in their communities and exhibited in the conduct of their lives, in their comportment 
toward others, and in their civic and social intercourse. It would thus be possible to 
do justice to the doctrines of other communities by acknowledging and respecting the 
qualities they engender without describing these qualities in primarily Christian terms. 
At the same time, appropriate Christian valuations of such qualities could be framed in 
terms of an "eschatological" rather than present salvific value. The specific ways in 
which the presently observable and assessable conduct and dispositions of non-
Christians will conduce to their future salvation are now hidden from view and known 
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only to God.35  
What can be recognized in the present are the ways in which religion guides a person 
towards true salvation.36 Only to the extent that another religion can be shown to propose 
a way to salvation as Christians understand it can the religion be said to be superceded and 
fulfilled by Christianity, in the way that inclusivism has often understood these terms. But 
where they do not do so, religions are clearly invalidated by Christianity. 
If the salvific value of a religion can only be assessed eschatologically, then it follows 
that salvation for a religion's followers might also best be understood eschatologically, and 
this is indeed the route DiNoia takes: "By projecting the moment of experienced salvation 
into the time of death or beyond death, Christian theology of religions in a prospective 
vein combines a confident affirmation of the possibility of salvation for non-Christians with 
respect for their distinctive doctrines about the true aim of life and for the finality of the 
dispositions they foster in their communities?"37 In this regard, DiNoia is much like 
George Lindbeck.' DiNoia, however, goes beyond Lindbeck to by appealing to the 
doctrine of purgatory. He acknowledges that it may seem "foolhardy" to invoke 
purgatory, trading one set of problems for an even more difficult set. But if, for the sake 
of discussion, it can be accepted, then he believes that it helps in seeing more clearly how, 
from the Christian point of view, salvation of non-Christians can be defended. 
"Ibid., 75. 
36Ibid., 77-78. 
37Ibid., 104. 
38See above, pp. 96-98. 
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As traditionally understood, the doctrine of purgatory teaches how believers with 
unrepented sins or with lingering consequences of forgiven sins may have these obstacles 
to the ultimate aim of life, namely, fellowship with the Trinity, overcome. Purgatory is 
viewed as an intermediate state between death and final judgment in which one may be 
further transformed into a person who is able to enjoy this fellowship. Purgatory, then, is 
not so much for the sake of God who cannot abide imperfections as for persons who are 
unable to enjoy fully fellowship with him. What is crucial to see in this doctrine is that "it 
allows for an interval (which may be thought of as instantaneous and coterminous with 
death) the essential feature of which is the experience of a necessary purification or 
transformation in view of the assured prospect of eternal bliss.' 
DiNoia extends the doctrine of purgatory to include non-Christians. "If this possibility 
is open to Christians, then surely there is no reason in principle to rule it out for non-
Christians. According to Catholic doctrine, purgatory provides for an interval for the 
rectification of whatever is lacking in any human being who dies justified or in the state of 
grace, but unprepared for the full enjoyment of bliss."' In DiNoia's proposal, non-
Christians can be included among these human beings. 
The Diversity of Aims and Truth in Other Religions 
Another central concern for the theology of religions is the possibility of truth and 
rightness in the doctrines of other religions. According to DlNoia, Christians typically 
39Ibid., 105. 
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have been confident about this possibility, and they have often justified this confidence by 
relying on a concept of general revelation. In the theology of religions, the concept has 
generally been used to attribute the presence of these true and right doctrines to the 
activity of God. Concerning the possibility of extra-Christian truth, this concept functions 
in much the same way that the concept of special revelation works, namely, to guarantee 
or allow for the possibility of revelation. Such usage is therefore extended in the sense 
that general revelation lacks "a level and comprehensiveness of communication and 
vehicles" that are held to be present in special revelation.' 
DiNoia argues that the concept of general revelation does not account adequately for 
the specific ways in which different religious communities (including Christianity) portray 
and defend the truth and rightness of their own doctrines. He suggests (and in this respect 
he shares much with other postliberal accents and concerns) that theologians who rely on 
this concept tend for this reason to miss the significance of these particular ways. 
This is especially true of those proposals that depend on the presence of a universal 
religious experience to make general revelation possible. It has been especially inclusivists 
and pluralists who have tried "to explain how 'religious experience' provides the required 
universal access to revelation and how the assorted forms of religious expression diversely 
articulate this experience of the transcendent realm."' For instance, Rahner's account 
relies on a notion that itself relies heavily on transcendental philosophy that the experience 
of divine grace is ubiquitous to account on the one hand for the full access to the truth 
41Ibid., 83. 
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privileged to the Christian community and on the other hand for the partial access to the 
truth available in other religious communities.' Pluralist positions, DiNoia concedes, are 
more diverse, but he notes that "they converge in ascribing to religious experience the 
fundamental role in generating equivalently partial religious conceptions of the elusive 
truth of the transcendent realm."" Such views cannot rule in principle an unlimited 
number of genuine if partial revelations. What is crucial to the argument, however, is that 
both views "tend to obscure both the logic of the concept of revelation and the doctrinal 
warrants for affirming the possibility of truth in the teachings of other communities."' 
DiNoia's own account of religious experience is closer, in George Lindbeck's 
terminology (which DiNoia acknowledges), to the cultural-linguistic than the experiential-
expressive.' It does not, however, depend on this point, nor does it necessarily prefer the 
cultural-linguistic account of religious experience as advanced by Lindbeck. DiNoia 
allows for a more generalized account of religious experience than Lindbeck's own. The 
one inviolable provision, however, is that any such account does not "blur important 
cross-religious variations in the doctrines by which religious communities identify the 
sources of the truth and rightness of their beliefs and practices.' 
An adequate account of potential truth in non-Christian communities must do justice 
'For his most extended discussion of this issue, DiNoia, "Implicit Faith," 209-241. It is also 
discussed at length in Diversity, 98-103. 
44DiNoia, Diversity, 87. 
"Ibid., 87-88. 
46Ibid., 189. 
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to those communities' own accounts of the truth of their doctrines and the sources of that 
truth." Here is where concepts like "general revelation" and "religious experience" meet 
with concrete difficulties. DiNoia points out: 
Buddhist doctrines, for example, regard Gautama the Buddha as the rediscoverer of 
the universal Dharma and stress the role of his personal experience and inquiry, rather 
than any revelation, in coming to enlightenment and leading others to it. It seems 
especially inappropriate to suggest that Buddhist and other similarly nontheistic 
communities are in fact in possession of some revelation imparted by a transcendent 
divine agent." 
Christians, as they seem to know intuitively and at any rate is necessary doctrinally, 
want to attribute all truth to God's initiative and work. Therefore, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that truth, wherever it is found, derives from the sole divine source of truth. 
This acknowledgement arises from the claim that ultimate salvation, while available to all, 
comes through a particular mediator, Jesus Christ. This is understood "not only [as] a 
doctrine about the means of salvation but also a doctrine about the knowledge and 
promise of salvation."' In other words, the Christian community, when it teaches that it 
alone points to and shows the true aim of life, also teaches that it alone is the source of the 
knowledge and promise of salvation. The whole of Scriptures supposes (when it does not 
explicitly affirm) that God himself gives knowledge both of the possibility and the 
conditions of salvation. This knowledge cannot be the outcome of human discovery and 
observation; it is what God himself makes known to human creatures. The doctrine of 
48Ibid., 88. 
49Ibid., 89. 
"Ibid., 83. 
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revelation works to affirm this particular truth about the promise of salvation. The 
promise of revelation bears on the issue of truth in that it establishes "a domain of 
knowledge and a perspective on all other domains of knowledge and experience."' On 
the one hand, this knowledge does not oppose human nature and experience, and it is not 
alien to them, either. On the other hand this knowledge is not confined to them. The 
knowledge of the promise is relevant to all things and issues in that it appropriates and 
corrects all other knowledge. This is especially evident where the divine identity and 
purposes are concerned, and also where human nature and destiny are concerned. As 
DiNoia elaborates, "However optimistic the Scriptures may be about the possibilities of 
knowledge of God as 'cause of the world,' it is only by revelation, in contrast with 
discovery, that we have knowledge of God's self-descriptions and of his promises in our 
regard."' 
This knowledge, however, while it extends to all things, is itself "ineradicably 
particular insofar as it is transmitted in sources entrusted by God to the Christian 
community."' DiNoia insists that there is nothing at all odd about this. As he asks 
rhetorically: "If in his gracious will God intends to enter into communication and 
interpersonal relations, how else than according to the structures and processes of 
communication embedded in the makeup of human beings?"' This is not God backing 
52Ibid., 84. 
"Ibid. 
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himself into any particular cultural or historical corner. Rather, by doing so "he makes 
himself accessible in precisely the modalities in which persons become accessible to each 
other—specifiably, identifiably, bodily, personally—with names, with ancestors, in the 
context of particular natural and ethnic identities, with particular family ties, and so on. 
Far from being preposterous, it makes perfect sense . . ."" 
As in the matter of salvation, the role of other religious communities is "providential." 
They may have contributions to make, but it is too much to say that they participate or 
provide for the distinctive Christian aim of life and the patterns of life it recommends for 
their pursuit. They may contain truths, but their aims and patterns of life prove true only 
in the light of the Christian revelation. What might be these contributions? It might 
include the function of teaching the Christian community. For instance, Christians might 
have something to learn from the Buddhist community about selflessness, mindfulness, and 
discipline, or from neo-Hindus about non-violent resistance.' 
Theology in Dialogue 
DiNoia's theological reflection on questions of salvation and truth in other religions 
helps to establish a theology for dialogue. A second major aspect of his theology of 
religions is an effort to examine certain issues of Christian theology in dialogue with other 
religious communities. Here we turn to his considerations on putting this theology into 
the practice of dialogue. Again, the focal point of the effort lies with religious doctrines. 
"Ibid., 85. 
"Ibid., 92-93. 
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The effort centers around the potential discussion of Christians with non-Christians about 
the truth and rightness of their respective doctrines, individually and as a set or scheme." 
DiNoia puts the issue into perspective by drawing attention to features of the current 
situation. Not since the days of the early Church have Christians been faced with 
widespread experience of different religious traditions and their communities. The 
Christian aim has not changed, but it is now expressed and understood "in a climate in 
which knowledge and appreciation of rival claims about the meaning and aim of human life 
may be expected to be widespread."' He agrees with sociologist Peter Berger's 
assessment that a "pluralization of both institutions and plausibility structures" 
characterizes the social and cultural climates of modernized societies." In the area of 
religion, people are faced with a vastly expanded number of choices, and Christians find 
themselves facing dialogical situations with a variety of positions. Of course, since the 
Enlightenment Christians have had to engage religious skeptical or atheistic thinkers in 
conversations of various kinds. Today, however, the challenges come from people who 
are not religious skeptical but who advocate well-developed conceptions of the aim of life 
and of patterns of life. Christians now must contend and converse with members of 
"Ibid., 111. 
'Ibid., 112. 
"Ibid. I have quoted DiNoia here, although the text suggests that he is quoting Peter Berger from 
page 17 of The Heretical Imperative. I believe he has paraphrased this sentence: "Modernity pluralizes 
both institutions and plausibility structures." Peter L. Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary 
Possibilities ofReligious Affirmation, (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1979), 17 (emphasis 
original). This puts clearer emphasis on a point of fundamental importance to Berger, namely, "that 
modernity has plunged religion into a very specific crisis, characterized by secularity, to be sure, but 
characterized more importantly by pluralism" (The Heretical Imperative, xi). 
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communities shaped by and teaching, as DiNoia puts it, "massive and enduring bodies of 
religious wisdom and highly ramified systems of doctrines derived from sources as ancient 
and rich as any of their own."' 
It is this situation of religious plurality which leads DiNoia to suggest a course of 
action that at first glance appears to be the very antithesis of a postliberal approach. He 
recommends the rehabilitation and use of topics that belong to the traditional discipline of 
natural or philosophical theology, namely, arguments about the existence and nature of 
God, and arguments to support predications.' 
DiNoia highlights the importance of the issue and the relevance of this approach by 
posing a hypothetical conversation about religious matters between a Muslim and a 
Buddhist.' During the conversation, the Muslim repeatedly uses the term "Allah." 
Unfamiliar with the term, the Buddhist finally asks the Muslim to identify "Allah." The 
Muslim replies that Allah is the one who spoke to Muhammad, as the Qu'ran reports. The 
Buddhist, who knows little of either Muhammad or the Qu'ran, asks whether Allah is like 
a god in the Hindu pantheon. No, replies the Muslim, because Allah is the one and only 
God. This reply still leaves the Buddhist puzzled, so the Muslim asks him to reflect on the 
beauty and orderliness of the natural world. This is the creation of Allah. The whole 
meaning of life, according to the Muslim, is to live in submission to this Allah. 
As the conversation continues, the Buddhist repeatedly refers to "Nirvana." He 
60DiNoia, Diversity, 114. 
"Ibid., 119. 
'Ibid., 115-119. 
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attaches great importance to Nirvana, so the Muslim assumes that the Buddhist must be 
referring to his God. But this is not so, corrects the Buddhist; Nirvana is not any kind of 
God, nor is it a presently existing reality. The Muslim, however, remains puzzled, so the 
Buddhist asks him to imagine those intense experiences in which the Muslim might have 
felt as if transported outside himself. Nirvana is something like this, only ineffably more 
so. The aim of life, according to the Buddhist, is to attain this state by following the 
Excellent Eightfold Path. 
In both cases some fact or state of affairs within human observation or experience 
served as a starting point for reference to their respective ultimate aims of life. The 
Muslim pointed to the natural course of events in the universe, and attributes this to the 
activity of Allah. The Buddhist referred to a certain kind of intense experience, and 
connected this with the state of Nirvana. The arguments of both conversation partners 
illustrate the kind of arguments that are needed for religious dialogue, namely, referential 
patterns of argument. 
Suppose, further, that the conversation turns to describing Allah and Nirvana. The 
Muslim asserts that Allah is holy; the Buddhist asserts that Nirvana is the fullness of bliss 
and the absence of bliss. How can such attributes be predicated of beings and states held 
to be beyond sense perception? Again, a special kind of argument is needed at this point, 
arguments in support of predications. 
For these arguments DiNoia turns to precritical theology, in particular to Thomas 
Aquinas. His reasons are twofold. 
For one thing, Aquinas is innocent of the key moves that have been the subject of such 
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vigorous attack in postmodern philosophy and theology: the quest for a unitary 
method for all knowledge and inquiry ("foundationalism"), the conflation of 
epistemology with metaphysics, and the separation of consciousness from bodiliness. 
Furthermore, Aquinas's theology furnishes a rich resource for exhibiting the logic of 
referential and predicational patterns of argument, as they function both in the 
Christian scheme itself and in interreligious dialogue.63  
DiNoia, however, also notes that "it is neither possible nor desirable to repristinate 
Aquinas as if the intervening centuries had evaporated."" The past two centuries have 
brought substantial changes to the understanding and undertaking of philosophical 
theology, and they must be reckoned with. Nevertheless, it is DiNoia's conviction that 
Aquinas remains useful even for postmodern times. 
Religious References and Interreligious Conversations 
Referential arguments function logically to introduce a subject into a religious 
discourse. In the Christian tradition these arguments are usually called arguments for the 
existence of God, but they have, as the preceding conversation would suggest, parallels in 
nontheistic traditions. There are special problems associated with religious references. In 
ordinary conversations, we rely on broad general knowledge to supply references that 
might be required. If that knowledge fails, then further work is needed to establish the 
reference. The situation of religious references is usually more complex. The reason is 
that such references are made to things that are not identical with any objects of ordinary 
sense perception. Consequently, a special class of referential arguments has arisen in 
religious communities. In the history of the Christian tradition, three types of referential 
63Ibid., 126. 
"Ibid. 
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arguments have been advanced.' One type appeals to aspects of nature, such as the 
design of the universe. A second type appeals to certain historical events, such as 
miracles. A third type appeals to the human self, that is, to subjective states or 
experiences. 
It is just this kind of argument, however, that, while "seem[ing] to be logically 
required if a religious tradition is to support its claims about the focus of life as a whole," 
have fallen out of favor in recent centuries." Developments over the past two centuries 
have undermined the confidence of many Christians in referential arguments.' Arguments 
of the first type include cosmological and design arguments. They became especially 
prominent in medieval theology, but modernity has subjected them to a critique that has 
been widely judged as devastating. Similarly, the modern historical consciousness has 
made appeals to history increasingly uncertain. As a result, modern theology has largely 
depended on arguments of the third type. But without referential arguments of the first 
type (appealing to the natural course of events in the world), arguments both on the basis 
of history and of the human self have proven vulnerable. 
But as DiNoia's hypothetical conversation shows, Christian theology needs to adopt 
once again arguments of this kind in the new situation of religious plurality and 
interreligious conversations. Against the criticism of contemporary Western philosophy, 
65Ibid., 20. 
'Ibid., 116. DiNoia notes that this account of arguments in religious discourse depends on that 
developed by William A. Christian, Sr., in Meaning and Truth in Religion (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1964), 185-237. 
67DiNoia, Diversity, 120-125. 
161 
DiNoia argues that interaction between religious communities requires these arguments, 
and that theories that rule them out in principle themselves become implausible in light of 
this situation. Without referential arguments, it is impossible to draw the categorical and 
conceptual maps in which the realities and concepts held by religious communities are 
located. 
The role of these arguments, however, is much more modest than those of the so-
called "foundational theology." The use of philosophical theology that DiNoia has in mind 
is in the postmodern or postliberal mode that does not seek to ground the truth of 
Christian affirmations in supposedly universal and universally accessible foundations. 
Rather, he uses it in a "nonfoundational" way to locate the widest possible context for our 
understanding and explaining them: "Referential patterns of argument in theology serve 
not so much to establish God's existence as to secure the particularistic claim to 
universality that the Christian community makes for its arguments.' As he further 
explains: 
Staking this claim is not equivalent to establishing a foundation for the truth of all 
Christian doctrines once and for all. That "foundation" exists only in the truth who is 
God himself and can never be a human construction. Rather, the readiness to develop 
and employ arguments of the sort described here characterizes a conception of the 
theological enterprise in which--case by case, doctrine by doctrine—the force of 
Christian affirmations is expounded in connection with the full range of human 
knowledge of the world." 
In DiNoia's reading, the arguments for the existence of God in the Summa Theologiae 
[do] not signal a methodological doubt such that Christian theology cannot go about 
68Ibid., 130. 
69Ibid., 153. 
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its business until it has 'proven' the existence of its subject. This possibility is ruled 
out from the start by Aquinas' prior description of the nature of theological inquiry. 
To assert that theology gets its subject matter from revelation implies that faith in God 
constitutes one of the principles of the inquiry. The Triune God is already "in place," 
so to speak, in his full, scheme-specific characterization." 
The "scheme-specific characterization" of God consists of characterizations of him and his 
work such as are found in the Bible and reflected in the liturgy. This characterization is 
presupposed before Aquinas turns to referential arguments. In appropriating Aquinas, 
DiNoia is arguing not only that one can use his arguments, but that they are used in the 
same way that Aquinas used them, not to establish first the existence of God and thus 
permit one to speak about him, but to clarify the universal extent to which claims about 
him apply. For Aquinas, these arguments served primarily internal theological purposes 
"in sustaining the broadest possible context for Christian affirmation, in connection not 
only with the doctrine of God but also with the doctrines of grace, christology, 
sacraments, and so on throughout the Christian scheme."' 
DiNoia extends their use to serve the purposes of interreligious dialogue. He argues 
that this is appropriate because their logical function is precisely to secure the universal 
scope of Christian claims. Such arguments, moreover, are required by dialogue. For 
example, a dialogue with nontheistic Buddhists would require the Christian to apply some 
kind of argument for God's existence, not to be able to talk about God at all, but to begin 
to meet the Buddhist objections. 
"Ibid., 129. 
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Religious Predications and Interreligious Conversations 
As DiNoia's hypothetical situation suggests, interreligious conversations are likely to 
involve attributes ascribed to ultimate realities. Differences in these attributes, if taken 
seriously, will lead to serious disagreements. 
Just as the nature of religious references usually requires special kinds of arguments, 
so also does the problem of predications. In ascribing attributes to ineffable beings and 
states, such as Nirvana, one often wants both to exclude imperfections on the one hand 
and yet advance truth claims on the other. This is certainly the case in the Christian 
tradition. For instance, in attributing holiness to the Triune God, Christians want to 
ascribe holiness in a way that makes a claim to truth, and yet to do so in a way that 
acknowledges that how this applies to God is beyond human comprehension. The 
problem is how one can predicate attributes of God that meets both these conditions. In 
other words, 
Christian theology needs some account of our predications about the Triune God to 
show that, despite their serious limitations, they nonetheless entail claims to truth. 
When Christians assert that God is holy, or merciful, or sheerly existent, and 
acknowledge that they do not know what it is like for God to be these things, they still 
mean to assert that these predications are true of him.' 
In Christian history, the view of univocal predication has largely been rejected. 
Several other theories of predication have been advanced, and DiNoia takes note of three 
which are inadequate. 
The first suggests that all such predications can be reformulated as paradoxical or 
apophatic utterances that deny limitations to God (thus: "God is good" would be 
equivalent to "God is not evil"). Another semantic theory of religious predications 
72Ibid., 144. 
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reconstrues them as assertions about the divine causal activity as experienced by us. 
What appear on the surface as ascriptions of attributes to the Triune God are in fact 
construable as descriptions of our experience of him, or of our relation to him (thus: 
"God is good" is equivalent to "God is the cause of goodness"). Neither of these 
theories denies the propositional force of Christian doctrines that express predications. 
Rather, according to the first view, the propositional force is always negative, while 
according to the second, it is always relative to human states. There is a third view 
that seems to exclude the propositional force of predications about the Triune God. 
According to this view, such predications must be construed as metaphorical, as 
evocations (nondiscursive symbols) that afford, occasion, or express certain 
experiences of the transcendent realm without being directly descriptive of it (thus: 
"God is good" is symbolic).' 
While these views are correct inasmuch as they recognize that the nature of God 
transcends human conception and language, they are all inadequate because they require 
straightforward affirmative predications to be reconstrued as something beside 
affirmations. 
For help, DiNoia again turns to Aquinas as a resource; here he appropriates his 
analogical theory of predication. The theory of analogy holds that while there are 
concepts such as goodness and existence that properly may be predicated of both 
creatures and the divine creator, they apply or are predicated in unique and 
incomprehensible ways of God. In the context of interreligious dialogue, the theory of 
analogy permits one to link specifically Christian predications about God in a 
straightforward way with visible states of affairs. 
This position differs markedly from those typical of pluralists. Pluralist accounts stress 
the ineffability of the ultimate reality to which different religious communities all refer. 
They argue that the doctrines of the different communities refer to same object, but that 
'Ibid., 144-145. 
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this object is absolutely beyond all desciption.74 The result is that pluralist accounts 
sharply curtail the possibility of religious communities actually making truth claims. 
While in no way underestimating the ineffability ascribed to God or to non-Christian 
realities like Nirvana, DiNoia stresses that ineffability does not rule for at least some 
religious communities the propositional force of predications. Evidence of this belief 
among different major religious communities comes in the form of actual disagreements on 
matters such as theistic beliefs and corresponding attempts to secure the universality of 
their own distinctive claims. These communities "agree in identifying objective states of 
affairs as the context for their teachings about God, the true aim of life, and conditions of 
human existence in the world, and so on. This conviction gives rise to arguments that 
seek to secure each community's particularistic claim to universality."' Consequently, an 
account of religious predications that allows for their possessing propositional force is 
basic to conducting interreligious dialogue, because it allows one to recognize differences 
and oppositions between communities and so take the possibility of disagreements 
seriously. 
'DiNoia singles out Stanley Samartha and John Hick as examples of pluralists who sharply limit the 
propositional force of religious predications (147-152). 
'Ibid., 149. 
PART TWO 
AN ASSESSMENT AND CRITICAL APPROPRIATION OF THE POSTLIBERAL 
APPROACH TO THE THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS 
CHAPTER SIX 
TOWARD A NONFOUNDATIONAL THEOLOGY OF RELIGIONS 
Sociologist Peter Berger has characterized neo-orthodox theology as "the 
reaffirmation of the objective authority of a religious tradition after a period during which 
that authority had been relativized and weakened."' Modern theology had subjected the 
Bible's authority to criteria such as the standards of historical investigation. With 
theologians like Barth (whom Berger regarded as the most important example of neo-
orthodoxy), "[o]nce more theology returns to its source and derives all its propositions 
from the revelation, the 'Word of God,' assumed to be given there."' To be sure, Barth 
held material positions that were not only different from those of the Reformers, but which 
the earlier theologians very likely would have opposed. Like the Reformers, however, the 
priority of the Bible was a central presupposition in his theology. 
What Berger said of neo-orthodox theology may also be said of postliberal theology. 
This is especially true for Barth, whose theology anticipated and influenced those who are 
more properly called "postliberals." Theologians such as George Lindbeck seek to affirm 
`Peter L. Berger, The Heretical Imperative: Contemporary Possibilities ofReligious Affirmation 
(Garden City, New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1979), 79. 
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once again the authority of the Bible after its authority had been relativized and weakened 
even further. 
This reaffirmation has led postliberals to seek help from premodern theology in 
overcoming problems raised by modern approaches to theology. William Placher looked 
to Aquinas, Luther, and Calvin for help in diagnosing and righting modem theology's 
faulty thinking about God.3 Lutheran theologian Ronald Thiemann showed how theology 
after the Enlightenment had failed in its many attempts to rethink the doctrine of 
revelation. Instead of rejecting the doctrine outright, however, he returned to the 
Apology of the Augsburg Confession for "a helpful orientation . . . to reconceptualize the 
doctrine of revelation."' Bruce Marshall, in his defense of George Lindbeck's discussion 
of truth in The Nature of Doctrine, argued that the postliberal's conception had been 
anticipated by several centuries in the theology of Thomas Aquinas, a finding with which 
Lindbeck wholeheartedly agreed.' 
Therefore, even though some of its positions may be inadequate or wrong, the 
postliberal reaffirmation may be expected to have much to offer those who still hold to 
premodern commitments and approaches to theology. Just as postliberals believe 
theology should learn from premodern approaches, so I am convinced that a confessional 
approach might learn from postliberal theology. This is what I shall attempt here. In these 
'William C. Placher, The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern Thinking about God 
Went Wrong (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1996). 
'Ronald F. Thiemann, Revelation and Theology: The Gospel as Narrated Promise (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 96. 
sBruce D. Marshall, "Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian" The Thomist 53 (1989): 353-402; George 
Lindbeck, "Response to Bruce Marshall," The Thomist 53 (1989): 403-406. 
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closing chapters I shall try to assess and appropriate the postliberal approaches of Karl 
Barth, George Lindbeck, Paul Griffiths, and J. A. DlNoia for use by the particular 
confessional tradition of which I am a part, namely, the Lutheran tradition.' This 
appropriation is something like the postliberal project in reverse. Postliberals try to 
recover premodern, traditional practice and theology and bring them into use in a 
pluralized, postmodern context. I shall try, however, to appropriate the concerns and 
insights of postliberal approaches to make an already-given traditional approach to 
theology better able to address issues raised by the contemporary situation of religious 
plurality. 
This attempt will be limited in scope. It will focus on key topics and concerns raised 
either by the postliberal approach or the field of the theology of religions itself. This 
chapter will consider questions related to nonfoundationalism. 
Nonfoundational Approaches to Theology—Present and Past  
I have characterized the postliberal approach to theology as nonfoundational and 
descriptive.' The proposals examined in this study share these characteristics. They are 
critical of modern theology for its attempts to justify or correct Christian claims, 
teachings, and practices on grounds that lie outside the Christian religion itself Instead, 
6By "Lutheran tradition," I mean one which adheres to the Apostles', Niceno-Constantinopolitan, and 
Athanasian Creeds and the confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, i.e., the Book of Concord. 
Among other things, this implies a "high" view of Scripture and a firm commitment to classical dogmas 
on the Trinity and Christ. See also James W. Voelz, What Does This Mean? Principles of Biblical 
Interpretation in the Post-Modern World (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1995), 19-20. This is 
a confessional commitment in a strict sense, and for this reason, I shall refer to the Lutheran Confessions 
as accepted and normative doctrinal expressions for the Lutheran community. 
'See above, pp. 16-25. 
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they call for a nonfoundational theology that describes Christian thinking, speech, and 
action in specifically Christian terms. 
In both its nonfoundational and descriptive aspects, postliberal theology converges 
with the theology of the Lutheran Confessions.' The theology of the Confessions is 
nonfoundational in that it bases and tests doctrine according to the Scriptures alone.' 
There is no appeal to a second source for doctrine or a second set of criteria, nor is there 
any attempt to justify or test doctrine and practice on grounds that are universally 
accessible or self-evident.' 
The nonfoundational character of the Lutheran Confessions shows especially where 
features or appeals to nature might seem appropriate. This happens in the Apology's 
discussion of marriage (Ap XXIII). Here the Apology recognizes an unchanging right to 
enter into marriage based on a natural desire of one sex for the other." This shows that 
human decisions such as the Roman teachings on celibacy cannot do away with marriage 
8I shall use the following abbreviations for the Lutheran confessional documents: AC—Augsburg 
Confession; Ap—Apology of the Augsburg Confession; SA--Smalcald Articles; SC—Small Catechism; 
LC—Large Catechism; FC Epit—Epitome of the Formula of Concord; FC SD—Solid Declaration of the 
Formula of Concord. 
9In its preface, the Augsburg Confession asserts that its faith is based on the Scriptures (AC Preface 
8), while in its conclusion it offers to explain further on the same scriptural basis (AC Conclusion 7). 
The Smalcald Articles assert that the Word of God alone establishes articles of faith (SA II, II, 15). The 
Epitome of the Formula of Concord states that the Old and New Testaments are the only rule and norm 
for teachings and teachers, and that all other writings should be subordinated to them, being received as 
no more than witnesses to the way the prophetic and apostolic teachings were preserved (FC Epit 1-2). 
'Other documents, including the ecumenical symbols and the earlier accepted Lutheran confessional 
documents, were accepted as "the unanimous declaration of [the Christian] faith" (FC Epit 6), and so all 
doctrines should conform to them. But an absolute distinction was maintained, with the Scriptures 
reamining the only judge, rule, and norm for doctrine (FC Epit 7). 
"What the Apology calls "natural love"—a v (Ima mil v. 
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(Ap XXIII, 7, 12-13). But marriage itself is recognized as a divine ordinance not because 
of visible evidence but because Scripture teaches it (Genesis 1; Ap XXIII, 7). In the same 
way, since the Fall into sin, there is also lust, and control of lust is a reason for marriage. 
Nevertheless, it is on basis of Scripture that marriage is known to be a command of God 
(Ap XXIII, 17). 
The theology of the Confessions also often involves the kind of descriptive method 
that postliberals advocate. In the Confessions, the discussion often centers on matters of 
Christian language and practice. Here the task is to discern what is proper to the doctrinal 
"logic" or "grammar" of the Christian faith. The Lutheran criticism is that an 
objectionable teaching or practice does not cohere with other beliefs, while the Lutheran 
defense is that its controverted position makes better, fuller sense of Biblical teaching. 
This is especially prominent in the Apology and the Formula of Concord. 
It might be said that the theology of the Confessions had the luxury of relative 
isolation from the challenges of secularization and competition from other religions that 
confront Christians of the late twentieth century. A specifically post-liberal reflection may 
be helpful in answering such criticisms. It may also be helpful in understanding the present 
situation more clearly. 
Questions of Truth 
Among the most frequent criticisms of the postliberal approach are those concerning 
its conceptions of truth and truth claims. One criticism is that postliberal focus on 
specifically Christian authority and sources does not permit it to make claims and 
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judgments about those who do not recognize this authority. Another criticism is that its 
approach to questions of truth leave questions of reference open; that is, its approach is 
non-referential or non-realist. 
Religious Plurality and Christian Truth 
A major criticism of premodern approaches to theology is that the priority they give to 
the Christian Scriptures and community does not allow them to make meaningful claims to 
truth to those outside the community. Such would obviously include members of non-
Christian religious communities. Especially worrisome are claims that locate truth and 
salvation in Jesus Christ based solely on the Christian Scriptures.' For example, Stanley 
Samartha, an Indian theologian and leading proponent of pluralism, worries about these 
things. Like many pluralists, he argues that both historical circumstances and theological 
demands call for an examination of all exclusivist claims.' He likens such claims to stones 
thrown into a stream: they make a splash, then sink without making any difference to the 
waters flowing past. The implications for Christian claims based on the Scriptures are 
clear: 
Very often, claims for the "normativeness" of Christ are based on the authority of the 
Bible. Exclusive texts are hurled back and forth as if just by uttering texts from 
12E.g., Jesus' claim in John 14:6: "I am the way and the truth and the life. No one comes to the 
Father except through me"; the apostolic claim: "There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other 
name under heaven given among men by which we must be saved"; and the Church's confession: 
"Whoever would be saved shall, above all else, hold the catholic faith. Unless every person without 
exception holds this faith whole and undefiled, he will without doubt perish eternally" (Athanasian 
Creed). 
I3Stanley J. Samartha, "The Cross and the Rainbow: Christ in a Multireligious Culture," in The Myth 
of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology ofReligions, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter 
(Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1987), 69. 
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scriptures the problem is settled. The authority of the Bible is indeed important for 
Christians. In the multireligious situations, where there are other scriptures whose 
authority is accepted by neighbors of other religious traditions, how can the claims 
based on one particular scripture become the norm, or authority for all?' 
Samartha believes that it is impossible. For this reason, however, he believes not simply 
that appeals to the Bible (or the scriptures of other religious communities) should stop, but 
that claims that have their final justification on these authorities should also come to an 
end. In other words, his concern is not simply with the manner of argument (based on the 
Scriptures) but with the basis (the Scriptures themselves) upon which arguments are 
mounted in the first place. 
But even theologians who hold traditional, particularistic claims about salvation have 
argued that it is necessary to step outside of purely Christian considerations and make the 
case for Christian superiority on more generally accessible grounds. For instance, 
evangelical mission theologian Harold A. Netland has argued that Christians need to 
appeal to neutral criteria in evaluating other religions. To overcome the assumption that 
negative evaluations of other religious communities are basically products of a limited and 
subjective perspective and therefore nonbinding, Netland argues that it is necssary to 
appeal to objective, nonarbitrary criteria for evaluating religious traditions. The first part 
of his argument is to show that there are indeed such criteria. To do this, he contends that 
if cognitive relativism, which holds that truth, knowledge, and norms for rationality are 
relative to particular contexts, is unacceptable on epistemological grounds, then it must be 
"Ibid., 78. 
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that there are context-invariant criteria for judgment.' Thus he tries to identify some, 
such as basic logical principles (e.g., noncontradiction), consistency with other fields of 
knowledge, and moral grounds.' From these he develops definitions and propositions 
which he believes are both context-neutral and justify acceptance of the Christian faith as 
true "because it is the only worldview that satisfies the requirements of all the above.' 
Netland's approach is self-consciously foundationalist. It challenges premodern 
approaches to show that claims justified from the perspective of its own community can be 
meaningfully made across community boundaries. The same challenge, however, also has 
been issued to the postliberal approach. Postliberals refuse to justify and test their claims 
on grounds that are external to the community. A key worry about the postliberal 
approach is that it leads to relativism and fideism. According to some theologians, 
nonfoundationalism means that the postliberal position does not allow for claims to be 
made that can apply to those outside the community, nor does it permit judgments to be 
made on matters outside the boundaries of its community.' As discussed already, this has 
been a major concern about Barth. Alan Race, to cite just another example, sees Barth's 
exclusive concentration of revelation in Jesus Christ as making belief to be a purely 
'5Harold A. Netland, Dissonant Voices: Religious Pluralism and the Question of Truth (Grand 
Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1991), 151-180. 
16Ibid., 180-195. 
"Ibid., 193. 
'or the discussion in this section I am indebted to William Placher's discussions in "Revisionist 
and Postliberal Theologies and the Public Character of Theology" (The Thomist 49 [1985]: 392-416) and 
in Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation ([Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989], 154-170), and to John Thiel's discussion in Nonfoundationalism 
([Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1994], 79-108, especially 97-103. 
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arbitrary judgment. The result is that Barth has "so isolated theological language that it is 
impossible to know whether or not what he believes is credible at all."' The same has 
been said about Lindbeck. David Tracy, while recognizing that Lindbeck's approach has 
an "admirable desire to avoid relativism and fideism," nonetheless cannot escape these 
charges: 
[H]ow can theologians assess the truth-claims of Lindbeck's grammatically analyzed 
traditions? Professor Lindbeck is fully aware of this set of problems and tries many 
ways to meet it . . . . Even those who agree that a "purely neutral" theory of rationality 
is never "purely neutral" and who agree that skill, practice, etc., are crucial ingredients 
in any attempts to assess rationally all theological claims will remain unpersuaded that 
Professor Lindbeck's "epistemological realism" is other than relativism with a new 
name or that his "cultural-linguistic" grammatical model for theology is other than 
confessionalism with occasional "ad hoc" apologetic skirmishes." 
Let us put aside for a moment the question of whether such concern is justified and 
note that reasons for such a concern may be found in the four examples cited here. 
Barth's evaluation of religion explicitly rejects as untheological any grounding of 
concepts, including the concept of religion, that is independent of internal Christian 
considerations. Instead, he argues that the Christian interpretation of religion must be 
entirely theological. Griffiths argues that central and highly specific Christian dogmas 
should be constitutive for the Christian understanding of interreligious encounters. 
DiNoia emphasizes that different religions have different aims and so promote different 
patterns of life to attain their respective aims. The clearest reasons for concern are likely 
19Alan Race, Christians and Religious Pluralism: Patterns in the Christian Theology ofReligions 
(London: SCM Press Ltd; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1993), 28. 
"David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology: A Reflection," The Thomist 49 (1985): 470, 
471-472. 
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over Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model, because, more than the other proposals, it 
suggests that religions are not only distinct but self-contained and hermetic. In comparing 
religions to natural languages and different religious communities to different groups of 
language speakers, it might seem to make as little sense to ask whether a given religion 
were more true than another as it would to ask, for instance, whether French were more 
true than Chinese. Would not a cultural-linguistic understanding of religion lead to the 
conclusion that there is a similar inability to speak about universally applicable truths, such 
as the triune God alone is the agent of the creation of all things and redemption of all 
humankind? And if so, then does it not come into conflict with basic Christian tenets? If 
these questions can be answered satisfactorily, then the same worries about the other 
proposals—postliberal and premodern alike—also should be relieved. 
Let us answer the second question first: this inability would indeed mean that the 
cultural-linguistic model does conflict with a basic tenet not only of Christianity but of 
other religions as well. Therefore, the key question is the first: does a cultural-linguistic 
understanding necessarily lead to an inability to speak about universally applicable truth? 
It may be best to begin by recalling that Lindbeck himself has dealt with this question: 
"One language or culture is not generally thought of as 'truer' than another, much less 
unsurpassable, and yet that is what some religions profess to be. . . . Can the possible truth 
of one or another of these assertions of unsurpassibility be admitted; or, more precisely, 
what could such an assertion mean?"21 His answer to the first question was yes: the 
cultural-linguistic model could accomodate assertions of unsurpassibility. His answer to 
21Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine, 46. 
179 
the second question explained the nature of this unsurpassibility: one or another religion 
could be unsurpassed in a categorical sense. This would not guarantee that the actual 
truth claims made by the community were themselves true, but it would mean that a given 
religion could be unsurpassed in the sense that it alone provided the categories by which 
meaningful truth claims could even be made. Lindbeck, however, recognized that the 
actual speech and practice of religious communities demanded that his model also 
accomodate propositional claims to truth, which he then went on to show. 
Does this, however, necessarily satisfy critics of postliberal and premodern theology? 
It would seem not. If so, then where does the problem lie? It does not lie with claims of 
universal scope; that is, the objection is not that claims of universal scope are being 
eliminated either by premodern or postliberal theology. The problem lies with the 
apparent lack of universal justification for these claims. The critics of postliberal and 
premodern theology seek not only to be able to make claim to truth on a universal scale, 
but also to provide justification of such claims on a universal scale. 
A crucial point of postliberal nonfoundationalism, however, is to say that the 
justification of these claims (and other theological activity as well) is properly based on the 
grounds and criteria recognized as belonging to the community, and not set by external 
concerns and considerations, such as those of philosophy or politics. As John Thiel puts 
it, the fear of postliberal theology's critics is that its restriction of theology to confessional 
norms of content and logic "leads inescapably to an interpretive exclusivity that limits the 
claims of Christianity to relative, parochial, and even isolated contexts."' This fear, 
22Ibid., 102. 
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however, involves a confusion of the nature of theological claims with their scope. The 
postliberal argument, that Christian theology should give priority "in its logic to the 
meaningful context of Christian belief, does not entail the restriction of reasoning to that 
context."' 
What Samartha and Netland exhibit is a tendency that philosopher Richard Bernstein 
has called "the Cartesian anxiety." It reduces the question of the justification of truth 
claims to an either/or situation: "Either there is some support for our being, a fixed 
foundation for our knowledge, or we cannot escape the forces of darkness that envelop us 
with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos.' So it is in interreligious encounters. 
Either one can make claims that can be shown to be justified apart from any specific 
religious considerations and context, or one's claims will be considered arbitrary. 
Postliberals, however, hold that justification of these claims does not depend on the 
ability to provide warrants on a universal basis. Instead, they argue that one cannot do 
this, because "the manner in which one commits oneself to [such a] belief, or reasons from 
it, or gathers evidence for its cogency, or makes judgments about its significance cannot 
be universal, since these activities are practices tied to particular religious frameworks 
from which they draw their meanings."' They doubt that there is any universal 
interpretive framework in which to translate the different religious schemes and thus 
provide a comprehensive basis for discussion and judgment. But does this mean that no 
'John E. 'Thiel, Nonfoundationalism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1994), 98. 
'Richard Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 18. 
Thiel, Nonfoundationalism, 102. 
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discussion and judgment can take place? Postliberals answer no; discussion is still 
possible, but it is necessary to seek places where categories overlap and concepts are 
similar. Moreover, it is not necessary for Christians to dispose of universal claims for 
which they can find no universal justification. For example, William Placher says that he 
knows of no way to defend the Christian faith in terms that all rational human beings 
would be forced to accept. All arguments must be made in the context of some tradition, 
and the conversation needs to start with the rules and assumptions held in common by the 
conversation partners. On the other hand, Placher says: "But I also believe that the God in 
whom Christians believe exists and loves regardless of whether any human tradition 
acknowledges that God."' He finds no reason to do away with this universal truth, just 
because it is impossible a priori to show this to all people. 
With this in mind, we can turn back to Lindbeck. He correlated the cultural-linguistic 
model with an intratextual method of theology, in which meaning is constituted by uses. 
So, the concept of God is arrived at from the concept developed in the Scriptures and how 
that concept is used in the Christian community. One learns how to use the term "God" as 
Christians understand it is justified, and how to use it to understand reality and give shape 
to life. But intratextuality as Lindbeck defined it also means that a religion assumes into 
itself all reality: it describes all reality as within its scope. In this way, we can see that 
Lindbeck's understanding of the cultural-linguistic model is capable of universally 
applicable claims. 
If, however, justification of truth claims is limited to particular spheres of 
'Placher, Unapologetic Theology, 123. 
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understanding, to particular contexts, does this not effectively mean a condition of 
relativism between contexts? The answer is no. Postliberals doubt that there are context-
neutral standpoints from which different claims can be sorted out and evaluated. But this 
condition rules out neither understanding nor evaluating alien claims; neither does it rule 
out making claims to apply to another community. In properly understanding the beliefs 
or practices of another religious community, or in properly making one's own beliefs and 
practices understood, one will have to know the context in which such beliefs or practices 
are made. This will almost certainly require much effort, just as learning a second 
language does, but there is nothing that in principle rules out understanding. In evaluating 
alien claims or in arguing for one's own claims, the postliberal point is that there is no 
Archimedean point—no independent evaluative standpoint—and that every evaluation and 
argument thus must be made within a certain context. 
Realism 
A second question of truth deals with cognitive realism. Postliberal theology has been 
charged often with antirealism. I should state at once, however, that although postliberal 
theology at large has been criticized, the charge only applies to some. But among them 
are some of postliberalism's leading figures, including Hans Frei (with whom we are not 
dealing) and George Lindbeck (with whom we are).' Colman O'Neill charges Lindbeck 
"For a fuller discussion of Lindbeck and charges of antirealism, see Jeffrey Hensley, "Are 
Postliberals Necessarily Antirealists? Reexamining the Metaphysics of Lindbeck's Postliberal 
Theology," in Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm, eds. The Nature of Confession: Evangelicals 
and Postliberals in Conversation, (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996) 69-80; and 
Marshall, "Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," 353-402. 
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with a "novel definition of 'ontological' truth."' As O'Neill understands it, Lindbeck sees 
the ontological or propositional truth of an utterance depending upon the subjective 
disposition of the utterer. This, however, is contrary to the traditional understanding of 
ontological truth, in which the truth of an utterance does not rely on the attitude or actions 
of the one speaking. Alister McGrath sees Lindbeck's cultural-linguistic model as 
effectively equating the concept of "truth" to "internal consistency."' Similarly, Francis 
Watson finds that, since for Lindbeck "religions correspond to different languages and 
cultures," truth is purely intrasystematic, "that is, dependent on the grammatical rules for 
correct and incorrect utterance that happen to be in force in a given locality?"30 Thus he 
concludes that his efforts amount to a "consistent and almost obsessive dismantling of the 
various ramifications of a correspondence theory of truth . . . typical of postmodern 
theorizing. It induces a sense of mild euphoria as apparently stable structures prove to be 
ungrounded, composed of nothing more substantial than words, as if suspended in the 
These criticisms are misplaced. What Lindbeck meant by "ontological truth" is not at 
all novel: "that truth of correspondence to reality which, according to epistemological 
28Colman O'Neill, "The Rule Theory of Doctrine and Propositional Truth," The Thomist 49 (1985): 
431. 
"Alister McGrath, A Passion for Truth: The Intellectual Coherence of Evangelicalism (Downers 
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1996), 151, 153. 
'Francis Watson, Text, Church and World: Biblical Interpretation in Theological Perspective 
(Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 134. 
311bid. Other examples are adduced in Hensley, "Are Postliberals Necessarily Antirealists," 71-72. 
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realists, is attributable to first-order propositions."' What concerned Lindbeck, and what 
many of his critics have failed to understand, is that his concern is with the conditions 
under which an utterance is rightly uttered. In other words, Lindbeck's concern is not 
with truth but with justification. It is in order to clarify the conditions under which one is 
justified in uttering an ontologically true statement that Lindbeck introduces the notion of 
intrasystematic truth, not, as some have supposed, to replace the usual notion of 
ontological truth. As Bruce Marshall explains: 
The point of introducing the notion of intrasystematic truth is not, as [Colman] O'Neill 
supposes, to state the basic meaning of the term "true" in the religious domain. That 
has already been accomplished in Lindbeck's discussion of ontological truth as 
correspondence to reality. The point is rather to clarify one of the essential criteria of 
truth in the religious domain. . . . Thus the issue here is not whether there are 
(ontologically) true propositions, but what the conditions are under which one can 
state a sentence which is a true proposition.' 
Nonetheless, while these criticisms are misplaced, there is truth in the charge itself. 
While Lindbeck acknowledges as important the matter of a theological statement's 
reference to reality, he argues that it is limited to the point of agnosticism. Adopting 
Aquinas' theory of analogy, he insists that what can rightly be attributed to God is indeed 
true, but that it lies beyond our knowing what it means. Moreover, he extends the notion 
of analogical "signification" beyond attributes of God in himself (e.g., the being and 
goodness of God) to acts of God (e.g., the resurrection of Jesus). In this view, the point 
of truth claims is not to know things about God (e.g., what it means that he is good) or 
about things he has done (e.g., raising Jesus from the dead). Rather, it is that they provide 
"Lindbeck, The Nature ofDoctrine, 64. 
'Marshall, "Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian," 364. 
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the warrants for certain patterns of behavior.' Here charges of antirealism have merit 
against Lindbeck. His own model does not demand this limited notion of reference, and it 
runs against both the literal sense and traditional understanding of many theological 
statements. 
What, then, is the underlying reason for this position? It is his desire to affirm 
doctrinal agreement without compromise on doctrinal formulations. If cognitive content 
of doctrine were an issue, then compromise would be necessary for agreement. But, at 
least in Lindbeck's experience, compromise has not been necessary. He takes this to mean 
that the cognitive content is slight enough not to require agreement in this sense. What is 
necessary is agreement in function: in the ways different doctrinal formulations work in 
the lives of believers and communities of believers. 
Religious Experience and Religious Plurality 
While there is much variety among the inclusivist and pluralist proposals in the 
theology of religions, a common trait is the assumption that different religions should be 
understood as different responses to the same ultimate reality. From this viewpoint, the 
basic difference between these inclusivists and pluralists is that inclusivists relativize non-
Christian religions to the Christian faith, while pluralists relativize all religions to a 
religious conception constructed independently of any particular tradition or community. 
`The crucial difference between postliberals lies right here. For some, and they include the most 
prominent—Lindbeck, Frei, as well as Kathryn Tanner—the point of theological language is not to know, 
they are in the sense "agnostic." Rather, such language authorizes certain ways of life. For others such as 
Griffiths and DiNoia, the point of theological language is in part to refer to something, and that this 
reference is meaningful, that it corresponds in some way to ordinary sense experience. 
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This "experiential-expressivism," as Lindbeck calls it, is the target of postliberal criticism. 
One criticism is that experiential-expressivism does not seem plausible. The diversity 
of religious referents, texts, teachings, and practices is so great that it is impossible to 
specify this reality concretely. Paul Knitter, a leading pluralist, confirmed the pointedness 
of this criticism when he acknowledged that it shows that pluralists can "too quickly 
presuppose or describe the common ground that establishes unity among religions" and 
"too easily draw up common guidelines for dialogue among religions."' 
Another criticism has to do with the uniqueness of religious communities. The issue of 
Christian uniqueness involves the self-understanding of the Christian community with 
respect to other religious communities. Understandably, it is at the heart of the current 
intra-Christian debate over the theology of religions.' The issue is not whether 
Christianity is unique, but what is the nature of its uniqueness. As John Hick and Paul 
Knitter, the editors of The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, acknowledge: "Christianity, of 
course, is unique in the precise and literal sense in which every religious tradition is 
unique—namely that there is only one of it and that there is therefore nothing else exactly 
like it."" The basic question is whether there is a "unique definiteness, absoluteness, 
normativeness, superiority to Christianity in comparison with other religions in the 
35Paul F. Knitter, One Earth Many Religions: Multifaith Dialogue and Global Responsibility, 
preface by Hans Kiing (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1995), 44. 
"The very titles of some leading books in the field illustrates: The Myth of Christian Uniqueness and 
Christian Uniqueness Reconsidered (to which both Di sloia and Griffiths contributed); Paul F. Knitter's 
No Other Name? (A Critical Survey of Christian Attitudes Toward the World Religions, American 
Society of Missiology Series, No. 7 [Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1985]) and Carl E. Braaten's 
No Other Gospel! (Christianity among the World's Religions [Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 19921). 
'The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, vii. 
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world."' This question demarcates the line between exclusivism and inclusivism on one 
side—both of which, while differing in many respects, maintain the uniqueness of Christ 
for ultimate salvation—and pluralism on the other, which is willing to recognize the 
independent validity of other religions for salvation. 
The Lutheran position maintains a strong sense of Christian uniqueness. The 
Athanasian Creed connects salvation with affirmations about the Trinity and about the 
person and work of Jesus Christ. It is necessary for salvation to worship one God in three 
persons and three persons in one God, without confusing the persons or dividing the 
substance. It is also necessary for salvation to believe that Jesus Christ, the Son of God, is 
at once God and man, and yet not two Christs but one; and that he suffered for our 
salvation and now is raised from the dead, ascended into heaven, and will return to judge 
the living and the dead. The specifically Lutheran symbols confess their agreement with 
this and other ecumenical symbols.39 In other ways, too, the Confessions uphold Christian 
uniqueness regarding salvation and truth in very strong terms. The understanding of the 
First Commandment rules all other things, whether of other religions or some other 
invention, to which a person should trust and depend on.' In sin, the First Commandment 
proves impossible to fulfill, and yet the Creed reveals the redeemer from sin, death, and 
the devil, namely, Jesus Christ, upon whom "all our salvation and blessedness depends" 
(LC II, 33). To be sure, the Confessions affirm that the Law of God is known in the 
Ibid. 
'See the Preface of the Book of Concord; Smalcald Articles (SA), I; FC Epit Rule and Norm, 4; FC 
SD Rule and Norm, 4. 
40See especially LC I, 1-23. 
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consciences of all humankind, and even in the state of sin there remains some knowledge 
about God (FC SD II, 9). Nevertheless, it is only through knowledge of Jesus Christ and 
the work of the Holy Spirit to bring that knowledge that one can know God the Father as 
full of favor and grace (LC II, 64-65).4' 
Lutheran theology finds both convergence with and lessons from postliberals in their 
stress on Christian uniqueness. On this point, the usual portrait of Barth as sharply 
exclusivistic is accurate.' His comparison of Christianity with Pure Land Buddhism is 
instructive. Both may be understood as religions of grace. Even if their conceptions of 
grace were identical (which, as Barth points out, they in fact are not), Christianity is 
unique not because of any concept, even grace, with which it shares with this school of 
Buddhism. Rather, its uniqueness lies solely in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
The later postliberals take an approach different from Barth as well as from many 
other current proposals. They argue for uniqueness on what I would call formal rather 
than substantive grounds. In other words, they develop their positions on uniqueness by 
looking to characteristics of religions rather than to any particular issue (e.g., Christ or 
ultimate salvation). Lindbeck does this with his advocacy of a cultural-linguistic model of 
religion. Different religions are viewed like different languages in that they are like 
interpretive frameworks that allow one to make truth claims and open particular 
possibilities for experiences. This permits one to understand that a religion is unique in a 
'The issue of the knowledge of God is pursued further in the next chapter. 
'However, as I argued in chapter two, in other important respects the usual portraits of Barth are 
inaccurate and better understood from a postliberal perspective. 
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very strong sense, that does not only see religions as unique but permits categorical claims 
to unsurpassibility. Griffiths argues for Christian uniqueness by way of a careful analysis 
of religious doctrine. This leads him to conclude that only for detailed and pressing 
reasons, none of which have been supplied, should Christians consider abandoning 
doctrines of a highly particular nature and fully universal scope—doctrines such as the 
Trinitarian and Christological dogmas. This uniqueness would include both universalistic 
and particularistic dimensions integral to Christian faith and life. Further, far from 
following the pluralist revision of their body of doctrines, Christians should make their 
central doctrines basic to the development of their approach to interreligious encounters. 
DiNoia takes a parallel route, stressing that the aims of different religions are unique, as 
are the patterns of life, articulated in their bodies of doctrines. In this view, the Christian 
aim for fellowship with the Trinity and the understanding and way of life that leads one to 
enjoy it are distinct from the Buddhist aim of Nirvana and the understanding and way of 
life fostered by Buddhists for achieving it. 
The more important postliberal contribution, however, lies with its arguments for 
Christian uniqueness. The arguments of Lindbeck, Griffiths, and DiNoia all can be readily 
adapted for use by Lutheran theology. The argument of Griffiths is the most detailed and 
defends most clearly the need and right of Christian theology to retain and put to use its 
central doctrines. For this reason his is the most attractive. The fact that all three 
arguments derive from reflections upon features of different religious communities rather 
from specifically Christian theological considerations is not an obstacle. They are not used 
to establish the possibility of Christian uniqueness, but rather to make clear that the 
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presumption of Christian uniqueness is plausible in the situation of religious plurality. All 
three do this effectively, especially in undermining the presumption of pluralists that a 
strong notion of Christian uniqueness is untenable. 
Related to its defense of Christian uniqueness is the postliberal recognition of the 
particularity of all religions. Just as postliberals insist on the uniqueness of Christianity, 
so they also stress that each religious community be understood as unique. 
Acknowledging Christian uniqueness says that other religions are different. 
Acknowledging religious particularity says that other religions are diverse. William 
Placher notes that many theologians and philosophers seem reluctant to accept a genuine 
religious plurality, where there are different and conflicting religions and no tradition- or 
community-neutral standpoint from which to evaluate them.' To accommodate this 
reluctance, they have typically adopted one of two basic strategies." One move is to see 
other religions as versions of one's own. This is the basic strategy of inclusivism. The 
other move develops an independent standpoint from which one supposedly can evaluate 
all religions. This is the basic strategy of pluralism.' 
The later postliberal approaches—Lindbeck, Griffiths, and DiNoia—grant that 
religions are different and come into opposition and conflict." They recognize not only a 
'Placher, Unapologetic Theology, 16-17, 144. 
"Placher admits that this twofold distinction is really an oversimplification, but useful at least for 
illustrating the basic issues, which is all that I intend here (ibid., 144). 
'The former is exemplified by the anonymous Christian theory of Karl Rainier; the latter by the 
pluralistic hypothesis of John Hick. For summaries of the positions of Rahner and Hick, see above, pp. 
4-5. 
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difference between Christianity and other religions and a corresponding uniqueness to 
Christianity, but that different religions are themselves unique. Lindbeck makes the point 
by modelling religions after languages and cultures, with each with unique categories, 
concepts, and grammar. Griffiths does so by arguing that different religions make 
different semantic claims with different syntax. DiNoia makes the point by stressing that 
different religions point at different aims and foster unique patterns of life to attain them. 
From this standpoint, both inclusivists and pluralists effectively deny religious 
plurality. Superficially, of course, inclusivists and pluralists affirm the plurality of 
religions, but in their actual treatment of the issue, they do not. By supposing that non-
Christian religions are fulfilled or superseded by Christianity, an inclusivist proposal like 
the anonymous Christian theory refuses from the outset to acknowledge religious plurality 
by regarding non-Christian religions as incomplete or imperfect versions of Christianity. 
By suggesting that all religions are properly understood as incomplete and limited 
responses to a single ineffable ultimate reality, a proposal like the pluralistic hypothesis 
sees Christian and non-Christian religions alike as versions of a single basic religious 
movement, namely, the transformation from self-centeredness to reality-centeredness. By 
exposing their inability even to recognize genuine plurality, postliberals effectively 
undermine the plausibility of both these inclusivist and pluralist proposals. 
The postliberal view also undermines perhaps the most frequent justification for 
"Karl Barth, I should note at once, does not do this. The reason is that his argument in §17 of 
Church Dogmatics is not directed toward dealing with a situation of religious plurality, as it would be for 
the later postliberals, but with the place of the concept of religion in Christian theology. This can be seen 
not only from the section itself, but its position within Church Dogmatics, where it is part of Barth's 
discussion of revelation. 
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inclusivism and pluralism, which is the need to respect other religions.' As especially 
DiNoia notes, both inclusivists and pluralists are concerned about particularistic or 
exclusivistic claims, e.g., claims that there is only one way of salvation for humankind, or 
that there is only one true ultimate reality. Their concern is not that such views are self-
evidently false or meaningless, but that they may cause offense. This is a basic reason 
Christian inclusivists and pluralists seek to account the validity of non-Christian religions 
toward salvation. This move itself, as we have just noted, effectively denies religious 
plurality, and so actually works against showing respect to other religions. 
This accent constitutes an even more important contribution than its stance and 
arguments for Christian uniqueness. Indeed, it relativizes the whole issue of Christian 
uniqueness, because it shows the matter of uniqueness, no matter how conceived, to be 
only one aspect in Christian theological reflection about other religions. A proper 
understanding of the relationship of Christianity to other religions involves more than 
ascertaining whether and how Christianity is unique among the religions of the world. It 
also involves reflection on the relationship between Christianity and each of the religions 
of the world. The contribution of the postliberal approach is to recognize and argue that 
each religious community is likely to be unique as well. 
As their arguments show, much of the field of the theology of religions has this lesson 
to learn from the postliberals, and Lutherans should be among them. It is one thing—an 
important thing, to be sure—to defend Christian uniqueness. But this issue does not 
'9n this regard, postliberals share the basic concern of politically-oriented theologies of religions 
such as proposed by John Milbank. See above, pp. 9-10. 
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exhaust the topic. Given the field's focus on the topic of salvation for non-Christians and 
through their religions, it is understandable that religious particularity has been 
overlooked. Thus the postliberal outlook provides a much-needed corrective. 
One reason for adopting this outlook is simply that it gives others respect by taking 
them and their religious communities seriously. Another reason is that the situation of 
religious plurality means religious encounters, perhaps competition. Part of the task of a 
theology of religions should be to equip Christian communities in effectively approaching 
and interacting with members of other religious communities. As just pointed out, 
incluvisism and pluralism can tend to deny plurality. Moreover, a strong accent on 
Christian uniqueness can lead to overlooking specific differences. The postliberal 
recognition of religious particularity counters both tendencies and instead encourages 
theology to approach its encounters with non-Christian religious communities on an 
individual basis, and to proceed in an ad hoc manner. 
Learning from Other Religions 
In so far as theology is a human activity, the product of human reflection, it may be 
possible to learn something from other areas of human activity. Christian exegetes have 
long benefitted from the findings, categories, and concepts of grammarians and 
philosophers. It may be possible also to benefit from the findings, categories, and 
concepts of others engaged in rational reflection about matters such as the nature of 
ultimate reality and the purpose of human existence, that is to say, from other religious 
communities. There is nothing intrinsically alien about human reason for theological 
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purposes, although there is nothing intrinsically fitting about it either. 
This does not mean Christians could or should look to non-Christian truths as criteria 
against which to test Christian claims. As postliberals would urge, the proper criteria for 
the Christian community to apply in testing alien claims are Christian ones. This 
restriction might seem to rule out a great deal that could be learned from another religious 
community. However, I can see at least two general ways in which it might be possible to 
learn from another religious community. 
One way that Christians can learn from another religious community is to use their 
stories, discourses, and doctrines to help understand a Christian situation. For instance, 
some postliberals are criticized for appearing to bypass questions of reference." For those 
like Stanley Hauerwas, the truth of Biblical narratives seems to lie not in whom and what 
they refer to but in the kind of people who are formed by the story.' In assessing this 
approach, Christians might learn from Ramanuja, a Hindu who lived in the eleventh and 
twelfth centuries: 
The assertion again that a statement referring to some accomplished thing gratifies 
men merely by imparting a knowledge of the thing, without being a means of 
knowledge with regard to its real existence—so that it would be comparable to the 
tales we tell to children or sick people—can in no way be upheld. When it is 
ascertained that a thing has no real existence, the mere knowledge or idea of the thing 
does not gratify. The pleasure which stories give to children and sick people is due to 
the fact that they erroneously believe them to be true; if they were to find out that the 
matter present to their thought is untrue their pleasure would come to an end that very 
4sSo argues William Placher in Unapologetic Theology, 163-164, about David Kelsey and Stanley 
Hauerwas. My illustration should be understood as hypothetical. For more on hypothetical cases of this 
kind, see William A. Christian, Sr., Doctrines ofReligious Communities: A Philosophical Study (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), 4. 
"Stanley Hauerwas, A Community of Character: Toward a Constructive Social Ethic (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 55. Cf. Placher, Unapologetic Theology, 164. 
195 
moment. And thus in the case of the texts of the Upanishads also. If we thought that 
these texts do not mean to intimate the real existence of Brahman, the mere idea of 
Brahman to which they give rise would not satisfy us in any way. 
The conclusion therefore is that texts such as "That from whence these beings 
are born" etc. do convey valid instruction as to the existence of Brahman, i.e., that 
being which is the sole cause of the world, is free from all shadow of imperfection, 
comprises within itself all auspicious qualities, such as omniscience and so on, and is of 
the nature of supreme bliss." 
This passage seems to suggest that Christians ask whether their Scriptures would also fail 
to "satisfy" readers if they did not actually refer to the realities they speak about. If this 
were so, one might be led to ask whether the Scriptures could be relied on to form their 
readers' lives, whether they referred to external realities or not. If they could not be so 
relied upon, then this form of argument might be used against views such as Rauerwas's. 
In turn, one might be led to seek other discussions of this issue in the Indian religions. 
Christians might also learn from other religious communities how they might deal with 
those outside the community. For instance, as Griffiths pointed out, there has been a very 
long running exchange between Indian "theistic" religions and Buddhists over the 
existence of an ultimate divine being. As Christians today encounter Buddhists, it may be 
helpful to learn how they have been viewed by other Indian religions who have carried on 
apologetical and polemical exchanges with Buddhists. These exchanges, on the one hand, 
might help Christians understand Buddhist arguments against the endurance of the self. 
On the other hand, and perhaps more usefully, one might be able to appropriate some 
arguments in defending against Buddhist polemics. 
"The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary ofRamanuga, trans. George Thibaut (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1904), 199-200. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
KNOWLEDGE, SALVATION, AND MISSION 
The last chapter looked at implications of the postliberal approach particularly with 
respect to a Lutheran theology of religions. We saw how the theology of the Lutheran 
Confessions converged with the nonfoundational dimension of postliberal theology. 
Based on this convergence, I discussed some applications and lessons that a Lutheran 
theology of religions should draw from postliberals, and I considered some critical issues. 
With its focus on doctrine and its advocacy of a "grammatical" method of theology, 
however, the postliberal approach would seem to hold more specific implications for a 
Lutheran theology of religions. The purpose of this chapter is to uncover some of them. 
Such an appropriation is in line with the thrust of the postliberal approach. David 
Tracy meant it as a criticism when he called George Lindbeck's theology in The Nature of 
Doctrine "confessionalism" and likened it to Karl Barth's.' But the comparison with 
Barth is apt and the characterization of confessionalism is accurate. Confessionalism in 
the sense of thinking and working from within a particular context is unavoidable, say 
postliberals, and needs to be acknowledged rather than denied. Paul Griffiths speaks also 
for other postliberals when he says that to be confessional "is simply to be open about 
'David Tracy, "Lindbeck's New Program for Theology: A Reflection," The Thomist 49 (1985): 465, 
470. 
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one's historical and religious locatedness, one's specificity, an openness that is essential 
for serious theological work and indeed for serious intellectual work that is not in thrall to 
the myth of the disembodied and unlocated scholarly intellect . . ."2 Tracy's comments 
speak more to his lack of comprehension about postliberal theology than any fault or 
defect on the part of Lindbeck—or Barth or Griffiths. 
The advance of postliberal theology lies with its reflection on the challenges of both 
the contemporary situation and of the responses of modern theology. In biblical 
hermeneutics Hans Frei has pointedly shown how both liberal and conservative exegetes 
have made assumptions that have led to an "eclipse" of the category of narrative in the 
Bible.' Whether or not one agrees with specific exegetical conclusions, his critique is 
powerful and the direction in which he points hermeneutics, namely, to consider once 
again narrative, is beneficial. Similarly, the postliberal approaches to the theology of 
religions, on the one hand, bring an incisive critique against modern approaches and, on 
the other hand, point theologians back toward their communities' bodies of doctrines for 
considering the challenges of religious plurality. In particular, postliberals point 
theologians toward the underlying "logic" or "grammar" of their doctrines. In this view, 
the basic theological task is to uncover the rules which govern the thought, speech, and 
action of the community and to make sure that thought, language, and action conform to 
'Paul J. Griffiths, "The Uniqueness of Christian Doctrine Defended," in Christian Uniqueness 
Reconsidered: The Myth of a Pluralistic Theology of Religions, ed. Gavin D'Costa (Maryknoll, New 
York: Orbis Books, 1990), 169. 
'Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century 
Biblical Narrative (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). 
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these rules.' 
In this chapter I shall begin by discussing briefly the postliberal understanding of rules 
as they pertain to theology. Next I shall look at the Lutheran Confessions in an attempt to 
discern some of its central rules and trace out some connections with other aspects of 
Lutheran teaching. Then we can put these to use in discussing some issues in the theology 
of religions. 
Theology and Rules 
In speaking about "theology" and "rules," confusion may easily arise. The rules 
discussed here is not like the Golden Rule of the Sermon on the Mount or the Silver Rule 
of Confucius. But since they are not this kind of rule, I should explain further what I 
mean. 
Let us observe first that the crucial metaphor for postliberals is language. This is 
evident, for example, in central postliberal features like the notion of a grammatical 
method of theology; the concepts of intra- and extra-textuality; and the cultural-linguistic 
model of religion. The view of language is analogous to the view of philosophers like 
Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle that "speaking a language is engaging in a rule- 
'Cf. Hans Frei's understanding of theology as an aspect of Christianity and a "religion-specific" task 
(Types of Christian Theology, ed. George Hunsinger and William C. Placher [New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press, 1992], 2): 
Here Christian theology is first of all the first-order statements or proclamations made in the course of 
Christian practice and belief. But second . . . it is the Christian community's second-order appraisal 
of its own language and actions under a nom or norms internal to the community itself This 
appraisal in turn has two aspects. The first is descriptive: an endeavor to articulate the "grammar," or 
"internal logic," of first-order Christian statements. The second is critical, an endeavor to judge any 
given articulation of Christian language for its success or failure in adhering to the acknowledged 
norm or norms governing Christian use of language. 
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governed form of behavior."' Searle observed that just as games like baseball, football, 
and chess are governed by rules, so also is speaking a language. In saying this, however, 
he did not mean simply that rules applied to the already-given activities of speaking or 
playing, but that some rules constituted these very activities.' Before one speaks, one 
must internalize certain rules about how to speak. These rules do not specify what 
actually is said, but without them, one does not actually speak. Accordingly, the task of 
characterizing language involves an uncovering of these usually implicit rules. The 
linguistic character of postliberal theology fits this understanding of language, and a 
similar notion of rules is evident. Lindbeck's proposal is the most explicit about this, 
where theology is a task that is like uncovering grammatical rules for a language, while 
doctrines in their strict sense are understood as the rules themselves. In their focus on 
doctrine and in their stress on the regulative function of doctrine, Barth, Griffiths, and 
DiNoia also share in this characteristic. For instance, in Griffiths, it shows where he 
maintains that the aspect of doctrine as community rules was perhaps the most basic 
dimension of all, from which the other dimensions flowed. Griffiths argues that religious 
doctrines have at least five important dimensions. Two turn out to be central in giving 
structure and meaning to the Christian life, including Christian engagements with non- 
5John It. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1969), 16. See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. 
M. Anscombe (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), §81-85. 
6See especially Searle's distinction of regulative and constitutive rules: "As a start, we might say that 
regulative rules regulate antecedently or independently existing forms of behavior; for example, many 
rules of etiquette regulate inter-personal relationships which exist independently of the rules. But 
constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of behavior. The rules of 
football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing football or chess, but as it were they create 
the very possibility of playing such games" (ibid. 33). 
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Christians. These are the semantic (function as cognitive truth claims) and syntactical 
(function as community rules) dimensions. He insists that both these dimensions of the 
Trinitarian and Christological dogmas were central factors for the Christian life, including 
occasions when it engages other religious conununities. Barth, in fact, makes this move 
when he appropriated the classical Christological dogma not for its claims about the 
incarnation but as a rule for guiding theological reflection on religion and the religions. 
We can gain further insight into this aspect of doctrines by observing that, in these two 
dimensions of doctrine, Griffiths's debt to philosopher William Christian is apparent. They 
correspond to the basic distinction that Christian finds in the doctrines of religious 
communities, namely, the distinction between primary and governing doctrines.' Primary 
doctrines comprise the different proposals a community might make that have to do with 
the setting of human life and the conduct of life in that setting. They include "proposals 
for belief about existents and the conditions of existence, proposals of courses of outward 
and inward action, and proposals of valuations of various features of the setting of human 
life and of human activities."' Governing doctrines, on the other hand, are principles and 
rules that a community works out to govern the formation and development of its body of 
doctrines.' To say, however, that they are principles and rules is not to say that they 
function only to "condition and regulate various sorts of decisions a community makes 
'William A. Christian, Sr., Doctrines ofReligious Communities: A Philosophical Study. New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987), especially 1-11, 219-231. Christian's analysis of 
doctrine has been important to the development of postliberal theology as a whole and influential to 
Lindbeck, Griffiths, and DiNoia. 
'Ibid., 219. See also pp. 1-2. 
'Ibid., 2. 
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about its body of doctrines. It would be better still to say that they express a community's 
understanding of the structure of its body of doctrines."' A "rule" in the sense of the 
Golden Rule is a primary doctrine. It proposes a course of action. Other primary 
doctrines would include the Ten Commandments and the Gospel. A "rule" in the 
grammatical-theological sense, however, would be a governing doctrine. 
Discerning the Logic of the Lutheran Confessions  
Given this analysis, we can say that the postliberal strategy directs Lutherans to look 
toward their key governing doctrines in trying to think and speak properly about the 
questions raised by religious plurality.' What are these doctrines—these rules—for 
Lutherans? They are not hard to find. The Smalcald Articles state about Jesus Christ: 
The first and chief article is this: that Jesus Christ, our God and Lord, "was put to 
death for our sins and raised again for our justification" (Romans 4). He alone "is the 
lamb of God who bears the sin of the world" (John 1). "God laid on him all our sin" 
(Isaiah 53). And "all have sinned and are justified without works by his grace through 
the redemption of Jesus Christ in his blood" (Romans 3) [SA II, I, 1-3]. 
The governing aspect of these doctrine-expressing sentences is that this doctrine about 
Christ and his redemptive activity is the chief doctrinal article (Hauptartikel). The 
meaning of "chief' is spelled out later in the article, where it is stated that nothing of this 
article can be given up or compromised. The same rule is articulated in the fourth article 
of the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, where the doctrine of justification is called 
'Ibid., 11. Emphasis added. 
"In this chapter, too, I shall use the following abbreviations for the Lutheran confessional documents: 
AC—Augsburg Confession; Ap—Apology of the Augsburg Confession; SA—Smalcald Articles; 
SC—Small Catechism; LC—Large Catechism; FC Epit—Epitome of the Formula of Concord; FC 
SD—Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord. 
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the "main doctrine of Christianity" (praecipuus locus doctrine christianae, Ap IV, 2). 
Another set of rules is closely related. They involve the distinction of Law and 
Gospel. In the fourth article of the Apology, this distinction is drawn specifically to give 
perspective to the importance of the controversy involved. The controversy does not 
interest us here, but the distinction does: 
All Scripture should be divided into these two lessons: into the law and the promises 
(in legem et promissiones). In some places it presents the law; in other places it 
presents the promise of Christ, namely, when it promises that Christ is coming and 
promises remission of sins, justifiction, and eternal life, or when, in the gospels Christ, 
when he had appeared, promises remission of sins, justification, and eternal life. When 
we speak of law in this disputation we mean the lessons of the Decalogue, wherever 
they are taught in the Scriptures. About ceremonial and civil laws of Moses we are 
saying nothing for the present (Ap IV, 5-6). 
Here again, we have some rules about doctrines. On the one hand, we learn that the 
Gospel, the message about forgiveness for Christ's sake, stands in close connection with 
the Law, and together they comprise the two main doctrines of the Scriptures. On the 
other hand, we find that they are to be divided. The Apology, in the interest of refuting 
the Roman Confutation, then pursues the kinds of righteousness that obtain from each. 
The Large Catechism, however, briefly but illuminatingly amplifies on the differences 
between Law and Gospel when it teaches that the commandments (Law) teach people 
what to do but the Creed (Gospel) tells of what God does for and gives to people (LC II, 
67). 
These distinctions are still further amplified in the Formula of Concord. The Law is 
described here as a divine doctrine that "reveals the righteous, unchanging will of God, 
shows how man should be disposed in his nature, thoughts, words, and deeds so to be 
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pleasing and acceptable to God, and threatens those who transgress the Law with God's 
wrath and temporal and eternal punishment" (FC SD V, 17). Here we see that the Law 
has both content and function. The Formula speaks not only about what the Law says 
(tells what God expects of human creatures). It also speaks of the kinds of functions that 
the speaking of the Law may perform, namely, to threaten sinners. It is the same with the 
Gospel. The content of the Gospel is "that the Son of God, our Lord Christ, took upon 
himself and bore the curse of the Law and atoned and paid for all our sins, through whom 
alone we come again to the grace of God, obtain forgiveness of sins through faith, are set 
free from death and all the punishments of sin, and are saved eternally" (FC SD V, 20). 
Its content is Jesus Christ; its effect is to comfort; for this reason it is a "good and joyful 
message" (FC SD V, 21). 
It is for reason of these functions that the Formula goes on to follow Romans 3 and 
Martin Luther and further define the Law in terms of the function (officium) of 
condemning sin and leading to a knowledge of sin (FC SD V, 17). The Law includes not 
only direct commands of God but conceivably could just about any event, including the 
death of Jesus Christ. This is brought out in the Formula, where it speaks about the 
suffering and death of Christ as a terrible revelation of God's wrath over sin (FC SD V, 
12).12 James Nestigen further explains this aspect of the Law: "Moral requirements, the 
law of the state, familial pressures, personal expectations—even a blown leaf, to take one 
of Luther's favorite examples—can all preach the Law. For each one of them can 
condemn, the rustling leaf probably most effectively because it makes its threats implicitly, 
"See also FC Epit V, 9. 
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letting the imagination fill them out.' 
If the things that may count as the Law have very broad boundaries, then the Gospel 
has highly specific content: Jesus Christ as redeemer. This content is brought out in the 
Apology, which teaches that when the gospel is properly understood, "it illumines and 
amplifies the honor of Christ and brings needed and abundant consolation to pious 
consciences" (Ap IV, 2). The centrality of the doctrine of justification, in other words, is 
Jesus Christ. A mere recounting of the person and work of Christ, however, is not in itself 
a presentation of the Gospel; it must have a certain effect, namely, to provide comfort to 
the repentant sinner. If it does not have this effect, however, then it may indeed have not 
an indifferent effect but its very opposite: terror. 
We could go on at great length about the distinction of Law and Gospel, and the 
applications of this perspective are also many. Nestigen, for example, draws some out for 
preaching.' But they also help us to stake out a coherent Lutheran understanding of 
crucial issues in the theology of religions. We should not expect that every issue reduces 
to a question of distinguishing Law and Gospel, but we may expect it to give insight not 
only into individual topics but into connections between them. 
Knowledge of God in the World Religions 
A central issue in the theology of religions is the nature of the knowledge of God 
'James Arne Nestigen, "Distinguisting Law and Gospel: A Functional View," Concordia Journal 
22 (1996): 31. 
"Nestigen draws an entirely correct and easily overlooked lesson from this functional or pragmatic 
perspective on Law and Gospel: "What is grammatically, doctrinally without question the pure word of 
the Gospel may become the harshest word of condemnation if the function is not also discerned" (ibid., 
33). 
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available through the world religions. One question raised often is whether nature or 
society or other extra-Christian spheres of activity and knowledge shows evidence of God 
and his activity or will. Frequently Karl Barth is cited as the negative position on this 
issue. This judgment, however, is not true, because Barth affirmed that God could reveal 
himself outside the boundaries of the Christian community!' 
The key question is whether this evidence can be understood as making God himself 
known. It is one thing to say that creation gives evidence that God exists or that the 
hardships, suffering, and pain of human existence shows God's wrath. It is another thing, 
however, to be able to say that one comes to know the identity of God through these 
things. In other words, it is one thing to say "The heavens declare the glory of God" 
(Psalm 19:1) but quite another to say "The heavens present to sinful human creatures the 
identity of God." The latter, however, is what many theologians now seek to affirm. 
Pluralists, as they stress the need to recognize a "rough parity" between religions, assume 
that the nature of the knowledge of God among different world religions is comparable 
(but not necessarily commensurable or very great). But even those whose positions are 
far from the pluralist stance argue that God himself is known apart from Jesus Christ. For 
example, Carl Braaten, a firm opponent of pluralism, contends: "The New Testament 
nowhere makes the claim that Christ is the one and only revelation of God in history and 
15See above, pp. 67-68. To repeat Barth on this point: "God may speak to us through Russian 
communism or a flute concerto, a blossoming shrub or a dead dog. . . . God may speak to us through a 
pagan or an atheist" (Church Dogmatics, vol. 1, The Doctrine of the Word of God, part 1, trans. G. T. 
Thomson [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1936], 60-61; Die kirchliche Dogmatik, vol. 1, Die Lehre vom 
Wort Gottes, part 1 [Munich: Chr. Kaiser, 1932], 55-56. 
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to humanity."' To be sure, this knowledge of God is not to see the "human face of God," 
but Braaten believes "[e]very religion has prophets who are similar to John the Baptist in 
preparing the way for the coming of Christ."' A theology of religions should be prepared 
"to take seriously all that human beings have experienced and believed about God prior to 
and apart from the preaching of the Gospel," to the point of seeing the so-called religions 
of grace like Jodo Shin-Shu as what Jesus said about the scribe in Mark 12:34—not far 
from the kingdom of God.' 
The Lutheran Confessions seem to give mixed answers to the question of the 
knowledge of God. The Formula teaches that even the heathen have some knowledge of 
God through the knowledge of the Law they have naturally (FC SD V, 22), and that 
human reason itself has some vague knowledge that a God exists and also about his Law 
(FC SD II, 9). Moreover, the Apology and the Large Catechism specifies that the Law 
known naturally agrees with the Ten Commandments (Ap IV, 7; LC II, 67). On the other 
'Carl E. Braaten, No Other Gospel! Christianity among the World's Religions (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1992), 69. The differences between the approaches and positions of Braaten and 
pluralists like Paul Knitter are sharp and profound. For Braaten, it is exemplified in the titles of their 
major writings on the theology of religions. As Braaten has explained: "Paul F. Knitter has written a 
landmark book on Christianity and the world religions that bears the title No Other Name? The reason 
for the question mark is to call into question the traditional biblical-Christian claim that Jesus Christ is 
unique, nonnative, decisive, and final self-revelation of God and the salvation of the world. Acts 4:12 
declares: 'There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among mortals 
by which we must be saved.' In stark contrast, this book bears the title No Other Gospel! The 
exclamation point, however, is included in the title for a reason similar to Knitter's. I can find no better 
way to accentuate Paul's emphasis in Gal 1:6-9, where again and again he warns his readers about 
turning to a 'different gospel': 'a gospel contrary to what we proclaimed to you'; but he also says, 'not 
that there is another gospel.' . . Today we stand once again between the question mark imposed by the 
skeptical spirit of our age and the exclamation point punctuating the christological kerygma of apostolic 
times" (No Other Gospel!, 1). 
"Ibid., 69. 
'Ibid., 71, 73. 
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hand, the Confessions also speak about the sinfulness of human creatures lying especially 
in their ignorance of God and in their inability to trust in him and to fear and love him (Ap 
II, 7-8, 23). 
The first step in resolving this dilemma is recognizing the nature of the Law as 
understood and kept naturally, that is, according to the unregenerate human creature. The 
Apology concedes that human reason can understand the Law to some extent, but this 
extent is a matter not simply of degree but of order. It can only recognize external 
demands, but it has no grasp of its demands to fear God, love God, pray to God (Ap IV, 
7-8). In other words, human reason has some notion how to fulfill the Second Table of 
the Law, but none with regard to fulfilling the First Table. But in its inability to keep the 
First Commandment, human reason shows its utter inability even to grasp the true 
requirements of any others, whether they pertain to God directly or to God through our 
relationships with other human beings (cf. Ap II, 16; IV, 34). The fulfillment of the First 
Commandment, in turn, comes not merely in knowing that there is a God, for "there has 
never been a people as wicked as not to establish and maintain some kind of worship" (LC 
I, 17), but in trusting in the one true God. 
The second step is applying the distinction of Law and Gospel and recognizing that the 
true knowledge of God's identity, upon which fulfillment of the First Commandment 
depends, comes not through any features of nature, culture, or religion (which yields only 
a partial and radically incomplete view of the Law), but specifically in the Gospel of Jesus 
Christ. As the Large Catechism explains about the Creed (which itself is understood as 
"pure grace" [LC II, 68]): 
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For God himself has revealed and opened to us the deepest depths of his fatherly heart, 
his sheer, unspeakable love in these three articles. He created us for this very purpose, 
to redeem and sanctify us. Besides giving and handing over to us everything in heaven 
and on earth, he has given us his Son and his Holy Spirit, through whom he brings us 
to himself. As we explained before, we could never come to recognize the Father's 
favor and grace except through the Lord Christ, who is a mirror of the Father's heart. 
Apart from him we see nothing but a wrathful and terrible judge. But we could have 
known nothing of Christ either, had it not been revealed by the Holy Spirit (LC II, 64-
65). 
There is no true knowledge of God except through Christ, and no knowledge of Christ, 
except through the Holy Spirit at work through the preaching of the Gospel. As the Small 
Catechism explained: "I believe that I cannot by my own reason or strength believe in 
Jesus Christ, my Lord, or come to him; but the Holy Spirit has called me by the Gospel, 
enlightened me with his gifts, sanctified and kept me in the true faith; . . ." 
Thus it must be concluded that true knowledge of God, that is, knowledge of his 
identity, far from being available through non-Christian religious communities, is restricted 
to the Christian community in two basic respects. First, it depends on the Gospel, or, 
more specifically, the preaching of the Gospel and the administration of the sacraments 
(see AC V). Apart from this activity, God cannot be known. Second, it depends on the 
Scriptures. The Gospel is not merely a concept to be grasped or a proposition to be 
accepted but a message rooted in a particular history and a particular interpretation of that 
history and a particular framework in which this interpretation is worked out. These are 
not found, then, generally in a genre of literature but in a specific text, the Christian 
Scriptures. While a basic reception of the Gospel (that is, one in which God is known and 
believed in) may require fairly limited knowledge of contents of the Scriptures, the 
maturity of the life of individual members and of the community as a whole depends on 
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acquiring knowledge but in developing skills to understand and put to proper use what the 
Scriptures teach. 
There are important implications for understanding properly the Lutheran view of 
salvation of non-Christians, but before we turn to that, I want to discuss another topic 
related to the issue of the knowledge of God. 
Pluralists stress the ineffability of God. Part of their argument for understanding that 
different religions are responses to this single incomprehensible reality relies on the 
assumption "that the object or content of authentic religious experience is 
infinite—Mystery beyond all forms, exceeding our every grasp of it. The infinity and 
ineffability of God-Mystery demands religious pluralism and forbids any one religion from 
having the 'only' or 'final' word."' God's nature is such that all human knowledge and 
understanding of it is always limited and partial. 
The Lutheran emphasis moves in the opposite direction. But it is not in the direction 
of showing that God can indeed be characterized and comprehended. When pluralists 
stress God's ineffability, they are returning a negative answer to questions about what 
God is like. Lutheran theology, however, does not look first to ask about what can be 
known about God—about his characteristics and attributes—but to his identity. This 
identity, in turn, is bound up with the distinction of Law and Gospel. As Lutheran 
theologian Edmund Schlink explains: 
°Paul F. Knitter, "Preface," in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Toward a Pluralistic Theology 
ofReligions, ed. John Hick and Paul F. Knitter (Marylcnoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1986), x. For 
examples of pluralist proposals that hinge crucially on this notion, see the contributions to Part II: "The 
Theological-Mystical Bridge" of The Myth of Christian Uniqueness. 
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In the Roman church the dreadful fact had become evident that, in spite of the 
preservation of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity, God was not known any more, 
since the Gospel had been lost. But to know God's essence means to know "the most 
profound depths of his fatherly heart, and his sheer, unutterable love" (LC II, 64). To 
know God's love means to receive his gracious love. However, the love of God the 
Creator, Redeemer, and Sanctifier is not given through the demands of the law but 
through the gift of the'Gospel. The triune God, therefore, is known only in the 
distinction of law and Gospel, that is, by faith in the Gospel." 
God can be known because he has made himself known in Jesus Christ. Knowledge of 
Christ is the result of communicating the Gospel. This knowledge, moreover, consists 
crucially of knowing Christ as redeemer, through which knowledge the sinner can receive 
comfort and assurance. 
In this light, the logical centrality of the incarnation becomes clear. As the Nicene 
Creed says, the eternal Son of God, "for us men and for our salvation came down from 
heaven and was incarnate of the Holy Spirit of the virgin Mary and was made man." The 
particularity of the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, in other words, is connected closely 
with soteriology. 
What does this mean for the theology of religions? It breaks the dilemma posed by 
pluralists. Although God in himself is beyond our comprehension, he has made himself 
known in human form, in the incarnation. In view of this, the first question is not "What is 
God like?" but "Who is God?" In identifying God with Jesus Christ, then we have a way 
to know his unseen Father. Pluralists are, in a sense, right about God in himself: he is 
beyond our knowing. But, unlike pluralists, Lutherans insist that though it is impossible to 
search and attain true knowledge of God, he makes himself known through Jesus Christ. 
"Edmund Schlink, The Theology of the Lutheran Confessions, trans. Paul F. Koehneke and Herbert 
J. A. Boman (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1961), 66. 
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To be sure, pluralists like John Hick have adopted Trinitarian and Christological 
positions largely at odds with classical dogmas and orthodox positions of the Christian 
church. For them, an incarnational perspective is unacceptable and likely to be rejected 
out of hand. I shall deal with the implications of this rejection later. But first I shall 
consider the issue of salvation. 
Salvation in Christ and the World Religions 
The postliberal approach, with its emphasis on the uniqueness of aims, concepts, 
teachings, and practices of different religious communities, rules out a clear affirmation 
that non-Christian religious communities are ways of ultimate salvation. Both Lindbeck 
and DiNoia, however, wish to maintain the possibility of universal salvation. For this 
reason, both adopt versions of postmortem evangelization, according to which non-
Christians have opportunity to work out their salvation after death. 
From a Lutheran perspective, neither is satisfactory. Lindbeck's proposal depends on 
a reading of Scripture that sees non-Christians in this life as in a neutral state. This view 
contradicts the Biblical witness and Christian practice on several levels. First, it runs 
counter to Biblical statements that indicate there are only two ways and no third or middle 
ground (e.g., the way of the righteous and the way of the wicked in Psalm 1; the two 
roads in Matthew 7:13-14; darkness and light in John 3:16-21). Second, it runs counter to 
the Biblical teaching of the universality of sin and of God's punishment for sin (e.g., see 
Romans 1-3). In view of the sin of all people, God cannot be neutral with respect to 
anyone, although on account of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, there is peace 
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with God for all humankind. DiNoia's proposal depends problematically on the 
acceptance of the doctrine of purgatory, which from a Lutheran perspective has no strong 
Biblical support and which runs counter to the central doctrine of justification by grace 
through faith. 
Third, these views call into question the consistency of their postliberal thinking. For 
Lindbeck, the desire of holding out the possibility of salvation is reason enough, while 
DiNoia's argument is basically that this possibility is the position of the historic Christian 
mainstream. Both, however, acknowledge that widespread recognition of this possibility 
is very much a modern occurrence, and given their suspicion of modernity, it is 
contradictory for them not to advance a more detailed argument against traditional 
positions that deny the possibility. 
The question of salvation, when viewed within the perspective of the distinction of 
Law and Gospel, takes on definite shape. This perspective shows that salvation must be 
understood as salvation from the consequences of defying the Law of God—death and 
damnation. Sin must be understood as more than imperfection or finitude; it is nothing 
short of offense against God and with the result that people face his wrath and 
punishment. Lindbeck argues that apart from knowledge of the Christian religion it was 
impossible to know whether to accept or reject salvation. From this, he concludes that 
apart from this knowledge, one was in a neutral state with respect to salvation. Ignorance 
of God's Law and of God himself, however, does not constitute an excuse; rather, it is 
evidence of disobedience toward God. Salvation is the work of God, from first to last. It 
is also God's offer, and therefore may be rejected. But the initiative and the work of 
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salvation is all God's doing. 
Christian Mission in Postliberal Perspective 
Closely related to the issues of knowledge of God and ultimate salvation are questions 
about the Christian mission. In terms of postliberals, again, the issue is most acute in the 
case of Lindbeck and his cultural-linguistic model, and as we saw in examining his 
approach, he does not rule out evangelistic missions. What does happen under the 
cultural-linguistic model, however, is that the approach becomes akin to learning a 
language. 
This is not a feature unique to Lindbeck's approach but a basic implication of the 
postliberal stress on the logical or grammatical features of a religion and its theology (or 
analogous intellectual venture in nontheistic religions). Postliberals draw attention to the 
fact that religions involve more than isolated beliefs or responses to experiences but 
includes certain rules like those of logic or grammar that also must be learned to be put to 
use. Becoming religious, then, is not so much a matter of learning or assenting to beliefs, 
as a matter of acquiring and using a skill. In this view, mission is a slow, involving 
process, as Lindbeck suggests, more like the catechesis of the ancient church than 
conversion emphasis of contemporary revivalism. There is, of course, nothing new in this 
understanding. Lindbeck himself attests to this from personal experience as a child of 
missionaries to China. What the postliberal analysis does do, however, is suggest reasons 
why the same kind of understanding of mission is necessary for dechristianized situations, 
situations toward which Europe and North America are heading. It also suggests that the 
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understanding of evangelism that emphasizes personal decision and commitment is likely 
either to become increasingly ineffective or to move increasingly away from the historic 
Christian positions in doctrine, heritage, and community life. 
What also needs to be recognized, however, is that part of the dimension of Law and 
Gospel is that it is the address of God. I have noted that the postliberal proposals we have 
examined bear a linguistic character. It should be further noted that the "speakers" in the 
postliberal model are human. Insofar as becoming Christian is like learning to speak a 
language (Lindbeck) or to play a musical instrument (DiNoia), it is the Christian who 
acquires and puts into use the necessary rules and skills. But from the standpoint of the 
preaching of Law and Gospel, it must also be recognized that there is language which the 
Christian hears. To be sure, there is a definite sense in which one must learn to listen, and 
this skill cannot be assumed to be innate but must be formed. Nevertheless, the listening is 
a listening to God in the Law as he threatens and in the Gospel as he promises. 
The Theology of Religions in Postliberal Perspective 
The discussion on the knowledge of God and the world religions concluded with an 
observation about a Lutheran argument that bounded the knowledge of God in light of the 
incarnation. I suggested that pluralists would not receive such an argument favorably. 
One can well imagine a whole range of topics over which pluralists would be in 
disagreement with other Christians, including Lutherans firmly committed to their Creeds 
and Confessions. What does this suggest for the state of the theology of religions? I 
believe that postliberals can give us a different perspective on this general issue. 
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I shall begin, however, by putting this perspective in perspective, so to speak. In The 
Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas S. Kuhn challenged the usual accounts of 
scientific development, which is portrayed as a process of steady, gradual accumulation." 
Kuhn argued that the history of science showed that scientific disciplines advanced in 
sudden intellectual revolutions. A prevailing "paradigm," which informs the nature and 
task of the discipline's inquiries, would become untenable. At that point, new paradigms, 
incommensurable both with the old and with each other, would emerge and compete until 
one prevailed. The notions of incommensurability and conflict, of course, ran very much 
counter to the usual portrayals of science as a highly ordered, rational venture. But 
Kuhn's account has had a very great influence, extending well beyond the borders of the 
history and philosophy of science.' 
The notions of incommensurability and conflict have been used to characterize thought 
and action in other areas as well. Alasdair Maclntyre, for example, has argued that 
contemporary moral discourse is in a state of disorder, with incommensurate conceptions 
of morality competing and conflicting.' The same sort of observation has been made 
'Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 2d ed., enlarged (Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 1. 
Statistical evidence of this widespread influence may be found in a study of citations in the Arts and 
Humanities Citation Index from 1975-1983, which showed The Structure of Scientific Revolutions to be 
cited more often than any other twentieth-century work (see Arts and Humanities Citation Index 1995, 
vol. 1, 8-9). 
23MacIntyre begins his book After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (2d ed. [Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984], 1-5) with what he calls "a disquieting suggestion." He asks us to 
imagine a future in which the natural sciences were abolished as fields of learning and areas of study, and 
in which scientists were imprisoned and executed. Later, although they have been largely forgotten, an 
attempt is made to revive the sciences from the remaining fragments of knowledge. The result would be 
sciences practiced in ways that would be ordered but also would seem arbitrary and very different from the 
perspective of modern science: 
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about theology. Kathryn Tanner (herself a postliberal) has done this in observing a 
widespread incoherence in modern theology.24 Although various theological positions 
may aim for or claim a kind of orthodoxy, consistently there has been little success in 
achieving agreement across the lines of different factions. She argues that this incoherence 
stems from a very basic sort of disorder. As she explains: 
This lack of success becomes apparent in a mutual failure of recognition, i.e., in the 
refusal of the various factions to accept each other's orthodoxy. In general, there is a 
curious inability to arrive at a consensus in modern times about what it is permissible 
to say on theological issues that had previously been resolvable. To be sure, difference 
and dissension do not in this way erupt for the first time within a hitherto monolithic 
orthodoxy in theological statement. A rich diversity in theological forms of Christian 
self-expression has always existed; orthodoxy in the sense of limits to acceptable 
Christian statement has never demanded uniformity. What is odd about the modern 
situation is the degree to which difference takes on the character of mutual exclusivity. 
Disputes of the fundamental sort under discussion here are never finally resolved one 
way or the other by a consensus opinion concerning the boundaries of acceptable 
statement.' 
In such a culture men would use expressions such as "neutrino", "mass", "specific gravity", "atomic 
weight" in systematic and often interrelated ways which would resemble in lesser or greater degrees 
the ways in which such expressions had been used in earlier times before scientific knowledge had 
been so largely Lost. But many of the beliefs presupposed by the use of these expressions would have 
been lost and there would appear to be an element of arbitrariness and even of choice in their 
application which would appear very surprising to us (1). 
MacIntyre argues that moral discourse in the actual world is in the same disordered state into which 
scientific discourse would fall in the future he imagined (2-3). While we still use many key expressions of 
moral thought, the conceptual scheme for morality itself is fragmented and incomplete. 
MacIntyre further argues that such breakdowns cannot be diagnosed by contemporary philosophical 
methods such as analytical philosophy and phenomenology (2). Such a diagnosis would require a 
historical narrative of at least three distinct stages, corresponding to a pristine state, catastrophe, and 
attempt at restoration. This historical narrative, moreover, could not be of an evaluatively-neutral kind, 
but would need to presuppose standards and criteria of success and failure, order and disorder (3). 
Others have made similar suggestions about the state of moral language in contemporary Western 
societies. See especially Jeffrey Stout in Ethics After Babel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1988), where he 
notes that this diagnosis has been made often (1-7). 
'Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment? (Oxford 
and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988). 
"Ibid., 3-4. 
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The generality of this disorder suggests, in turn, "not the accidental corruption of any 
particular theological faction through the untoward outside influence of flawed 
philosophical principles, but a curious forgetfulness about the rules for proper Christian 
talk on the part of the church itself as a whole. A plausible explanation for general 
disruption is a wide ranging breakdown of the church's own discursive habits."' 
There is a widespread discussion in the theology of religions, and much of it can be 
comprehended under the typology of exclusivism, inclusivism, and pluralism. This 
typology sees the basic issue in the theology of religions as a matter of a certain set of 
substantive topics, centered in topic of salvation, clearly embracing Christian identity, 
truth, and mission, and impacting doctrines of God, Christ, and sin. These topics, to be 
sure, are indeed important and raised for Christian reflection by the contemporary 
situation of religious plurality and competition. But one finds in the literature of the 
theology of religions not merely a sense but actual language that shows increasing 
fragmentation in the field. For example, the contributors and editors of The Myth of 
Christian Uniqueness speak of the pluralist move as "crossing the theological Rubicon" 
and as a "paradigm shift," language that clearly signals drastic and irrevocable changes in 
Christian thinking on the part of its proponents.' The typical historical account shows the 
same tendency: a movement from traditional exclusivism to a more open inclusivism to a 
wide open pluralism. 
In the light of kinds of observations made by Kuhn, Maclntyre, and especially Tanner, 
261bid., 5. 
'The Myth of Christian Uniqueness, vii-viii. 
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the postliberal approaches examined here can be seen to recognize a "wide ranging 
breakdown" in discursive habits in the theology of religions. In their critical modes, they 
recognize a definite departure among whole classes of approaches (e.g., pluralism) from 
the "rules" for how Christians should think, speak, and proceed toward non-Christians and 
their religions. In their constructive modes, these postliberal approaches recommend that 
theologians deal with issues and questions in ways that not only apply specifically 
Christian concepts but govern their uses by the Christian "logic" or "grammar" articulated 
in its theology. 
In the theology of religions, I find the postliberal diagnosis running in two directions. 
One has to do with the nature of a Christian theological interpretation of religion, and it 
comes out most clearly in Barth's critique of modern theology on the concept of religion. 
When modern theologians granted independence to the concept of religion, they 
surrendered from the outset even the possibility of a properly theological interpretation of 
religion and the religions. He acknowledged that substantive positions varied widely. 
Moreover, some positions differed little from those of their premodern fathers. All their 
approaches, however, effectively denied that religion should be understood in light of the 
specifically Christian revelation of God. Thus, Barth saw the problem not so much in 
what was said about non-Christian religions but in the conditions of Christian speaking at 
all. His constructive alternative, on the other hand, is a clear example of attempting to 
recover and apply basic rules for Christian discourse. In his view, no topic or issue is to 
be defined or used apart from specifically Christian theological definition and use. In 
response, Barth recovered the Christological dogma for practical use to guide Christian 
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thought and speech, a use which modern theology had lost. On the basis of the teaching 
of the assumptio camis, Barth concluded that, on the one hand, all human religion is 
unbelief, and, on the other hand, that the true religion was true not of itself but by sheer 
grace in the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
A further difficulty is that the experiential-expressivist understanding of doctrine as 
symbolic of this experience does not permit one to make propositional truth claims. This 
understanding runs counter to that of not only Christians but of other religious 
communities as well, and for this reason (among others) rules out experiential-
expressivism. In other words, he finds experiential-expressivism inadequate for failing to 
follow a basic rule of Christian theology (to say nothing of analogous enterprises in other 
religions). Lindbeck understands that this issue is serious. This is shown in the fact that 
he takes it as a major challenge for the cultural-linguistic model to accommodate truth 
claims, and he deals at length with the issue, trying to show that it can be done. As he 
does, he isolates a shortcoming in the cognitivist view. This view stresses the ontological 
truth of claims and beliefs as primary. Lindbeck argues that this stress leads to 
overlooking the importance of the conditions under which a claim is made. It is 
important, in other words, not only that a truth claim correspond to reality, but also that 
the claim be made in a way consistent with this reality. And so the example of the 
crusader: although it is ontologically true that Christ is Lord, Lindbeck argues that the act 
of killing accompanying and apparently being justified by this claim is not consistent, does 
not cohere with, the reality of the Lordship of Jesus Christ. In failing to comprehend this 
dimension, the cognitivist model, in Lindbeck's view, is also inadequate, and again, for 
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failing to recognize a basic rule of Christian discourse. 
The second kind of breakdown in theological discourse pertains to characterizations of 
other religions. Lindbeck himself does not explicitly pursue this kind of argument, but it is 
evident in his discussion on the relationship of Christianity with other religions. He argues 
that the cultural-linguistic approach gives a better understanding of religions and their 
relationships to each other than the experiential-expressivist model characteristic of liberal 
theology. A key difficulty with experiential-expressivism is its view that different religions 
are basically different expressions of common religious experiences (and hence the term 
experiential-expressivism). The variety of differences in these religious expressions in 
belief and practice makes it impossible to specify features of this allegedly common 
experience, thereby making such a claim, as he puts it, "logically and empirically 
vacuous.,)28 
With Paul Griffiths, a breakdown in theological discourse is the basic reason he calls 
for a renewed evaluation of the problematic of religious plurality. His own appraisal of 
the discussion in the Christian theology of religions is that it is largely sterile, because it 
ignores its purported objects: the world religions. In his rethinking of the problematic, he 
stresses the category of religious doctrine as a crucial but neglected aspect of Christian 
thinking about religious plurality. This attention to doctrine permits him to argue against 
pluralism's demand for radical revision or outright rejection of central doctrines. Their 
pragmatic reasons do not stand up to the uses to which doctrines are put in liturgy, 
'George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age 
(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984), 32. 
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catechesis, and evangelism, to say nothing of their central value as truth claims and as 
community rules. A key result is an argument that Christians should preserve both the 
semantic (cognitive content) and syntactical (regulative function) dimensions of these 
doctrines, and that they should govern Christian thinking about interreligious encounters. 
DiNoia advances Griffiths's observation about the theology of religions overlooking 
other religions by detailing how both inclusivism and pluralism deny genuine plurality. 
Inclusivism and pluralism fail not so much in their understandings of other religions as in 
faulty theological commitments. Where both inclusivists and pluralists go wrong is not in 
their investigations of other religions, but in a basic assumption about religions, namely, 
that at least some, including major religious communities like Christianity and Buddhism, 
are basically alike. In inclusivism, this is done by regarding other religions as imperfect 
forms of the absolute Christian religion; in pluralism, this is done by regarding all religions 
as finite responses to a single ineffable reality. Are these positions the result of empirical 
investigation? Postliberals argue that they could hardly be, given the evidence of basic and 
thoroughgoing differences between religions. Are they conclusions drawn by 
extrapolation from established doctrine and practice? Again, this cannot be the case. 
Inclusivism and pluralism both reject traditional exclusivist claims. The grounds for this 
rejection are often not doctrinal but pragmatic, especially the desire not to give offense to 
non-Christians. But it is precisely in this willingness to let theological reflection be guided 
by external reasons such as pragmatic concerns that the breakdown in theological 
discourse among inclusivists and pluralists becomes evident. 
These postliberal approaches give us a way to observe not only differences among 
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proposals, which are readily apparent, but diagnose an underlying disorder. This 
diagnosis, to be sure, is severe; the disorder is, as Tanner put it, of a very basic sort. In 
this view, the differences between different types of proposals are not simply deep but 
complex and wide-ranging. The problem, for instance, between exclusivism and pluralism 
is not simply that exclusivists are arrogant or that pluralists prize tolerance too highly; nor 
is the problem between exclusivism and inclusivism simply that exclusivists underestimate 
the desire of God to save the world or that inclusivists fail to recognize that saving faith 
explicitly results in confessing Jesus Christ. The problem is that although they may use the 
same terms—God, Christ, salvation, sin, grace—they may mean them in different, perhaps 
contradictory ways, and they may relate them to other concepts in different, perhaps 
contradictory ways. Christ, for instance, is for the exclusivist the sole mediator of 
salvation and the object of saving faith; apart from not only his saving work but also trust 
in him there is no hope of salvation. He is related to God as the only-begotten Son of the 
unseen Father. Apart from him there is no true knowledge of God and no salvation. For 
the pluralist, however, Christ is unique, but he is not necessarily the only mediator of 
salvation. He is related to God as one of a number of ways through which knowledge of 
God can be attained and from which salvation can come. 
The postliberal analysis does not suggest a way to overcome or reconcile these 
differences, but it does give Christian theologians a more adequate way to comprehend 
them. It is also helpful, because it suggests a way at least toward a more constructive 
discussion, and perhaps a way out. Basically this way would be to recognize and put to 
uses the contents and logic of Christian doctrine. I have tried to take this approach here 
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by returning the Lutheran approach to the theology of religions to the contents and 
especially the internal logic of the Lutheran Confessions. 
Constructively, the postliberal argument for a return to the Christian logic or grammar 
in its discussion of non-Christian religions is grounded well on two fronts. First, it tends 
to make sense of more of the Christian tradition. A major shortcoming with pluralism is 
the radical revision it calls for. As Griffiths pointed out, while they acknowledge that non-
Christian religions as well as the Christian religion must revise their self-understandings, 
they do not stress this sufficiently. Further, as Griffiths argues especially clearly, without 
detailed and pressing reasons to abandon classical doctrines, they must be maintained and 
their content and function applied. 
Second, it tends to take non-Christian religions more seriously. Lindbeck, Griffiths, 
and DiNoia all argue that different religious communities are distinct, not only in what 
they claim, teach, and practice, but in the logic or grammar of their thinking, speech and 
action. In this way, other religions are given the kind of respect, the respect of 
uniqueness, that inclusivism and pluralism both effectively deny. 
CONCLUSION 
The growing awareness of the situation of religious plurality has brought new issues 
and questions for Christian theologians to deal with, issues and questions that belong what 
is now called the "theology of religions." Much discussion in the field has centered on the 
question of salvation, especially whether non-Christian religions play a role in attaining 
salvation. More recent proposals, however, have been asking about different aspects of 
the Christian relationship with non-Christians. An important set of such proposals takes a 
postliberal approach. 
This study has examined some leading postliberal approaches to the theology of 
religions: those of Karl Barth, George Lindbeck, Paul Griffiths, and J. A. DiNoia. 
Postliberals work from a nonfoundationalist assumption that criticizes the typically modern 
desire for certain grounds upon which one can justify and test. Instead, they argue for the 
autonomy and uniqueness of the Christian community. Accordingly, they stress that the 
task of theology is not explanatory but descriptive. The theological task is not to explain 
Christian terms, concepts, beliefs, and practices in terms of a more widely accessible 
scheme, but a descriptive task that serves the community and follows its aims, logic, and 
concepts. 
To call Barth "postliberal" is in a sense anachronistic, but he has been a central 
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postliberal influence and his approach to the Christian interpretation of the concept of 
religion and of historical religions clearly anticipates both the nonfoundational and 
descriptive aspects of the postliberal approach. On the one hand, he challenged liberal 
Protestant theology for granting independent status to the concept of religion. No matter 
the result that obtained, he objected as untheological all attempts that treated the Christian 
revelation as an instance—even the most perfect instance—of a general concept of 
religion. On the other hand, he insisted that a theological interpretation of religion be 
worked out based on the Scriptures and within the scheme of Christian doctrine. This 
interpretation was based on the doctrine of the incarnation, which Barth applied as a guide 
for Christian thinking about the issue. On this basis, he concluded theologically that 
human religion is unbelief, and that the true religion—the Christian religion—was true 
only by virtue of Jesus Christ, and not for any immanent reason. 
The later postliberals—Lindbeck, Griffiths, and DiNoia—all shared with Barth 
concerns over liberal theology, particularly its tendency to foundationalism. One 
important result of their arguments is a strong argument for Christian uniqueness. The 
later postliberals, however, went a step further than Barth in recognizing not only the 
uniqueness of the Christian faith and community, but that other religious communities also 
had their own uniqueness. This affirmation of a genuine plurality of distinct religious 
communities challenges both inclusivism and pluralism for their desire to locate and 
emphasize features religions hold in common. 
A major challenge to the postliberal approach lies with questions of truth. The worry 
is that postliberalism leads inevitably to relativism and fideism. Postliberalism entails 
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neither. Postliberals affirm both claims to universal truth and the possibility of justifying 
them. They are, however, very doubtful about the possibility of the universal justification 
of claims to truth. This opposes a central characteristic of modern foundationalism, that 
truth claims should be justified on grounds that correspond to the scope of the claim. 
This study also attempted to appropriate the postliberal approach for a specifically 
Lutheran theology of religions. This appropriation was guided by the conviction that in its 
basic features the theology of the Lutheran Confessions, the acknowledged body of 
doctrine for the Lutheran community, converged with postliberal theology both in its 
nonfoundational and descriptive aspects. The postliberal conception of the theological 
task corresponds to its nonfoundational convictions. Instead of seeking to explain and 
justify religious statements and practices according to external, universally accessible 
grounds, postliberal theology seeks to explicate claims and beliefs according to the 
concepts and logic within the tradition. The aim is not to achieve a kind of closeout 
argument but to show the overall coherence of the tradition with itself and with features 
that might be held in common within whatever context one is arguing or conversing. Here 
I discussed questions about the knowledge of God, salvation of non-Christian, and 
Christian mission, guided by considerations on the distinction of Law and Gospel and in 
light of the postliberal approach. The attempt here was to show what the Lutheran logic 
required for responses to these questions. I concluded that true knowledge of God comes 
through faith in the Gospel, so that, although things about God may be known through 
outside the Christian community, what is true in this knowledge and a knowledge of his 
identity comes specifically in Jesus Christ and in the Gospel message of Christ. 
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Accordingly, salvation, while accomplished for all humankind, is offered in the preaching 
of the Gospel and secured through faith. In the same way, the Christian mission must be 
understood as constituted by this proclamation. Postliberal considerations, however, also 
shed light on this process, at least from a human viewpoint. Understanding the Christian 
faith involves the acquisition of certain skills and knowledge, something like learning a 
second language. These conclusions, to be sure, run directly counter to the prevailing 
inclusivist and pluralist trends in contemporary theology, but they proceed from and are 
consistent with the logic and contents of the Lutheran body of doctrine. 
Although this project is one in the field of the theology of religions, the most important 
conclusion is that the problem raised by the situation of religious plurality is an internal 
theological problem. I touched on this problem in the closing section of the last chapter, 
by recognizing that the results of the postliberal approach presented evidence of a basic 
breakdown in the field's discourse. However, I could do no more with it. Since I could 
go no further, I would like to sketch briefly one direction in which further study might go. 
It would begin not with the contemporary problem of religious plurality but with the 
state of theological discourse since the. Reformation. In particular it would focus on 
questions of sin and grace and of Law and Gospel. Behind this attention is a conviction 
that Christian views about, on the one hand, sin and God's wrath, and, on the other hand, 
grace and God's forgiveness, have undergone considerable changes and divergence since 
their Reformation formulations, so that for many theologians these are no longer central 
doctrines, especially with respect to the wrath of God. From the perspective of the 
Lutheran Confessions, this is a crucial problem, not least for the theology of religions, 
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where the question of salvation does become urgent. But if these are the results, what are 
the causes and what are related effects or consequences? They surely must be 
significant—but are they evident? These are the kinds of questions to which some 
answers I might hope to begin to find. The purpose would not be so much to refute a 
certain position that may be outstanding in the field, but to come to terms with an 
apparent inability to discuss deep theological differences between Christians, differences 
that come to the fore in the theology of religions. 
There are, of course, many other areas that about which the postliberal approach 
opens questions and raises issues. I want here to touch on two. One area is raised by the 
linguistic metaphor that is basic to the postliberal understanding. Especially for Lindbeck 
and his cultural-linguistic model, but also in the cases of Griffiths and DiNoia in their 
understandings of doctrine, there seems no place for Christian language that is the address 
of God. In other words, there seems no recognition that God speaks. This, of course, 
was central to Barth's theology, although it played no significant role in his discussion of 
religion. What is more important, however, the understanding that God speaks in Law 
and Gospel, to threaten and to promise, are central to Lutheran theology and constitutive 
of its practice. That is to say, without the preaching of Law and Gospel, there is 
repentance or forgiveness, and without them there is no knowledge of God in either his 
wrath or his grace, nor is there any Church. It remains to be seen how and to what extent 
the postliberal approach converges with this crucial dimension of Lutheranism. 
The second area concerns ecclesiology. The theology of religions has largely 
concentrated on a response to other religions and implications they hold for Christian 
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belief and practice. These implications do affect the church as a whole, but they do not 
address the church and its self-understanding as such. Accents like Lindbeck's, however, 
on intrasystematic truth, which stresses that what one says should correspond to other 
beliefs and to other aspects of life, and like Griffiths's on the catechetical and liturgical 
dimensions of doctrine, suggest an ecclesiological dimension to the theology of religions. 
Although the shape of this direction is indistinct, it can be seen that, because of its stress 
on Christian uniqueness and the particularity of all religious communities and because of 
its nonfoundationalism, the postliberal approach points in the direction of a sectarian 
understanding.' Whether others can or should follow down this way is an important 
question to address. 
'This is explicit in Lindbeck. See George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and 
Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1984), 126-128: cf. idem, "The 
Sectarian Future of the Church," in The God Experience, ed. Joseph Whelan (New York: Newman, 
1971), 226-243. 
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